Beyond Abaclat: Mass Claims in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Regulatory Governance for Sovereign Debt Restructuring

In: The Journal of World Investment & Trade
Author: Kei Nakajima1
View More View Less
  • 1 International Court of Justice, The Hague, The Netherlands
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution


Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):



Whereas investment treaties and arbitration rules do not usually provide any explicit provision for mass claims in investment treaty arbitration, the Tribunal in Abaclat v Argentina established a landmark jurisprudence that allowed a massive 60,000 investors to bundle and bring their claims before a single arbitral tribunal. However, its reasoning has been severely criticised for its conclusion, which apparently favours bondholder protection at the expense of financial policy leeway of defaulted sovereigns: investment arbitration may adversely affect the orderly implementation of sovereign debt restructuring. This article attempts to take a more balanced approach towards this issue, by focusing on regulatory aspects of arbitral proceedings. A ‘regulatory’ investment treaty arbitration will not only provide creditor protection by opening the door for mass claims, but will also show a deference to an orderly restructuring by closing the door if circumstances so require.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 608 113 2
Full Text Views 395 18 0
PDF Views & Downloads 173 47 0