State Actor-Social Movement Coalitions and Policy-making Under Authoritarianism: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development in the Urban Municipality of Kenitra

in Middle East Law and Governance
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This article examines the conditions under which state actor-social movement (sasm) coalitions form in policy-making in authoritarian states. Based on a comparison of three cases of policy reform undertaken by the Party of Justice and Development (pjd) in the municipality of Kenitra, Morocco, it argues: 1) in authoritarian states, we must analyse sasm interactions and the interactions between elected state actors and nominated state actors representing the central authorities; 2) the pjd forms coalitions with social movement organizations (smos) depending whether its policy preference is in opposition to the authorities’ and whether it has mass appeal; 3) when its preference conflicts with that of the authorities yet has broad support, the pjd formally mobilizes smos; when it conflicts with the authorities’ preference but has limited appeal, informal party-social movement coalitions are formed; and when it is neither in conflict with the authorities’ preference nor has mass appeal, coalitions are unnecessary.

State Actor-Social Movement Coalitions and Policy-making Under Authoritarianism: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development in the Urban Municipality of Kenitra

in Middle East Law and Governance

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    Interview Rabat February 21 2011.

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    Interview Khenifra March 24 2011.

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    Interview Rabat April 14 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra March 3 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra April 14 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra July 3 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra December 5 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra June 26 2013.

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    Interview Rabat April 14 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra July 1 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 26 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 5 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra March 3 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra December 12 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra December 6 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra March 3 2011.

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    Interview Kenitra June 26 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 3 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra December 6 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra December 12 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra December 12 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra December 5 2012.

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    Interview Kenitra July 2 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 28 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 5 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 27 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 28 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 28 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 1 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra December 3 2013. While as demonstrated above the pjd is highly cooperative with ismos and with smos that do not display an Islamic ethos it employs a different attitude and strategy vis-à-vis smos linked to other political parties. When it comes to countering other political parties’ policies and/or activities the pjd does not consider the smos sphere as neutral.

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    Interview Kenitra June 28 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 1 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 27 2013.

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    Interview June 26 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra July 5 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra June 27 2013.

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    Interview Kenitra December 3 2013.

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