1 The ICSID Convention of 18 March 1965, which entered into force on 14 October 1966. 2 THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE WITH INVESTMENT ARBITRATION. A COMMENT. Journal of World Investment, 3 J.W.I. 3. 2002, p. 473; THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES. THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE. Journal of International Arbitration, 2002, 19(3), p. 227; and AABITRAJE DE INVERSION A LA MEXICAINE, Juridica 35, 2005, p. 165. 1 1 elaborate on the specific steps and their accurateness in Aportaci6n DE MEXICO AL arbitraje DE INVERSION. Anuario Mexicano dc Derecho Internacional, UNAM, VI, 2006, p. 651. 4 77ie Direcci6n de Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales, a division of the Ministry of the Economy, formed a team of well-trained lawyers, headed by Hugo Perezcano, who gained the reputation of a seasoned and astute international litigator. (footnotes continued on next page)

5 As of 2004 Mexico is part of the OPIC (Daily Official Gazette, 14 June 2004). As of 2008 (Daily Official Gazette, 5 August 2008) it adhered to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 6 Although setting-aside proceedings have taken place, by and large they cannot be characterized as mere dilatory tactics. Merit existed in the same - although I avow disagreeing with some. (I canvassed my position in THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE. Journal of International Arbitration, 2002,19(3), p. 227.) 7 Mexico has entered into free trade agreements with 13 countries and investment treaties with 19 countries, all of which display ICSID as an option in investment cases. (A few other investment treaties have been finalized but, at the time of this note, had not been published for review.) 8 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 9 I have formally and informally enquired into the reasons behind the failure to adhere to the Icsii) Convention. m Exercising my Constitutional Bill of Right to enquiry into matters of public interest (derecho de petición) under Article 8 of the Mexican Federal Constitution. 1� The exact words are: "En relacion con la supuesta contradicción de Mexico a la que usted hace referencia, quisiera hacer dos comentarios. Primero, el Convey o CIADI y los APPRIS son instrumentos juridicos cuyo contenido y alcances son distintos. No puede interpretarse que por suscribir APPRIS y TLC's, o que "155" paises se hayan adherido al Cm signifique que por consecuencia natural, 16gica o automatica Mexico tambien deba hacerlo. El Convenio CIAn1 es un sistema autonomo y unico de solucion de controversias entre un inversionista y un Estado que requiere de un estudio y un analysis cuidadoso sobre las ventajas y desventajas que conlleva una posible adhesion." �z Again, literally, "... incluir las reglas de arbitraje del ClADI como una opción mas que tiene el inversionista para someter su reclamacion al arbitraje sin ser Mexico miembro del ClADI tampoco es una contradicción. Si bien Mexico no es parte del CIAm ello no impide que un inversionista presente una reclamacion intemacional en contra del Estado demandado. En la negociacion de un tratado internacional, los Estados procuran prever todas las situaciones que se pudieran presentar cuando un inversionista cometa al arbitraje una reclamacion. Una de estas situaciones es que ambos Estados Contratantes sean miembros del CIADI, o que uno de ellos (o ambos) no lo sea." t� "Cabe mencionar que Mexico hace uso del ClADI a traves del Mecanismo Complementario del CIADI que permite que pauses no miembros hagan uso de la Secretaria del ClADI quien es el organismo que administra los arbitrajes" was the exact response. �^ "Por lo anterior, la decision de si Mexico debe suscribir el Convenio CIADI requiere de un analisis detallado donde se valore los beneficios reales que conllevaria la adhesion al mismo...." was the fmal remark.

�5 I have a high opinion of the official who answered my query. I simply differ. 16 I do not exhaust the differences. Should further analysis be desired, I perform such task in ARBITRAJE, Ed. Porrita, Mexico, D.F., 2004, pp. 494 et seq. 17 See Frederic Barchand, Revue de l'Arbitrage, 2007. �s Inter alia, the act implied the need of issuing a uniform law that facilitates the application and harmonizes Canadian laws according to such convention. 19 The complexity was magnified given that the ICSID Convention lacks of a federal clause. zo Article 133 of the Mexican Federal Constitution and the Treaty Execution Act (L.ey de Celebraci6n de Tratados) requires only that the treaty be signed by the President and approved by the Senate.

21 2,573 according to the last count (UNCTAD World Investment Report, Transnational Corporations, Extraction Industries and Development, October 2007, pp. 16-17, http://www.unctad.org). =z Besides, there is a positive side. International crises generate knowledge. They are sources oflaw. Different cases may be quoted in support of said affirmation. Argentinean cases have dealt with open and important subjects. For example, the (controversial) jurisdiction requirements, 'umbrella' clauses, the exhaustion of local remedies (including the polemical 'fork in the road'), the differentiation among contractual and international claims, the scope of the most favored nation clauses, the content of minimum treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, measures tantamount to expropriation, state responsibility, state of emergency and its international consequences. And these appear to be the tip of the iceberg. � The official reasons are that Bolivia considers that Icsii) favors investors over host States, that the World Bank's function makes it incompatible to administer arbitrations, confidentiality, it dislikes arbitrators acting as parties' representatives, the content of some disciplines and that "there is no case where the World Bank has sanctioned investors for not fulfilling their contracts".

24 Besides, foreign investment has been found to pour in jurisdictions having ratified not one single investment treaty (for instance, Brazil). zs Although there have been a few. The author is aware of four, which shed contradictory results. zb Which I must describe generically for confidentiality reasons. Some argue that the Additional Facility option reduces the impact of the failure to adhere. The argument is astray: absent Icsm Convention ratification the award is not insulated. It is treated as a New York Convention award and the benefits of ICSID mechanism arc foregone. z$ For example, the annulment of the cases of S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada and Feldman Carpa v. Mexico took approximately three years.

zy In a recent document, the Mexican Arbitration Institute (Institute Mexicano del Arbitraje - Inns) argued in favor of the adhesion by Mexico of the IcISD Convention. The reasons are as herein provided. (It can be consulted at www.imarbitraje.org.mx.) 3� A recent and eloquent essay defends the proposition: Jan Paulsson, ENCLAVES OF JUSTICE. Transnational Dispute Management, June 2007. 3� In addition to agreeing with the arguments sketched herein, Judge Sepulveda's analysis finds solid organic and political advantages to become part of I(ISID. (Bemardo Sepulveda Amor, MEXICO Y EL ARREGLO DE CONTROVERSIAS EN MATERIA DE INVERSI6N. Boletin Informativo CANACO, Mayo 2005, Ano 5, Número 12, p. 2.)