The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A Subversive Power Against the IMF’s Conditionality?
In: The Journal of World Investment & TradeSearch for other papers by Aike I. Würdemann in
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Abstract
In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
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The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A Subversive Power Against the IMF’s Conditionality?
In: The Journal of World Investment & TradeSearch for other papers by Aike I. Würdemann in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 4298 | 497 | 32 |
| Full Text Views | 517 | 26 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 426 | 69 | 3 |