Coalition Maintenance during Democratization: Comparative Insights from Tunisia and Yemen
In: Middle East Law and GovernanceSearch for other papers by Jens Heibach in
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Search for other papers by Tereza Jermanová in
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Abstract
In light of the oft-cited benefits of power sharing, this paper compares two cases of coalition governments that emerged from domestically initiated transition processes in the Arab world: the Tunisian Troika (2011–2014) and the Yemeni Coalition Government (1993–1994). While the former facilitated Tunisia’s democratization, the latter’s disintegration contributed to the 1994 war and Yemen’s authoritarian backsliding. It asks why coalition cooperation endured in Tunisia but not in Yemen, exploring intra-elite relations, the power dynamics at play, as well as elites’ motivations in launching and maintaining cooperation. The paper reveals that both coalitions’ internal functioning was hampered by adverse power configurations and ideological differences. In Yemen, intra-elite relations were further impaired by mutual distrust. Crucially, a history of sustained partnership along with normative commitment to the idea of power sharing, existent in Tunisia and not in Yemen, explains why cooperation within the Troika remained solid amid unfavorable circumstances.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 403 | 167 | 37 |
| Full Text Views | 164 | 11 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 309 | 25 | 0 |
Coalition Maintenance during Democratization: Comparative Insights from Tunisia and Yemen
In: Middle East Law and GovernanceSearch for other papers by Jens Heibach in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Tereza Jermanová in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
In light of the oft-cited benefits of power sharing, this paper compares two cases of coalition governments that emerged from domestically initiated transition processes in the Arab world: the Tunisian Troika (2011–2014) and the Yemeni Coalition Government (1993–1994). While the former facilitated Tunisia’s democratization, the latter’s disintegration contributed to the 1994 war and Yemen’s authoritarian backsliding. It asks why coalition cooperation endured in Tunisia but not in Yemen, exploring intra-elite relations, the power dynamics at play, as well as elites’ motivations in launching and maintaining cooperation. The paper reveals that both coalitions’ internal functioning was hampered by adverse power configurations and ideological differences. In Yemen, intra-elite relations were further impaired by mutual distrust. Crucially, a history of sustained partnership along with normative commitment to the idea of power sharing, existent in Tunisia and not in Yemen, explains why cooperation within the Troika remained solid amid unfavorable circumstances.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 403 | 167 | 37 |
| Full Text Views | 164 | 11 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 309 | 25 | 0 |