The Independence of the Inter-American Judge

in The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

Abstract

This article describes and analyzes several safeguards of the independence of the Inter-American judge. It concludes that the system enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights, the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Court’s practice are not enough to guarantee the appearance of independence of the Court’s judges. The major problem is the process of nomination and election of judges. At both national and international levels the process is not clear, transparent, or accountable. Women and ethnic and cultural groups are underrepresented. Judges’ terms of office and the re-election possibilities should be revised. Lastly, some guidelines should be adopted in order to regulate judges’ outside activities, incompatibilities, and disqualifications. All these issues should by addressed by the Organization of American States, States Parties to the Convention, and the Court itself, and this article gives some recommendations in this respect.

Sections

References

24)

Mackenzie, R. & Sands, P., ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 278.

25)

Interights, Judicial Independence. Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights, May 2003, p. 5, available at http://www.interights.org/documentbank/index.htm?id=259.

27)

CEJIL, Aportes para la reflexión sobre posibles reformas al funcionamiento de la Comisión Interamericana y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Buenos Aires: CEJIL, 2008), p. 18.

29)

CEJIL, op. cit., p. 18.

31)

INTERIGHTS, op. cit., p. 22.

32)

INTERIGHTS, op. cit., p. 4.

35)

CEJIL, op. cit., p. 18, and Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), El fortalecimiento de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, n/d, p. 6, available at http://www.adc-sidh.org/images/files/elfortalecimientodelacorteinteramericanadederechoshumanos1.pdf.

61)

Mackenzie, R. & Sands, P., ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 279.

63)

INTERIGHTS, op. cit., p. 30.

65)

Mackenzie, R. & Sands, P., ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 273.

68)

Meron, op. cit., p. 365. Additionally, Principle 9.2 of the Principles provides that: ‘Judges shall not serve in a case with the subject-matter of which they have had any other form of association that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality’.

69)

ICTY, Judgment of 21 July 2000, Appeals Chamber, para. 189.

Information

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 7 7 2
Full Text Views 2 2 2
PDF Downloads 0 0 0
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0