1AmcoAsiaCorp.andothersv.Republico[Il1dO/lesia, IcsW Case No. Arb/81/1, Decision of the first AdHoc Committee of 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Rep. 509 (1993); K16cktierIlldustrie-AlIlagmGmbHandothersv.UtiitedRepublicofCameroollandother, Icsin Case No. ARIJ/81/2, Decision of the first AdHoc Committee of 3 May 1985, 2 Icsid Rep. 95 (1994); MaritinreIntenrationalNomineesEstablishmentv.RepublicofGuinea, ICSID Case No. ARIJ/84/4, Decision of the AdHoc Committee of22 December 1989, 4 ICSID Rep. 79 (1997); WenaHotelsLtdv.ArabRepublicof Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARI3/98/4, Decision of the AdHoc Committee of 5 February 2002, 41 I.L.M. 933(2002); Vivendiv.ArgentineRepnblic, ICSID Case No. AKti/97/3, Decision of the AdHoc Committee of 3 July 2002, 41 LL.M. 1135 (2002). ZAmcoAsia, ibid., at �56.
3 See, in particular, C.F. Amerasinghe, Interpretationof Article25(2)(b)of theIcsiDConvention, in R. Lillich and C. Brower (eds.), International Arbitrationilltlie2lstCetitiiry:TowardsjlldicializatiollandUlli/anllity? Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, New York, 1994, p. 223; A. Asouzu, AReviewandCritiqueof ArbitralAwardsonArticle25(2}(b)of theICSIDConvention, 3 J. W.I 3, June 2002, pp. 397-454; A. Broches, TheConventionontheSettlementof InvestmentDisputesbetweenStatesandNationalsof OtherStates, 136 Renleil des Cours de 1'Acadcrnie de Droit International de La Haye 331; C. Schreuer, ThelcsidConvention,AConurrerrtary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2001, pp. 82-344; C. B. Lamm, Jurisdictionof theInternationalCentre forSettlementof InvestmentDisputes, 6 Icsio Rev. 462 (1991); K. Nathan, SubmissionstotheInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputesinBreachof theConvention, 12 Journal of International Arbitration 27 (1995); I. Shihata and A. Parra, TlreExperienceoftheInternationalCefitrefortheSettlementof InvestmentDisputes, 14 Icsii) Rev. 299 (1999); W.M. Tupman, CaseStudiesinthe jurisdictiolloftlieInternationalCentre forSettlementof InvestmentDispiites, 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 813 (1986). 4 From a purely informative point of view, it is interesting to note that in a matter unrelated to investments the German Supreme Court recently took the exact opposite view by declaring that an award decliningjurisdiction cannot be challenged at all for want of a corresponding ground of annulment in the German law on arbitration, which is derived from the Unutrai. Model Law (Ben. Case III ZB 44/01 of 6 June 2002, published in (2003) Schieds VZ (German Arbitration Journal) 39). Serious doubts have been raised, with reason, as to the correctness of this decision (see S. Kr6fl, RecourseagainstNegativeDecisionson Jurisdiction, 20 Arbitration International 55 (2004), at 61-72). 5 see, in support of this position, Schreuer, supra, footnote 3, pp. 911-913; D.D. Caron, ReputationandRealityintheIcsiDAnnulmentProcess:UnderstandingtheDistinctionBetweenAnnulmentandAppeal, 7 ICSID Rev. 21; and, for the opposite point of view, P. Pinsolle, TheAnnulmentofIcstoArbitralAwards, 1 J.W.I. 1, July 2000, pp.243-257.
6 Pinsolle, ibid., at pp. 253-255. ChampionTradingCo.andothersv.ArabRepublicof Egypt, Icsid Case No. ARB/02/9.
8 These decisions have been widely commented upon. See, for commentaries on the Decision of the AdHoc Committee of3 May 1985 in the Klockner case, in particular: A. Broches, ObservationsontheFinalityOFICSID Auards, 6 Icsin Rev. 321 (1991); M. Reisman, RepairinAIcsid's ControlSystem:SomeCommentsonAronBroches'ObservationontheFinalityof ICSIDAwards, 7 ICSID Rev. 196 (1992); A. Broches, OntheFinality4 Awards:AReplytoMichaelReisman, 8 ICSID Rev. 92 (1993); G. Delaume, The Finalityof ArbitrationInvolving States:RecentDevelopments, 5 Arbitration International 21 (1989); Caron, supra, footnote 5; A. Rcdfeni, IcsID--Losil1gitsAppeal? 3 Arbitration International 98 (1987); E. Gaillard, ChroniquedesSentencesClaDt, 114 Journal du Droit International 184 (1987). See, for a commentary on the Decision of the AdHoc Committee of 3 July 2002 in the Vivendi case, E. Gaillard, ChroniquedesSentencesC1AD1, 130 Journal du Droit International 230 (2002). ''Klöckl1er,supra, footnote 1, at §52.
111Vivcndi,supra, footnote 1, at �86. 11 "To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established principle of international law embodied in the C:ourt's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent" (International Court ofJustice, Caseof theMonetaryColdRenumedfromRomein1943, Rec. 1954, p. 32); "L.a jnridictiorrdelaCoitr dependdelaiolotit�desParties" (Permanent Court of International Justice, AffziredesDroitsdesmilloritésenHauteSilésiepolollaise, Series A, No. 15, p. 22).
tz See, for example, Article 190, al. 2 of the Swiss Loi federale sur le droit international privc: "Lasentenceestdefinitivedessacommunication.Elleliepetitetreattaqueeque :(...)b. Lorsqueletribunals'estdedareatortcompetentouincompetent." " �3 See Broches, Observations,supra, footnote 8, pp. 358-360; Schreuer, supra, footnote 3, pp. 935 and 936-943; P. Kahn, LecontrolsdessentencesarbitralesrenduespartinTribunalCIRDI,Lajuridictionintemationalepemranente, Society française de droit international, Colloquc de Lyon, 1986, p. 363. 14 See D. Thompson, TheKlicknerv.CameroonAppeal,ANoteonJurisdiction, 3 Journal of International Arbitration 93 (1986); B. Pirrwitz, AnnulmentofArbitralAwardsunder Article52qftiteWashingtonConventionontheSettlementof InvestmentDisputesBetweenStatesandNationalsof OtherStates, 23 Texas International Law Journal 73 (1988). rs See E. Gaillard, C.LR.D.l.Chroniquedessentencesarbitrales, 114 Journal du Droit International 135 (1987), at 187. 16 See ICSID, DocumentsConcerningtheOriginandFormulationof theConventionontheSettlementof InvestmentDisputesbetween.StatesandNationalsof OtherStates, Vol. II, pp. 271, 423 and 850-851. 17 See Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entitled "Supplementary means of interpretation", which states: "Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
�" See Schreuer, supra, footnote 3, p. 937: "Where there is no jurisdiction, the term absence of powers' would be more appropriate." 19 See T. Clay, L'arbitre, Dalloz, Paris, 2001; P. Thcry, POlliJoir juridicti01111eletcompetence(etudededroitilltematiollal privé), these, Paris II, unpublished.