Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State

in The Journal of World Investment & Trade
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

The Journal of World Investment & Trade

Law • Economics • Politics

References

I See e.g.: Aa1'tc�E 13 Energy Charter Treaty: ExpRoPRIATTON (1 ) Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriatcd or subjcctcd to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as "Expropriation") except where such Expropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out under due process of law; and (d) accompanicd by the payment ofprompt, adequate and effective compensation. Treaty betwecii United States of America and the Argentinc 1W public concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment (entered into force 20 October 1994): Article IV 1. Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ('expropriation-) except for a public purpose; in a non- discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and the general priticiples of treatrnent provided for in Article n (2) Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment inunediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; bc paid without delay; include interest at a cornmercially reasonable rate &om the date of expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of cxchangc on the date of expropriation. (available at: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/üa/docs/bits/argentina us.pd�.

2 See on this issue: T. Waelde/A. Kolo, Enviromnental Rcgulation, Investment Protection and 'Regulatory Taking' in International Law, 50 ICLQ 2001, 811-848; Y. Nouvel, Lcs mcsures cquivalent a une expropriation dans la pratique rccente des tribunaux arbitraux, 106 RGDIP 2002, 79-101; V. Lowc, Rcgulation or Expropriation?, 55 Current Legal Problems 2002, 447-466; R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments? 11 NEU Environmental Law Journal, 2003, 64-93; C. Yannacca-Small, "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law, in: OECD (eds), International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape. A Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives, 2003, 43-72; A. Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 4 TIJM - Issue #04 July 2007. 3 See e.g.: Article XII 2 (b) Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of thc Pcople's Republic of China on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments of 11 July 1988, Australian Treaty Scrics 1988, No. 14. The casc Plama v. Bulqarin can serve as example for the decision of an arbitral tribunal concerning a BIT (Bulgaria/Cyprus Brr) with a dispute settlement clause providing jurisdiction only with regard to the amount of compensation in case of an expropriation. The tribunal denied the possibility to import jurisdiction for other protection standards via a most favoured nation clause. Therefore, it had jurisdiction only with regard to expropriation. (Plama v. Bulgarin, (Energy Charter Trcaty), Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/plamavbulgaria.pdf, paras. 186, 207, 223, 227). In the case of EnCana v. Earador the tribunal had jurisdiction with regard to tax measures only in case of an expropriation but not in cases of violations of other protection standards. (EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, (Canada/Ecuador BiT), Award, 3 February 2006, 12 ICSID Reports 427, paras. 149, 166-168). In the same manner, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in Anc v. Hunyary was limited to expropriation. The BIT contained other protection standards like "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" but did not provide for jurisdiction ofan international arbitral tribunal with regard to these standards. (Anc A�iliate Limited and ADC & Aonte Management Limited v. Repllblic of Hungary, (Cyprus/Hungary BIT), Award of 2 October 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf, para. 295).

See e.g. Article I1 ofthe Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Covered Risks. 5 C. Schrcuer / U. Kricbaurn, The Concept ofProperty in Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in S. Breitenmoser et al. (eds), Liber Amiconum Luzius Wildhaber, Human Rights Democracy and the Rule of Law, 2007, 743-762.

6 The Pcij held that: The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which secms to be established by international practice and in particular by decision of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. (Pcij, Case Concerning the Pactary at Chorz6w (Indemnity), Judgment No. 13, 1928 Pcij, Series A No. 17, Order, 13 September 1928, p. 47). See, I. Marboe, Compensation and Damages in International Law, The Limits of "Fair Market Value", 7 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2006, p. 732 et seq.

7 see e.g.: I. Brownlie, Principies of I'ublic International Law6, 2003, p. 209. See e.g.: Tecnicas .4ledionmbientales Tecllled, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134, para. 119. Iran-US Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), Sedro, Inc. v. Natinnal Iranian Oil Company, et al, Interlocutory Award No. 1,i 55-129-3, 28 October 1985, 9 Iusctr 248, p. 275: "It is also an accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fidc 'regulation' within the accepted police power of states." See e.g.: T. Waclde/A. Kolo, Environtncntal Regulation. Investment Protection and 'Regulatory Taking' in International Law, 50 Ic:ucz 2001, 811, p. 839. 'J See e.g.: ibid. at p. 812; R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Environmental) Law Journal, 2003, 64, p. 79. ' See e.g.: Pape F7 Tnlβot v. Canada, (Nafta), Interim Award, 26 June 2000, 7 IcsiD Reports 69: [...] the scope of article 1110 does cover nondiscriminatory regulation that might be said to fall within an exercise of a state's so-called police powers. (para. 96). Indeed much creeping expropriation could be conducted by regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in international protection against expropriation. (para. 99). 10 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134. 11 Feldman v. Mexiro, (NAFTA), Award, 16 December 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 341. 1. 12 Tiwiras Medioambientales 'I ecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico Brr), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 Icsil) Reports 134, para. 119. " Ibid., para. 122.

14 Feldmanv.Mexico, (NAF 1 A), Award, 16 December 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 341, para. 103. '' Dolzer characterized this tellingly in the following way: ... one cannot but admit at this stage that the law of indirect expropriation can be establishcd, at this moment, on the basis of primary sources of international law, only in a very sketchy and rough manner. Large lacunae remain. (1�. l7olzer, Indirect Expropriation of Forcign Property, 1 ICSID Review, Forcign Investment Law Journal, 1986, 41-65, p. 59.) "• See FN 21. 17 See: R. Dolzer/M. Stevens, Bilateral Invcstment Treaties, 1995, p. 99. See e.g.: Article W Thailand/Sri Lanka BIT (available at: http://www.unctatl.org/sections/dite/üa/docs/ bits/ srilanka _thailand. pd£). 18 Art 13 Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to thc Final Act of the European (Energy Charter Treaty Conference, 17 Deccmber 1994, 34 UM 381 (1995); Article 1110 (1) NAFTA, 32 lLM 606 (1993); Art 3 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 12 October 1967, 7 ILM 117 (1968). " Critical with the treaty texts as not being precise enough in this point also: R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alirn Property, 1 ICSID Review-Foreigrr Investment Law Joumal (1986) 41, p. 55 et seq. 211 See e.g. Art 6(1) United Kingdom/Ukraine Bi'r (available at: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/ docs/bits/uk_ukrainc.pdf). 21 US Model Brr 2004 Article 6: Expropriation and Compensation 1. Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation"), except: ... Annex B Expropriation 1. Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation] (1) is intended to refleet customary international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.

4. The second situation addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation] (1) is indirect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without fornral transfer of title or outright seizure. (a) the dctcrmination of whcthcr an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact based inquiry that considers, along other factors: (i) the econornic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the govemment action interferes with distinct, reasonable invcstment-backed cxpectations; and (in) the character of thc governments action. (b) Except in rare circumstance, non-discrirninatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitirnate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf. See also, Canada Model BIT (FiPA), Annex B.I 3(1) Expropriation. Available at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/2004-FIPA-rnodel-en.pdf = US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Annex 10-D to Aricle 10.9(1) (available at: http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreciiieiits/13iI.iteral/Chile_FTA/Sectioii_Iiidex.html); US-Uruguay BIT (signed November 2005) (available at: 6ttp://www.unctad.org/scctions/ditc/üa/docs/bits/US Umguay.pd�. 2J Rightly critical: S.M. Schwebcl, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of Intemational Law, in: G. Asken/ K-H. Böckstiegel/ M J. Mustill/ I'. M. Patocchi/ A.M. Whitesell (eds), Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum in honour of Robert Briner, 2005, p. 815 et seil. =^ See e.g.: Biloune and Marine Drive Komplex Ltd. v. Ghnna Investments Ceetre and the Government of China, (Investment Agreement), Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989, 95 Ir 184, p. 209; Compania del Deanrroflo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Repiiblic of Costa Rica, (Ad-hoc Agreement), Award, 17 Febniary 2000, 5 IcsiD Reports 153, paras. 77, 78; LC�trE Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Cory., Litze Internntionnl Inc. v. Argentine Republic, (US/Argcntina Brr), Award, 3 October 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LGEArgcntina Liabiliry.pdf Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi 11), (France/Argentina BIT), Award, 20 August 2007, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ VivendiAwardEnglish.pdf, paras. 7.5.11, 7.5.17, 7.5.24-7.5.30. See: U. Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 The Journal ofWorld Investment & Trade 2007, 69-84, p. 70 et seq. 25 See e.g.: Arnoine Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, Award, 10 Fcbruary 1999, 6 ICSID Reports 5, paras. 59, 124; Metaldad Corp. v. United Mexican States, (NAFTA), Award, 30 August 2000, ICSID Reports 212, paras. 30, 45, 107, 111; Ttmicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Utiited Mexicin States, (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134, paras. 35, 151, 189. In all three cases the revocation of a special treatment guarantec, regulations or the dcnial of the issuing of permits madc it impossiblc for the Investor to make usc of its investment. See also: Compnitia de Aguas del Acon1"ija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi 11), (France/Argentina BtT), Award, 20 August 2007, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ VivendiAwardEnglish.pdf, paras. 7.5.17-7.5.19, 7.5.24-7.5.30.

z� See e.g.: IusCT, Oil Fields of Texas, Inc. v. The Covemlllellt �)ftlie Islamic Republic of Irall, Award No. 258-43-1, 8 October 1986, 12 IUSCTR 308, para. 43 (amounted to a permanent deprivation); S. D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 8 Icsio Reports 18, para. 283 (lasting removal). 27 See e.g.: IUSCT, Irr Industries, Inc. v. -Die Islarnic Republic of Iran, the Organizations ofnationalized Industries of Iran, Award No. 47-156-2, 26 May 1983, 2 IUSCTR 248, p. 352; Wena Hotels Ltd. r. Arab Republic of Egypt, (United Kingdom/Egypt BIT), Award, 8 December 2000, 6 ICSID Reports 89, para. 99; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic uf 6gypt, (United Kingdom/Egypt BIT), Decision on the Application by Wena Hotels Ltd. tor Interpretation of the Arbitral Award dated December 8, 2000, 31 October 2005, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documcnts/WcnaIntcrpretationDccision.pdf, para. 120. 28 See in particular: R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Environtncntal Law Journal, 2003, p. 79 et seq. 29 See e.g.: Iusct, Phelps Dodge Corp., et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 217-99-2, 19 March 1986, 10 IuscTR 121, para. 22; Soutlrem Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (National Law), Award, 20 May 1992, 3 ICSID Reports 189, paras. 158, 163-172; Cornpania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, (Ad-hoc Agreement), Award, 17 Febmary 2000, ICSID Reports 153, paras. 71, 72. 3u Biloiiiie and Marine Drive Komplex Ltd. v. Chana Investments Cciitre and the Government of Ghana, (Investment Agreement), Award, 27 October 1989, 95 Im 183. 3r Southem Paciftc Properties (Middle East) Limited (Si>i) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (National Law), Award, 20 May 1992, 3 Icsn> Reports 189. 32 IUSCT, Tipyetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stration v. '1 il,tts-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Irall, Award No. 141-7-2, 29 June 1984, 6 IUSCTR 219. 33 IUSCT, Phelps Dodge Corp., et al TiIc Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 217-'1'1-2, 19 March 1986, 10 IUSCTR 121. 5a Metaldad Corp. v. United Mexicall States, (NAFTA), Award, 30 August 2000, 5 IcsiD Reports 212. 35 Compairia de �eL4as del Aconguija S.A. and Vivertdi [J1I;,'ersal v. Argentine- Republic (Vivendi 11J, (France/ Argentina BIT), Award, 20 August 2007, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docurnents/VivendiAwardEnglish.pdf, paras. 7.5.20, 7.5.21.

36 Ibid., para. 103; emphases added. 37 Ibid., para. 104. 38 Ibid., para. 109. 39 Ibid., para. 111. l. See on this issue: I. Marboe, Compensation and Damages in International Law, The Limits of"Fair Market Value", 7 The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2006, 723-759.

41Methane;rCorp.v.USA, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ documcnts/MethanexFinalA ward. pdf. 12 Saluka Investment BV Czech Republic, (Dutch/Czech BIT), Partial Award, 17 March 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-PartialawardFinal.pdf. ai MethanexCorp. v. USA, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV - Chapter D-Page 4, para. 7.

The tribunal in Vivendi 11 (Compairia de Agitas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi UJtiiversal A��el/tille Republic, (France/Argentina BIT), Award, 20 August 2007, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docunients/VivcndiAward English.pdf) explicitly mcntioned this consequence when it rejected this approach (para. 7.5.21) and found that an expropriation had occurred (para. 7.5.34): ... lf public purpose automatically immunizes the measures from being found to be expropriatory, then there would never be a compensable taking for a public purpose.... (para. 7.5.21). 45 A rare exception is: In the Claim off Walter Fletrher Smith v. The Compania Urhmtizadora del Panpte y hlaya de Marianao (Cuba v. Usa), Award, 2 May 1929, Il Reports ofIntcrnational Arbitral Awards, 915, p. 916. S. D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Catlada, (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 8 ICSID Reports 18, para. 285. 47 Feldman �. Mf.wo, (NAFTA), Award, 16 Dcccmbcr 2002, ICSID Reports 341, para. 98. ;8 Tecnicas Medioambientales Ternued, S.A. v. United Mexican1 States, (Spain/Mexico B[T), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134.

49 Ibid., para. 122. 50 Ibid., para. 122. St It based itself on thejudgment in Matos and Silva: EGMK, Matos e Sili,a i,. Porlngal, Judguucnt of 27 August 1996, ECHR 1996-iv, para. 92. 52 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Reyublic, (US/Argcntina BIT), Award, 14 July 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf, paras. 311, 312, 322. 311.... The parties have referred in their exchanges to finding of the tribunal in 7'ecmed. That tribunal sought guidance in thc casc law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, in the case ofJames aiid Others. The Court held that "a measure depriving a person of his property [must] pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim 'in the public interest"', and bcar "a reasonablc relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized". This proportionality will not be found if the person concerned bears "an individual and excessive burden". The Court considered that such "a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto." The Court found relevant that non-nationals "will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its [ofthe measures] authors nor have been consulted on its adoption", and observed that "there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public intcrest than non-nationals." (reference to James and Others, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Scrics A, N° 98, paras. 50 and 63, and TCmicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134, paras. 121, 122). 312. The Tribunal finds that these additional elements provide useful guidance for purposes of determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory and give rise to compensation. 53 LG�E Energy Corp, LGF7E Cayital Corp., LGFrE International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, (US/Argentina BIT), Award, 3 October 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf, paras. 189, 194, 195.

Sa See c.g.: Et:Htt, Matos e Silva v. Portugal, Judgment of 27 August 1996, ECHR 1996-IV, para. 92.

e5 See c.g. EcatK, Sporronq and Lünnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A, no. 52, paras. 69 and 73.

5� See e.g.: Metaldad Corp. v. United Mexican States, (NAFTA), Award, 30 August 2000, 5 Icsii) Report 212, para. 103; Pope f7 Talbot v. Canada, (NAFTA), Interim Award, 26 June 2000, 7 tcsn) Reports 69, para. 102; Cnts Cas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, (US/Argcntina I31'r), Award, 12 May 2005, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMSFinalA ward_000.pdf, para. 262; '1('I""or Mobile Cornrnunications A.S. v. Hungary, (Nonmy/lll/llgary Bn), Award, 13 September 2006, available at: http://www.investmentclaims.com/ decisions/TelenorMobi)e-Hungary-Award-] 3-09-06.pdf, paras. 64-65; Compariia de Agtias del Acofiqiiiia Zu1. and Vivendi Universal v. Argcl1tille Republic (Vivendi �, (France/Argcntina BIT), Award, 20 August 2007, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documcnts/VivcndiAwardEnglish.pdf, paras. 7.5.11, 7.5.17, 7.5.24-7.5.30. In addition, the cxistcnce of an expropriation should also be accepted in the casc of a partial expropriation. This is the case when an overall investment project can be disassembled into a number of discrete rights and a right capable of economics exploitation independently of the remaindcr of thc investment has been taken. See on this issue, U. Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 2007, 69-84, p. 70 et seq. 57 For instance, in Ciis Gas 7'mH.�MM.�OH Company v. Argentine Republic ((US/Argentina BIT), Award, 12 May 2005, available at: littp://ita.Iaw.uvic.ca/docuiiiet)ts/CMS FiiialAward 000.pdf, para. 263, 264) the Tribunal denicd the existence of an expropriation since the investor still had full ownership and control of the investment despite the fact that the investment had lost 98.5% of its value due to the State measures.

5'i In the case of an expropriation that is only discriminatory it is possible that under the European Convention on Human Rights only a violation ofArticle 1 of the lst additional protocol in combination with article 14 of the Europcan Convention on Human Rights is found, without finding of a separate violation of Article 1 of the 1 st Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. z See c.g. ECHR,jal1les alld Others v. Ullitcd Killgdol1l, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para. 50. 60 Echr, James and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para. 51; with regard to restriction of the use of property: ECHR, Mellacher v. Atistria, Judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A, no. 169, para. 53. 6' EcHR, Hentrich v. France, Judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A, no. 296-A, paras. 47-49.

62 See e.g.: ECHR, Tsomtsos and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 15 November 1996, ECHR 1996-V, para. 40; Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 15 November, Echr 1996-V, para. 49; L3mnarescu v. RtllIl<1/lia [GC], no. 28342/95, Judgment of 28 October 1999, Eci ip, 1999-vi, para. 80; Zwierzymki v. L'oland, no. 34049/96, Judgment of 19 June 2001, Ectta 2001 -vi, paras. 72-74; Motais de Narbonne v. France, no. 48161/99, Judgment of 2 July 2002, paras. 19-23; Tregubenko v. Ukraine, no. 61333/00, Judgment of 2 November 2004, para. 54. Unlike in the cases Metlranex and Saluka, in the presented model the public purpose is not to be used to decide whether an expropriation has occurred. 6-' Southern Pacific Properties (Middle F.ast) Limited (Svr) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (National Law), Award, 20 May 1992, 3 Icau Reports 189.

64 If comparable projects were not stopped, one would have to analyse whether there was a discrinllnatory expropriation. In that case it would be unlawful. and the state would have to pay damages. It would not be necessary to rnake thc proportionality test. With regard to other potential projects it may be that they have the same negative effect, but are not comparable. Then, they need not be taken into consideration for the discrimmation test. 65 See e.g.: EcHa, Fredin v. Smeden (no. 1), Judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A, no. 192, paras. 54, 55. In Fredin v. Sweden the applicant, the owner of a gravel pit, argued that it was legitimate to expect that he could continue to extract gravel from his pit for a long time. Sweden revoked the licence to extract gravel for environmental reasons. The European Court of Human Rights denied the existence of a legitimate expectation of the applicant. On the contrary, the Court held that the applicant had to be aware that the exploitation could become illegal one day because of the existing regulations. The Court found that the interference was not disproportionate. See also, ECHR, I'ine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland, Judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A, no. 222, para. 59. It does not matter that the European Court of Human Rights (Eca m) considered thc intcrfcrcnccs in these cases not an expropriation but a regulation of use since the Court applies the proportionality test in a similar way with all types of property interferences. For further judgments of the Echt using the concept of legitimate expectations with expropriations see e.g.: In the case of Draoti v. Frallce no. 1513/03, Judgrnent of 6 October 2005, paras. 82-86, the legislature deprived the applicants of "an established claim to recovery of damages which they could legitirnatcly expect to be determined in accordance with the decided case-law". The Court held that this retrospective expropriation violated Article 1 ofProtocol No. 1 to the Convention; Lecarpentier v. Frallce, no. 67847/01, Judgment of 14 February 2006, paras. 51-53, has similar facts and was decided in the same way. The retrospective interference with legitiiiiatc expectations led to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the case of Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, Judgment of 30 June 2005, the lack of legitimate expectations of the applicants with regard to the continuity oftheir ownership position concenring tlie expropriated land together with the exceptional circumstances prevailing in the unique context of German reunitication in combination with the fact that the expropriation had been taken for reasons ofsocial justice surprisingly led the Court to the conclusion that the lack of any compensation was justified. f�fi See e.g.: In the Matter of Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporat!oll, Award, 24 August 1978, 56 f.K 258, p. 271; Biloune and Marine Drive Cornplex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Ceutre and the Government nf Ghana, (Investment Agreement), Award, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 183, p. 208; Alltoille Goetz aiid Others v. Republic of Burundi, (Belgium-Luxembourg Economie Union/Burundi Bit), Award, 10 February 1999, 6 ICSID Reports 5, para. 124; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican .States, (NAHA), Award, 30 August 2000, 5 Ics)D Reports 212, paras. 103, 107; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecll1ed, S.A. v. (Jnited Mexicall States, (Spain/Mexico BiT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134, paras. 122, 149, 150; Coiisortiiiiii R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, (Italy/Morocco BIT), Award, 22 December 2003, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ ConsortiumRFCC-Award_OOO.pdf, para. 69; MethanexCorp. v. UsA, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part m - Chapter D - Page 4, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MethanexFinalAward.pdf, paras. 7, 9, 10; Etirekci B. V. v. Republic ofPoland, (Netherlands/Poland BIT), Partial Award, 19 August 2005, 12 Icsm Reports 335, paras. 242, 243; Azurix v. Argentine Republic, (United States/Argentina BIT), Award, 14 July 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf, paras. 316-322.

f' US Model BIT 2004. Annrx B Expropriation 4. The second situation addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation] (1) is indirect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without fonnal transfer of title or outright seizure. (a) the determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact based inquiry that considers, among other factors: � (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes mitlr distinct, reasonablc investnrent- 6arkeA exhertntiorrs; ... Available at: http://www.state.gov/documcnts/organization/38710.pdf. Canada Model BIT (FIPA) Annex B.13(1) Expropriation The Parties confinn their shared undcrstanding that a) Indirect expropriation results frorn a measure or series of measures of Party that have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure; b) The determination ofwhether a measure or series of mcasures of a Party constitute an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, arnong other factors: in) the extern to which the measures or senes of n1casurcs interfere with distirrct, reasorrable investment- backed expectations; ... Available at: http://www.dtait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documcnts/2004-FtPA-modcl-en.pdf Entphases added. 68 See e.g.: R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 IcsiD Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal, 1986, 41, p. 62; R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments? 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal, 2003, 64-93, p. 78 et seq.; F. Orrego Vicuna, Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expcctations: Balancing the Rights of the State and the Individual under International Law in a Global Society, 5 International Law Forum, 2003, 188-197; L.Y. Fortier/ S.L. Dryer. Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It Whcn 1 See lt, or Caveat Investor, 19 Icsii) Rcvicw, Foreign Investment Law Journal 2004, 293, p. 306 ct seq.; A. Barbuk, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration and Protection of Legitimate Expectations, 1 TDM - Issuc #03, July 2004; R. Dolzer, Grenzen nationaler Steuerhoheit im völkerrechtlichen Investitionsschutz, in: K. Grupp / U. Hufeld, Recht - Kultur - Finanzen, Festschrift für Reinhard Mußgnug zum 70. Geburtstag am 26. Oktober 2005, 2005, 189-294; S. Fictta, International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States: an indication of the limits of the "Legitimate expectation" basis of claim under Article 1105 of NAFTA?, 3 TDM - Issue #02, April 2006; F. Costamagna, Investor's Rights and State Regulatory Autonomy: the Role of the Legitimate Expectation Principle in the CMS v. Argentina case, 3 Tnnn - Issue #02, April 2006; E. Snodgrass. Protecting Investor's Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle, 21 IcsiD Review, Forcign Investment Law Journal 2006, 1-58; A. Siwy, Indirect Expropriation and the Legitimate Expectations of the Investor, in: C. Klausegger et al. (eds), Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2007, 355-377. With regard to protection of confidence in international law see e.g.: J. Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht, 1971; E. Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public, 1977.

ey See e.g.: In the Matter of Revere Coyper atid Brass Inc. v. Oveyseas Private Investment Corporation, Award, 24 August 1978, 56 ILR 258, p. 271; Bt7βf<�' and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Chan" Investments Cerrtre and the Government ,{Chana, (Investment Agrcement), Award, 27 October 1989, 95 II.R 183, p. 208; Metaklad Corp. v. United Mexican States, (NAFTA), Award, 30 August 2000, 5 Icsil) Reports 212, para. 107; Ternicns Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexicall States, (Spain/Mexico 13IT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 0 Icsid Reports 14 para. 15(); MethanexCory. v. UsA, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, available at: http://ita.law_uvic.ca/documrnts/ McthancxFinalAward.pdf, Part Iv, Chapter D, para. 7; Azurix v. Argentine Republic, (United Statcs/Argeutina BIT), Award, 14 July 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf, para. 318. 7(1 International Tlnmderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, (NAFTA), Award, 26 January 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThundcrbirdAward.pdf, para. 147. �� See e.g.: yn�rN�(7Ntj/ '17iiitiderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, (NAFTA), Award, 26 January 2006, Separate Opinion, T. Waelde, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docurnents/ThunderbirdSeparateOpinion.pdf, para. 1; also: W.M. Reisman / M. H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral (jovernmental Statements as Applicablc Law in Investment Disputes, 19 IcsiD Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal 2004. p. 339. The Tribunal in Tecmed pointed to the fact that the investor expected to be able to use the landfill for a long ternt It also mentioned that thc authorities were not unaware of that fact. It considered the expectations of the investor to be legitimate: In view of the above, it is clcar the Cytrar would not have an operation level to reach a break-even point and obtain the expected rate of retum in a short time. INF could not be unaware of this and of the need to act in line with such expectations to avoid rendeing unfeasiblc any private Investment of the scale required to confine hazardous waste in the United Mexican Statea under acceptable technical operating conditions. Both the authorization to operate as a landfill, ... , and the subsequent permits granted ... were based on the Environmental Impact Declaration of 1994, which projected a useful life of ten years for the Landfdl. This shows that even before the Claimant made its investment, it was widely known that thc Investor expected its investments in the Landfill to last for a long term and that it took this into account to estimate the time and business required to

recover such investments and obtain the expected retum upon making its tender offer for the acquisition of the assets related to the Landfill.... such expectations should be considered legitimate and should be evaluated in light of the Agreement and of international law. (Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecined, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 Icsm Reports 134, para. 150). On this note but with regard to fair and equitable treatment: International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, (NAFTA), Award, 26 January 2006, Separate Opinion, T. Wälde, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ documcnts/ThunderbirdSeparateOpinion.pdf, para. 89; howevcr, nothing militates against applying this benchmark also to Legitimate expectations in the context of expropriation. T. Waelde/A. Kolo, Environmcntal Regulation, Investment Protection and "Regulatory taking" in International Law, 50 ICLQ 2001, 811, p. 844. With regard to formal requirernents for the existence of legitimate expectations see: E. Snodgrass, Protecting Investor's Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle, 21 ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal 2006, p. 31 et seq. �3 The arbitral tribunal in Tecmed included this consideration in its proportionality test. It pointed out that the authorities that sold the land and issued the licence to operate the landfill to the investor knew ofthe proximity of the landfill to the urban centre: First of all, such opposition was mainly based ... on the site's proximity to Hermosillo's urban center ... a circumstance that was certainly known by Promotora upon selling the Landfill's assets to Cytrar and also by INE upon granting the different peniüts to operate the Landfill. As expressed by the Respondent, the Landfill's proximity to Hermosillo's urban center, and not concrete evidence that the Landfill's operation is hannful for the environment or public health, is the issue that concentrates the opposition of the groups that are against the Landfill. (Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico Award,, 29 May 2003, 10 ICSID Reports 134, para. 140). 74 See e.g.: In the Matter of Revere Cowper arid l3rass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Award, 24 August 1978, 56 ILR 258, p. 271; Metaklad Corp. v. (United Mexican States, (NAFTA), Award, 30 August 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 212, para. 107; MethanexCorp. v. USA, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MethanexFinalAward.pdf Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7; Azurix v. Argentine Republic, (United States/Argentina BIT), Award, 14 July 2006, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf, para. 318. Similary: E. Snodgrass, Protecting Investor's Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle, 21 IcsiD Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal 2006, p. 36 et seq. The Tribunal in Spp stated with regard to the applicable law concerning actions of high ranking government officials that according to Egyptian law some of these acts might have been illegal. However, these acts had been communicated to the Investor under the appearance of goverliiiiental authority. The Tribunal held that the expectations raised with the investor through these acts were legitimate and protected by international law: Whether legal under Egyptian law or not, the acts in question were the acts ofEgyptian authorities, including the highest executive authority of the Government. These acts, which are now alleged to have been in violation of the Egyptian municipal legal system, created expectations protected by established principles of international law. (Southern P<1cijic Properties (Middle East) Lirnited (Spp) v. Arab Republic f�-Efy�, (National Law), Award, 20 May 1992, 3 lcsro Reports 189, para. 83). 76 The aim is not to protect the investor against regulations already in place at the time of the Investment but only against negative surprises after it already invested.

77 For instance, the arbitral tribunal in Tecmed indicated that the investor did not have any reason to doubt the legality of its investment at the time of the investment: ... Therefore, at the time the Investment was made, Cytrar and Tecmed had no reason to doubt the lawfulness of tlie Landfill's location, regardless of the social and political pressure that appeared subsequently. These companics were not negligent upon analyzing the legal issues related to the Landfill's location. (Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (Spain/Mexico l3rr), Award, 29 May 2003, 10 IcsiD Reports 134, para. 141). �s As already pointed out, the fact that there existed already considerable regulations and restrictions was of decisive importance for the ECHR in the cases of Fredin and Pine Valley for finding that there was no interference in legitimate expectations. ECHR, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), Judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A, no. 192, paras. 54, 55; Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Irelaiid,judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A, no. 222, para. 59. The arbitral tribunal in Methanex pointed out in its reasoning on expropriation that the investor knew that it invested in a economic brauch which is characterised by changing regulations and restrictions and that it had not obtained any special promise: Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, that govemmental environmental and health protection institutions at the federal and state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested corporations, non-governmcntal organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commocily prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for environmental and/or health reasons. Indeed, the very market for MTBE in the United States was the result of precisely this regulatory process. Methanex appreciated that the process of regulation in the United States involved wide participation of industry groups, non-governmental organizations, academics and other individuals, many of these actors deploying lobbyists.... Methanex entered the United States market aware of and actively participating in this process. It did not enter the United States market because of special representations made to it. (MethallexCorp. v. USA, (Nv,FTn), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV - Chapter D- Page 4, paras. 9, 10; available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docurncnts/McthancxFinalAward.pdf). (Emphases added). 79 To guarantee that there is no improper surprise, existing regulations have to be clear and lead to predictable results. l" The ECHR repeatedly considered in its proportionality test that a state intervened retrospectively in legitimate expectations of the applicant. In these cases it found violations of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for that reason. See e.g.: EciIR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A, and Others v. Belgium, judgement of 20 November 1995, Series A, no. 332, paras. 31, 43, 44: 43. The financial considerations cited by the Government and their concern to bring Belgian law into line with the law of neighbouring countries could warrant prospective legislation in this area to derogate from the general law of tort. Such considerations could not justify legislating with retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving the applicants of their claims for compensation. Such a fundamental interference with the applicants' rights is inconsistent with prcscrving a fair balance between the interests at stake. 44. It follows that in so far as the 1988 Act concerned events prior to 17 September 1988, the date of its publication and its entry into force, it breached Article 1 ofProtocol No. 1 (Pl-1). ECHR, Draon v. France, no. 1513/03, Judgment of 6 oktober 2005, paras. 65, 68. 82. In the present case, however, section 1 ofthe Law of4 Marcli 2002 abolished purely and simply, with retrospective effect, one of the essential heads of damage, relating to very large sums of money,

in respect of which the parents of children whose disabilities had not been detected before birth, like the applicants, could have claimed compensation from the hospital held to be liable. The French legislature thereby deprived the applicants of an existing "asset" which they previously possessed, namely an established claim to recovery of damages which they could leqitimately exyect to be determined in accordance with the decided case-law of the highest courts of the land. 85. Lastly, the Court considers that the grounds relating to ethical considerations, equitable trcatment and the proper organisation of the health service mentioned by the Conseil d'Etat in its opinion of 6 December 2002 and relied on by the Government could not, in tlae instant case, legitimise retrospective action whose result was to deprive the applicants, without sufficient compensation, of a substantial portion of the damages they had claimcd, thus making them bear an individual and excessive burden. Such a radical interference with the applicants' rights upset the fair balance to be maintained between the demands of the general interest on the one hand and protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions on the other. (Emphases added). "1 The ECHR mentioned in its proportionality test in Fredill P. Sweden the fact that a transitional period was provided for and even extended after a request of the applicant in this regard. (ECHR, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), Judgment of 18 February 1991, Senes A, no. 192, para. 54). 82 In this regard, arbitrator Schwarz in his separate opinion in S.D. Myers pointed out that Articles 1110 NAFTA is not to be interpreted as an invitation for arbitral tribunals to maske states liable for ordinary regulatory acts of states: Looking at Article 1110 in context, it is not possible to sec it as a generous invitation for tribunals to impose liability on governments that are engaged in the ordinary course of protecting health, safety, the environment and other public welfare concerns. (S. D. Myer.s, 7);f. v. Government of Canada, (NAFTA), First Partial Award, Separate Opinion, 12 November 2000, 8 IcsiD Reports 66, para. 214). 83 See e.g.: ECHR,James and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para. 54; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, Judgl1lent of 8 July 1986, Series A, no. 102, para. 121. The Holy Monasteries v. Creece, Judgment of Dezember 1994, Series A, no. 301-A, para. 71; Pressos Cornpania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belqium, Judgment, of 20 November 1995, Series A, no. 332, para. 38; The Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 23 November 2000, EcHR 2000-xn, para. 89; Lalleinetit v. France, no. 46044/99, Judgment of 11 April 2002, para. 18; Motnis de Narbollllc v. France, no. 48161/99, Judgment of 2 July 2002, para. 19; Pincovä and Pinc v. i,. Czech Republic, Judgment of 5 November 2002, ECHR 2002-VllI, para. 53; Broniowski v. Polen (C�Cj, no. 31443/96, Judgment of 22 June 2004, ECHR 2004-v, para. 176; Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, Judgment of 30 June 2005, para. 94; Strain and Others v. Rumania, no. 57001/00, Judgment of 21 July 2005, para. 52; Draon v. France [Ge], no. 1513/03, Judgment of 6 October 2005, para. 79. 84 See c.g.: ECHR, james and Others v. United Killgdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para, 54; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, no. 102, para. 121. 1.

85 Ibid. se See e.g.: EcHR, 71,e Former Killg ofGreece alld Others v. Greece, [GC], no. 25701/94, article 41 Judgment of 28 November 2002, para. 78; Senkspiel v. Germany, no. 77207/01, decision of 12 January 2006. In the case ofJahn and Others v. Germany [GC], no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01 , Judgment of 30 June 2005, the Court surprisingly accepted the lack of any compensation under the exceptional circumstanccs prevailing in the unique context of German reunification. It also considered the fact that the cxpropriation had been taken for reasons ofsocialjustice and the lack oflegitimate expectations ofthe applicants with regard to the continuance oftheir ownership position concerning the expropriated land. s� See e.g.: ECHR, James and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 Febniary 1986, Series A, no. 98; Litlrgow v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, no. 102; Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, Judgment of 30 June 2005; Senkspiel v. Germany, no. 77207/01, decision of 12 January 2006. 88 ECHR, The Forrner King of Greece and Others v. Greece, [GC], Judgment of 23 November 2000, Echt 2000-xn. 89 ECHR, The Former Kinq of Greece and Other.r v. Greece, [GC], no. 25701/94, Article 41 Judgment of 28 November 2002, para. 78. 9" ECHR, The Formen Kiryq of Greece and Others v. (Greece, [GC], Judgment of 23 November 2000, EcEln 2000-xu. '" ECommHR, L'innacle Meat Processors Company and 8 others v. United Kingdom, no. 33298/96, decision of 21 October 1998.

92 Although this case did not concern an expropriation but the control ofthe use ofproperty it may still serve as example of the proportionality principle. That pnnciple is also applied to cases conceming the control of the use ofproperty under Article 1 ofthe Additional Protocol to the Europcan Convention on Hurnan Rights. .3 ECommHR, Pinnade Meat Processors Company and 8 others v. Ullited Killgdoltl, no. 33298/96, decision of 21 October 1998. Emphasis added. 94 Ibid,: Whilst it is true that some ofthe applicants have now ceased their businesses as cattlc head deboners, the Commission notes that they remain owners of all their tangible assets, and that those assets can either be used in new or related businesses, or they can be sold. Further, in respect of eligible beef stocks held on 9 April 1996, the applicants have in fact reccived cornpensation totalling over £430,000.00. Given these circumstances, the Commission does not accept that, overall, the applicants can be said to have suffered an excessive burden. Thus, it considered the application to be manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of article 27 para. 2 of the Convention. 95 ECHR, James aeid Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para. 63; Lithgoul United Killgdoltl, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Serics A, no. 102, para. 116. � Ibid. Ibid.

ys See e.g.: EcHR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Scrics A, no. 52, para. 7?>;James and Others r. (United Kingdnm, Judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A, no. 98, para. 50; Lithgow v. United Killgdolll, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, no. 102, para. 120; Häkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, Judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A, no. 171-A, para. 51; Hentrich r. Frallce, Judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A, no. 296-A, para. 49; Tsomtsos and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 15 November 1996, ECHR 1996-v, para. 42; Brumarescu v. RUlllallia [GC], no. 28342/95, Judgmcnt of28 October 1999, ECHR 1999-vn, para. 78; Piron v. France, no. 36436/97, Judgment of 14 November 2000, para. 41; Zurierzynski v. l'oland, Judgment of 19 Jtme 2001, ECHR 2001-m, para. 71; Lallerm·nt France, no. 46044/99, Judgment of 11 April 2002, para. 18; Pincovä atid Pille '1. Czech Republic, Judgment of November 2002, ECHR 2002-vtn, para. 64; Zvolsky and Zvolska v. Czech Republic, Judgment of 12 November 2002, ECHR 2002-ix, para. 71; Allard v. Sweden, Judgment of 24 June 2003, ECHR 2003-vu, para. 61; Trequbenko v. Ukraine, no. 61333/00, Judgment of 2 November 2004, para. 55; Draon v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, Judgment of 6 October 2005, para. 85; Jahn and Others v. Cermany [GC], no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, Judgment of 30 June 2005, para. 95; Evaldsson and Others v. Sweden, no. 75252/01, Judgment of 13 February 2007, para. 55.

Information

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 11 11 5
Full Text Views 7 7 5
PDF Downloads 0 0 0
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0