1Guatemala — Anti-DumpingInvestigationRegardingPortlandCementfromMexico(Gllatemala-Cementi), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, para. 64. The system's rules and procedures in the Understanding onRulesandProceduresGoverningtheSettlementof Displltes (Dsu) apply to disputes arising under its "covered agreements", including the WTO Agreement. The covered agreements have their own "special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement" which prevail to the extent they are different from those in the Dsu. Unless otherwise agreed, disputes in relation to the applicability of these rules and procedures will be determined by the Chairman of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in consultation with the parties. Procedural uncertainty and conflict may weaken and undermine the system (see for instance, WTO Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia-SubsidiesProvidedtoProducersandExportersofAutomotiveLeather(Australia-AutomotiveLoathern), WT/DS126/RW, adopted 11 February 2000, as to the conflict between recommendations in Article 4.7 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Sctn Agreement), to withdraw a "prohibited subsidy" without delay, and Article 19.1 of the Dsu, to bring an inconsistent measure into conformity). The W ro's dispute settlement regime will be better served with uniform rules and procedures. 2 This was recently acknowledged by the Consultative Board to the W ro, established in June 2003 by the WTO's Director-General to prepare a report "on how to institutionally strengthen and equip the WTO to respond effectively to future economic challenges brought about by an increasingly integrated global economy". See its Report (hereafter Consultative Board Report), pages 49-50; available on the WTO Website, at: W7o DisputeSettlementatTen:Evolution,ExperiencesandEvaluation, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2005, pp. 27-61, at 35, gives a succinct summary of the academic view. 3 Complaints can be found on the WTO Website, at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispLl_e/ dispu_status_e.htm>; and adoption rates at: . 4 William J. Davey, TheWTODisputeSettlementSystem:TheFirstTenYears, Joumal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, 17-50, at 24. See also Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, PowerPlays&CapacityConstraints:TheSelectionofDefendantsinWTODisputes, available at: ; and Christina L. Davis and Sarah B. Beniico, WhoFilea?DevelopingCountryParticipationinWtoAdjudication, available at:
� WTO Agreement, Preamble. The WTO presently has 149 Members; see the WTO Website, at: . Statistics for developing and least developed countries are available at: ; and at: Remedies intheWroLegalSystems;BetweenaRockandaHard1'lace, E.J.LL., Vol. 11, 2000, 763-813, at 806. 1 Ibid., at 811.
"'japati-TaxesonAlcoholicBeveragesU,'pall-AlcoholicBeverages11), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, at 15. See also Jide Nzelibe, TheCredibilityImperative:TIlePoliticnlDynamicsof RetaliationintheWorldTradeO(Rallisatioll'sDisputeResolution Mechanism, p. 35, available at: www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/pubbclaw/index.html,; Chi Carmody, RemediesandConformityundertheW7oAgreement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, 307-329, at 309; and Heinz Hauser and Alexander Roitinger, AReneqotiationPerspectiveonTransatlanticDisputes, p. 10; available at: de jure discrimination in relation to Members' "most-favoured-nation"(MFN) and "national treatment" (NT) obligations. Although complete and therefore inflexible in a priniafacie sense, flexibility can be accommodated via recourse to the "escape" and "renegotiation" provisions in the WTO Agreements-thc safeguards provisions in Article XIX and the renegotiation provisions in Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Further, there are also exceptions to the MFN and NT obligations. See Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, StillHazyqfterAllTheseYears:T6eInterpretation ofNationnlTreahnentintheGATT/WTOCase-InwonTaxDiscrimination, E.J.I.L., Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, 39-69, at 54. 11 Nzelibe, ibid.; Cannody, ibid.; and Wilfred J. Ethier, PunishmentsandDisputeSettlementinTradeAgreements, pp. 4-5; available at: `www.bwl.uni-kiel.de/econ/ES-Old/ES-Papers/ethier.pdf. '= Ethier, ibid. 13 Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, TheEconomicStructurec?frenegotiatiotiandDisputeResolutionintheWorldTradeOrganisation, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179 (2002). 14 Nzelibe, supra, footnote 10, at 35. 15 Specific performance may be a remedy for those parts of the contract considered complete (see supra, footnote 10); however, recourse to "escape" or "renegotiation" provisions, or the MFN or NT "exceptions", may make this difficult. 16 Carmody, supra, footnote 10, at 309 and 329; andHauserandRoitinger,supra, footnote 10.
17 Carmody, ibid. �s Japatl-Alw¡'olicBeveragesII,supra, footnote 10, at 31. 19 Dsu, Article 19.1. 20 Ibid., Article 21.1. 1. 21 Ibid., Article 21.3. 22 Carmody, supra, footnote 10, at 328; and Mavroidis, supra, footnote 8, at 793. 23 Ibid. za Carmody, ibid., at 328. 25 Ibid., at 322. 21 Ibid., at 309 and 328. 27 As contemplated in Article 19.1 of the Dsu. '8 Dsu, Article 3.10. Cannody observes that WTO panels have made suggestions in several cases, only to have these watered down by the Appellate Body, presumably in due deference to sovereignty: see Cannody, supra, footnote 10, at 318.
z9UnitedStates-TaxTreatmentfor"ForeignSalesCorporations"(U.S.-F.S.C), Report of the Panel, WT/DS108/ARB, circulated 30 August 2002, para. 6.9, footnote 72. See also Robert E. Hudec, BroadeninqtheScopeof RemediesinWTODisputeSettlement, p. 22, available at: supra, footnote 10, at 309. )1) WTO Agreement, Article XVI.4. 4. This is achieved via retaliation (better described as the suspension of concessions or other obligations to the wrongdoer), subject to such retaliation being "equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment": Dsu, Article 22.4. See also Mavroidis, supra, footnote 8, at 807; Nzelibe, supra, footnote 10, at 8-14; and Wilfred J. Ethier, IntellectualPropertyRightsandDisputesSettlementintheWorldTradeOrganisation, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2004, 449-457. 12 See ChorzowFactories, 1929 P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 8, 4 at . See also Mavroidis, supra, footnote 8; and the International Law Commission's DraftArticlesontheResponsibilityofStatesfarInternationallyWrongfulActs, adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, held in 2001 (Chapter u "Reparation for Injury"); available at: . The WTO Panel in Australia-AutornotiveLeatherII,supra, footnote 1, concluded that the system provides for retrospective remedies, a decision which, although the subject of intense criticism (see Gavin Goh and Andreas R. Ziegler, RetrospectiveRemediesintheWTOAfterAutomotiveLeather, J.LE.L., Vol. 6, No. 3, 2003, 545-564), has also found support (see Mavroidis, supra, footnote 8, at 790). UnitedStates-StandardsforReformulatedandConventionalGasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, at 17. 34 Cannody, supra, footnote 10, at 328. 35 Mavroidis, supra, footnote 8, at 790 and 807; and Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Brock, FinancialCompensationintheW't'o:ImprovingRemediesof WTODisputeSettlement, J.I.E.L., Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, 101-12G, at 103. This leads to "buy outs" by powerful Members; see Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 54. 36 See the views expressed by Malaysia, India and Thailand during a Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body in January 2004. The minutes of that meeting (W ro Doc. TN/DS/M/15) are available at: supra, footnote 2, at 54.
37 Dsu, Article 22. 3� Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 54. 3" See Bronckers and van den Broek, supra, footnote 35, at 104; and James McCall Smith, WTODisputeSettlement:ThePolitiaof ProcedureinAppellateBodyRulings, World Trade Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003, 65-100, at 76. 4IJ See Kylie Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert W. Staiger, TheCase forTradableRemediesinW1'oDisputeSettlement, Tables 1 to 4; available at: . 41 Nzclibc, supra, footnote 10, at 2-3. 4= See Donald McRae, WhatistheFufureofWTODisputeSettlement? Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004, 3-21, at 11. ;3UnitedStates-DefinitiveSafeguardMeasuresonImportsof CertainSteelProducts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS248/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003.
;a Joost Pauwelyn, W'roVictoryonStrelHidesDeficiencies; available at: �www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ Pauwelynl.php#4�. The U.S. Administration also gained much-needed support from the steel lobby in matters such as fast-track authority from Congress to assist in concluding other trade agreements (such as the Central America Free Trade Agreement). �sUnitedStates-SafeguardMeasuresonImportsofFresh,ChilledorFrozenLambMeatfromNew7ealatidandAustralia, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS177/AB/R and WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001. 4� EuropeanCornmunities-Regime fortheImportation,SaleandDistributiono_fBananas(EC-Ballmras1II), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997. 47 See Nzelibe, supra, footnote 10, at 11-13, 26-28 and 34.
4<EuropeanCOInllllllÚties-RegilllefortheImportation,SaleanrlDistributionof Banmlas-Rec"IIrsetoArbitrationbytheEuropeanCommunitiesunderArticle22.6 oftHeDSL', Report of the Panel, W'I'/DS27/ARn/Ecu, circulated 24 March 2000, at para. 177. 11 Liz Harper, CfrnllenyesforPoorerNationsattheW't'o, September 2003� available at: `www.pbs.org/ ncwshour/bb/international/wto/case_study.htnih. 5o Nzelibe, supra, footnote 10, at 28. Nzelibc also suggests at 26-27 that the Ecuadorian experience may not be indicative of how other developing countries may react when faced with these circumstances, as they could have "relatively strong protectionist audiences" making "retaliation a politically desirable option". However, that, with respect, does not overcome the market-power hurdle. 31 Namely, whether a "compliance panel" must first review any implementation measures taken as a precondition to seeking authorization for retaliation, which the EU favours-with the ambiguity not there if no implementation attempt has been made. 52 The sequencing issue was first evident in EC-BananasIll,supra, footnote 46. The banana dispute was less about bananas and more about the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and its ability to quickly and fairly settle complex disputes; see Michelle M. Mulvena, HasTlreUVTOGoneBananas?Holi'theBananaDisputehastestedtheW1oDisputeSettlementMechanism; available at: �www.iicsi.edu/iiitljoiinial/vol7/vol72001 _pgl 77.pdf,. 3.1 Notable bilateral agreements have been achieved between: (1) the United States and Malaysia in UnitedStates-ImportProhibitionqfCertainShrimpandShrimpProducts(U.S.— Shrimp), WT/DS58; see Understanding between Malaysia and the United States Regarding Possible Proceedings under Articles 21 and 22 of the Dsu, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/16, available at: ; (2) Canada and Brazil in Canada--MeasllresA1fectill<�theExportofCii'ilianAircraft(ClIlada-Aircra/Ï), WT/DS70; see WTO Doc. WT/DS70/9, available at: U.S.-P.S.C., supra, footnote 29; see the Understanding between the European Communities and the United States Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the Dsu and Article 4 of the Sc:n�t Agreement, WTO Doc. W1'/DS108/12, available at: .docsonlme.wto.org/nDFDocuments/t/W T/DS/108-12.doc; (4) Australia and Canada in Australia-MeasuresA(�ectingIlllportatiollof Salmon, WT/DS18; and (5) the EC and India in EuropeanCOlllllnlllities-Allti-DulllpingDutiesOllIniportsof Cotton-typeBerlLillW'/yOIllIndia, WT/DS141.
34 Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 53. The Balas Text also addresses sequencing (see Balas Text, infm, footnote 100). e5 The United States did not favour sequencing before U.S.-F.S.C.,supra, footnote 29. Rather, it pressed for strengthening the enforcement regime of the W'l'o's dispute settlement procedures, favouring immediate retaliation and then "carousel retaliation" (via its Carousel Retaliation Act of 1999, designed to periodically rotate the list of products subject to retaliation to maximize their retaliatory effect). It did this on the back of victory in several high profile cases: EC-HoYll/ol/es,infra, footnote 75; E(.'-L3arranas ur,supra, footnote 46; C<1II<1d,¡-Periodicals, W'I'/DS31; and India-C'ntenn(U.S.), WT/DS50. Its position on sequencing changed following its defeat in US.-F.S.c., mmoured to be in exchange for backing down on carousel retaliation, although the legislative provisions remain. See Zinunerman, supra, footnote 2, at 41-44. The Balas Text (infra, footnote 100) does not contemplate the exclusion of carousel retaliation; see Heinz Hauser and Thomas A. Zimmenman, TlreChallengeofR�/(>rl/lil1gsheWToDisputeSettlementUnderstanding, Intereconomics-Review of European Economic Policy, Vol. 38, No. 5, September/October 2003, 241-245, at 242. 56 Davey, supra, footnote 4, at 49. Delays are further compounded by the AB hearing compliance appeals, even though it is not specifically authorized to do so. There is merit in discontinuing this practice, especially if panels have a greater degree of pennanency. 5� Hudcc, supra, footnote 29, at 27. Ss Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 54. 51 See Balas Text (� footnote 100) regarding the proposed amendment to Article 22 of the Dsu.
I" See Dsu, Articles 4.10, 8.10, 12.11, 21.2, 21.7 and 21.8. 11 See the Website of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, at: . 12UnitedStates-TransitionalSafeguardsMeasure onComberlCottonYam fromPakistan, Report of the Appellate Body,WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 2001. 63India-Anti-DumpingMeasureonBatteries fromBangladesh, WT/DS306. No panel has been established nor settlement notified in relation to this dispute. 64 Hudec, supra, footnote 29, at 27. fi' Mary E. Footer, DevelopingCountryPracticeintheMatterofWTODisputeSettlement, 35 J.W.T. 1, Febniary 2001, 55-98, at 65. fifi The trade remedies area is generally considered to embrace the WTO Agreements on Anti-Dumping Measures, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards and Rules of Origin, where the importing Member is permitted to impose discriminatory measures after certain procedures are observed, but these are prone to self- interest for protectionist or political purposes. Disputes arising under these Agreements have accounted for 53 per cent of cases decided under the WTO's dispute settlement system over the last four or five years. See Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 55-56; and Carmody, supra, footnote 10, at 320-321.
67 McRae, supra, footnote 42, at 16. 6H Id. 69 Id. See generally Pauwelyn, supra, footnote 44. Interestingly, the Government Accountability Office, an independent and nonpartisan organization, commonly known as the U.S. Congress' investigative arm or Congressional watchdog, states on its Website that "of the legal experts GAO consulted, a majority concluded that the WTO has properly applied standards of review and correctly ruled on major trade remedy issues" and that "the experts almost unanimously agreed that the WTO was not treating the United States any differently than other members": . Others have suggested that the "AB has not articulated any coherent doctrine as to when they may be allowable": Alan O. Sykes, T7ieSafeguardsMess:ACritiqueofWTO Jurisprudeuœ; available at: supra, footnote 42, at 16. 71 Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 55-56. '2 Ibid., at 54-55.
'3UnitedStates-ContinuedDumpingandSubsidyOffsetActof2000(U.S.-O�(jsetAct(ByrdAmendment)), WT/DS217 and WT/DS234. "UnitedStates-Anti-DumpingActof1916, WT/DS136; and UnitedStates-Anti-DumpingActof1916(Japan), WT/DS162. 75EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresConcerningMeatandMeatProduces(Hormones)(EC-Honnones), WT/DS26; and EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresConcerningMeatandMeatProducts(Hormones)(Canada), WT/DS48. '6Brazil-ExportFinancingProgramme forAircraft, WT/DS46; and Canada-Airaaft, WT/DS70. " U.S.-F.S.C, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000; and UnitedStates-TaxTreatmetitforForeignSalesCorporation-RecoursetoArticle21.5oftheDsubytheEuropeanCommunities, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002. �aU.S.-OffsetAct(ByrdAmendment), Report ofthe Appellate Body, WT/DS217/AB/R and WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003. 79 Centre For Trade Policy Studies, WTOAuthorizesRetaliationagainstByrdAmendmentbutRenewedCommitmenttotheRules,notSanctions,isNeeded, 31 August 2004; available at: . KOEC-Hormones, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998.
"'UnitedStates&Canada-ContinuedSuspensionofObligationsintheEC-HormollesDispute, WT/DS320 and WT/DS321. ez WTO, RegistrationBegins forPublicHearingsof"ContinuedsuspensionofobligationsintheEC-horm"'les"DisputePanels12-15September2005inGeneva, 12 August 2005; available at: . 11 See McRae, supra, footnote 42, at 10-14, and 17-18; compare with McCall Smith, supra, footnote 39, at 88. 84 McRae, ibid., at 11. 85 See Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 58. sb Ibid. (the Consultative Board also favours more transparency); and McRae, supra, footnote 42, at 10-12 and 16-18. 87 Zimmerman, supra, footnote 2, at 42—43. Also, the United States failed to have increased transparency included in the Balas Text (see infra, footnote 100).
88 McRae, supra, footnote 42, at 17. N9 U.S.-Shrimp, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 105-108. 9o EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresAffectingAsbestosandAsbestos-ContainingProducts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, paras. 52-58. '11 See McRae, supra, footnote 42, at 12; and Petros C. Mavroidis, AmicusCuriaeBriefsBeforetheW7'o:MuchAdoAboutNothing, at 9-10; available at: supra, footnote 2, at 57-58. y3 Ibid., at 53. �^ See Mary Footer and Saman Zia-Zarifi, CaseNote:EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresAffectingAsbestosandAsbestos-ContainingProducts, p. 142; available at:
95 EnropeanCummunities-MeasnresAfl�ctii�qtheApprovalandMarketingofBiotechProducts, WT/DS291, WT/DS292 and WT/DS293. There are suggestions that the EC has caved in to some extent and relaxed its moratorium. 11 Dsu, Articles 4, 5 and 25. y� Steve Chamovitz, WHJDisputeSettlement asa ModelforInternatiormlGOf'ema//œ; available at: supra, footnote 42, at 9-10. W Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 57.
100 One hopes that the Special Session of the W ro's Dispute Settlement Body reaches some meaningful consensus on reform. The Session has a useful starting point in the Balas Text, the compromise text prepared by its Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, which has been supplemented with the views expressed by the WTO's Consultative Board; see Woo Doc. TN/DS/9. 101 The AB has been conscious of the need to guard against claims ofjudicial activism. See, for instance, Goh and Ziegler, supra, footnote 32, at 563; and UnitedStates-ImportMeasuresonCertaillProducts fromtheEuropeanCommunities, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS65/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 92. 102 See, for instance, those favouring comprehensive reform (Bronckers and van den Broek, supra, footnote 35; and Hudec, suyra, footnote 29) and those against (Carniody, supra, footnote 10; and Nzelibe, suyra, footnote 10).
tos Davey, supra, footnote 4, at 25; John H. Jackson, TheRoleandEffectivenessof theWTODisputeSettlementMechanism, p. 204; available at: supra, footnote 2, at 38-40 and 52-53. See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, TensionsbetweentheDisputeSettlementProcessandtheDiplomaticandTreatyMakinqActivitiesoftheWTO, World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, 301-308. This was also recognized by three former Directors-General of the GATT/WTO (Messrs Dunkel, Sutherland and Ruggiero), who issued ajoint statement in February 2001 relevantly stating: "Our concern is that the dispute settlement system is being used as a means of filling out gaps in the WTO system; first, where rules and disciplines have not been put in place by its member governments or, second, are the subject of differences of interpretation. In other words, there is an excessive resort to litigation as a substitute for negotiation. This trend is dangerous in itself. The obligations which WTO members assume are properly for the member governments themselves to negotiate. The issue is still more concerning given certain public perceptions that the process of dispute settlement in the WTO is over-secret and over-powerful. We believe that all WTO members but the EU and US in particular-must exercise the utmost restraint in their recourse to the dispute settlement system. Litigation in trade matters is not, and must not become, an automatic alternative to negotiation." See WTO, jointStatementontheMultilateralTradingSystem; available at: supra, footnote 2, at 54-57).
107 There are presently 170 regional trade agreements in force, with this expected to rise to 300 by the end of 2005; see the W ro's Website, at: (note that as of 15 February 2006, this information on the Website had not been updated). By way of example, the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 2005, has its own dispute resolution regime (see Chapter 2, Section 13 "Dispute Settlement Proceedings"). Relevantly, where a dispute concerning any matter arises under the FTA and another trade agrecment to which both Parties are party, including the WTO Agreement, and the complainant opts for the FTA's regime, it will be precluded from having recourse to the WTO system (Australia-United States FTA, Article 21.4). 108 William Davey, SupportingtheWroDisputeSettlementSystem, 34 J.W.T. 1, February 2000, 167-170, at 167. 10. Consultative Board Report, supra, footnote 2, at 81-83. See also Jackson, supra, footnote 103, at 206-207. 110 Consultative Board Report, ibid., at 49. 111 Jackson, supra, footnote 103, at 200-201. The Consultative Board suggests that an "impartial special expert group" of the DSB can do this; see their Report, ibid., at 56.
Anderson, K., PeculiaritiesofRetaliationinWTODispute Settlement, World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002,123-134.
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement; available at:
Bagwell, K., P.C. Mavroidis and R.W. Staiger, The Case for TradableRemediesinWTODisputeSettlement; available at: ‹www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/gta/tradeable_remedies.pdf›.
Bronckers, M. and N. van den Broek, FinancialCompensation in the WTO:Improving RemediesofWTODisputeSettlement, J.I.E.L., Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, 101-126.
Carmody, C., Remediesand Conformity under theWTOAgreement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, 307-329.
Centre For Trade Policy Studies, WTO AuthorizesRetaliationagainstByrdAmendmentbut RenewedCommitment to theRules, notSanctions,IsNeeded, 31 August 2004; available at: ‹www.freetrade.org/ new/new2004.html›.
Charnovitz, S., WTODisputeSettlement as aModel for International Governance; available at:
Idem,The WTO'sProblematic"LastResort" AgainstNoncompliance; available at: ‹www.worldtradelaw.net/ articles/charnovitzlastresort.pdf›.
Davey, W.J., TheWTODisputeSettlement System, Journal of International Economic Law, 2000, 15-18.
Idem, Supporting the WTODisputeSettlement System, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 34, No. 1, February 2000, 167―170.
Idem,The WTODisputeSettlement System: TheFirstTen Years, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, 17-50.
Davis, C.L. and S.B. Bcnneo, WhoFiles? DevelopingCountryParticipationin WTO Adjudication; available at: ‹www.wisc.edu/wage/WTO/Papers/Davis.pdf›.
Dunoff, J.L., TheMisguided DebateoverNGOParticipation at the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, 1998, 433-456.
Ehlermann, C-D., TensionsbetweentheDisputeSettlementProcessand theDiplomaticand TreatyMakingActivities of theWTO, World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, 301-308.
Ethier, W.J., PunishmentsandDisputeSettlement in Trade Agreements; available at:
Idem,IntellectualProperty RightsandDisputeSettlement in the World Trade Organisation, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2004, 449-457.
Footer, M.E., Developing CountryPractice intheMatterofWTODisputeSettlement, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2001, 55-98.
Footer, M. and S. Zia-Zarifi, CaseNote: EuropeanCommunities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts; available at: ‹www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/footerasbestos.pdf›.
Gabilondo, L.P.J., DevelopingCountries in the WTODisputeSettlementProcedures, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2001, 483-488.
Ginsburg, T., InternationalJudicialLawmaking; available at:
Goh, G. and A.R. Ziegler, Retrospective Remediesin theWTOAfter AutomotiveLeather, J.I.E.L., Vol. 6, No. 3, 2003, 545-564.
Guzman, A. and B. Simmons, Power Plays &Capacity Constraints: The Selection ofDefendantsin WTODisputes; available at: ‹repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=bple›.
Harper, L.,Challenges forPoorer Nationsat the WTO, September 2003; available at
Hauser, H. and A. Roitinger, ARenegotiation Perspectiveon TransatlanticDisputes; available at: ‹www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2002/dp0209hauser_roitinger_ganz.pdf›.
Hauser, H. and T.A. Zimmerman, The Challenge ofReformingthe WTODisputeSettlement Understanding, Intereconomics-Review of European Economic Policy, Vol. 38, No. 5, September/October 2003, 241―245.
Horn, H. and P.C. Mavroidis, StillHazyafter All These Years: TheInterpretationofNationalTreatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on TaxDiscrimination, E.J.I.L., Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, 39-69.
Hudec, R.E., Broadeningthe Scope ofRemedies inWTODisputeSettlement; available at: ‹www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf›.
International Law Commission, DraftArticles on theResponsibilityof States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; available at: ‹www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibility_articles(e).pdf# pagemode=bookmarks›.
Jackson, J.H., TheWTODisputeSettlementUnderstanding—Misunderstandingson theNatureof theLegalObligation, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, Issue 1, January 1997, 60―64.
Idem,TheRoleandEffectivenessof the WTODisputeSettlementMechanism; available at: ‹muse.jhu.edu/ demo/brookings_trade_forum/v2000/2000.1jackson.pdf›.
Lacarte-Muro, J. and P. Gappah, DevelopingCountries and the WTOLegalandDisputeSettlement System: A View from theBench, Journal of International Economic Law, 2000, 395-401.
Mavroidis, P.C., Remedies in the WTOLegalSystem:Betweena Rockand aHard Place, E.J.I.L., Vol. 11, 2000,763-813.
Idem, AmicusCuriaeBriefs Beforethe WTO:MuchAdoAbout Nothing; available at: ‹www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010201.rtf›.