The Development of International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

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The Development of International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online


2 See S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993. 3 See Part II, below. 4 Report of the President to the United Nations General Assembly, Doc. A/51/292; S/1996/665, para. 8. 5 See below, p. 112.

6 Separate Opinion in Prosecutor v. Rajic (IT-95-12-R61), 5 July 1996 and 13 September 1996; ILR 108 (1998), 141 et seq., (171). 7 See the address of President Cassese to the United Nations General Assembly, 4 November 1997. 8 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT 94-1-T), Decision of the Trial Chamber of 7 May 1997; to be reported in Vol. 112 of the International Law Reports. At the time of writing the Appeals Chamber was due to hear appeals in this case. 9 Address of President McDonald to the United Nations Security Council, 12 February 1998; ICTY Press Release 291-E; 16 February 1998. 10 General Blaskic, former Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Croat army. A senior Bosnian Serb officer, General Djukic, had been arrested and indicted but had died before his trial had commenced. 11 The decisions of the Yugoslav Tribunal may also prove important prece- dents for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by S/RES/955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. The Rwanda Tribunal has already held in the Rutaganda Case (ICTR-96-3-T), 26 September 1996, that it will take account of the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal, a devel- opment which was inevitable given that the two Tribunals share a com- mon Appeals Chamber.

lz On these matters, see J. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1997; V Morris and M. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,1995 and P. King and L. Rosa, "The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal 1994-96", EJIL 8 (1997), 123 et seq. These works also contain valuable discussions of the substantive law issues. For a particularly important discussion of the jurisprudence on the difficult question of the reluctant witness, see F. Hampson, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Reluctant Witness", ICLQ 47 (1998), 50-74. 13 Amongst the extensive literature on this subject, see International Crimi- nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Path to the Hague, 1996; C. Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia", Int'l Aff 69 (1993), 641 et seq. and D. Shraga and R. Zacklin, "The Interna- tional Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", EJIL 5 (1994), 360. Most of the literature supports the creation of the Tribunal. For a contrary view, see T.D. Mak, "The Case against an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", International Peacekeeping 2 (1995), 536.

14 Thus, in Prosecutor v. Tadic (Protection of Witnesses), 10 August 1995, ILR 105 (1997), 599, the Trial Chamber held that the unique character of the Tribunal meant that the decisions of human rights tribunals regarding the standards of a fair trial were of limited relevance, para. 27. ls See the Decision of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutorv. Tadic (Jurisdic- tion), 2 October 1995, ILR 105 (1997), 419, para.l l. 16 The comparison is also misleading in other respects. Whereas the Nurem- berg Tribunal was established following the end of hostilities and after the principal Defendants had been arrested and at a time when those which established the Tribunal had complete power in Germany, the International Criminal Tribunal was created during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and has always been dependent upon States, particu- larly the belligerents, to detain and surrender those whom it indicts. In addition, the Nuremberg Tribunal was specifically established to try defendants from one party to World War II, whereas the International Criminal Tribunal has jurisdiction over persons from any of the belliger- ents and has, indeed, brought to trial Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. 1� This aspect of Nuremberg could be seen in the subsequent arrangements for the detention of prisoners at Spandau. The Tokyo IMT also exercised a jurisdiction which belonged to the States which had established it, although the manner of its establishment differed from that of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

18 S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993. Prior to the adoption of resolution 827, the Council had adopted a number of resolutions regarding viola- tions of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia; see resolutions 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 and 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993. Resolution 780 established a Commission of Experts. The first Report of the Commis- sion, Doc. S/25274 (10 February 1993) was influential in leading to the establishment of the Tribunal and gave an indication of the scale of the task with which the Tribunal was to be confronted. The Commission also published two subsequent reports, Docs S/26545 (5 October 1993) and S/1994/674 (27 May 1994). 19 For the difficulties which this approach creates, see J. Dugard, "Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court", CLJ 56 (1997), 329. Cf. also A. Zimmermann in this Volume. 20 Doc. S/25704, paras 19-21. 21 Ibid., para. 23.

22 See, e.g., J.M. Sjocrona, "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Some Introductory Remarks from a Defence Point of View", LJIL 8 (1995), 463. �3 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT 94-1-AR72), 2 October 1995; ILR 105 (1997), 419. For a critical discussion of the Tribunal's treatment of this challenge, see J.E. Alvarez, "Nuremberg Revisited: the Tadic Case", EJIL 7 (1996), 245. 24 ILR 105 (1997), 453. The Trial Chamber had earlier ruled that it had no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of its own establishment, ILR 105 (1997), 427. In the Appeals Chamber, however, only Judge Li took that approach.

25 See above, p. 101. 26 ILR 105 (1997), 465-470, paras 28-36. 27 ILR 105 (1997), 470, para. 37. 28 ICJ Reports 1954, 47 et seq., (61).

29 The Appeals Chamber referred to article 14 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 8 para. 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 3o ILR 105 (1997), 471-476, paras 41-48. 31 The Chamber referred to this argument at para. 44 of its judgment. 32 For more stringent criticism, see Alvarez, see note 23. It is noticeable that a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has followed Tadic in: Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi (ICTR-96-15-T), Decision of 18 June 1997, noted at AJIL 92 (1998), 66-70.

33 P. Tavernier, "The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda", Int. Rev. of the Red Cross 37 (1997), 605etseq.,(611). ). 34 ILR 105 (1997), 459-460, paras 16-18. The Report of the Secretary-Gen- eral containing the Statute of the Court, which was expressly approved by the Council in resolution 827, stated that the Tribunal "would not be subject to the authority or control of the Security Council with regard to the performance of its judicial functions" (Doc. S/25704, para. 28).

3s This possibility was expressly contemplated in the Secretary-General's Report, para. 28. 36 ILR 105 (1997), 434, para. 20. 37 See M. Wood, " The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions", in this Volume, p. 73-95. For discussion of article 25, see J. Delbruck, "On Article 25", in: B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 1994, 407 et seq.

38 The Trial Chamber drew attention to this principle in Tadic (Deferral), ILR 101 (1995), 1 (8 November 1994). See also the Decision of President Cassese in Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Application to vary conditions of deten- tion) Case IT-95-14-T, ILR 108 (1998), 69 (3 April 1996), paras 7-9. The fact that the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over individuals does not, of course, preclude the possibility that it can issue binding orders to States; see Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Objections to the Issue of subponae duces tecum), Decision of the Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, ILR 110 (1998), 607, para. 26. 39 The Security Council has on several occasions treated Republica Srpska as bound by decisions of the Council; see, e.g., S/RES/942 (1994) of 23 September 1994. The obligation for the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate with the tribunal is specifically incorporated into the Dayton Peace Agree- ment, 1995, article X; ILM 35 (1996), 75. See also J. Jones, "The Implica- tions of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia", EJIL 7 (1996), 226 et seq. 40 See the Address of President Cassese to the United Nations General Assembly, 4 November 1997. 41 Case IT-95-14-T, Decision of Trial Chamber II, 18 July 1997, ILR 110 (1998), 607, (616), and Case IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Decision of 29 October 1997, ILR 110 (1998), 607, (688). The Appeals Chamber had the benefit of a number of briefs from curiae, including one from the Max Planck Institute, which is reproduced in: Max Planck UNYB 1 (1997), 349 et seq.

42 Appeals Chamber Decision, paras 20-21. a3 Ibid., paras 35-36. This is the procedure specifically laid down in relation to the execution of warrants of arrest by Rule 61 (E). 44 Ibid., para. 38. A similar approach has been taken by national courts in a number of countries regarding the extension to individual officials of the immunity of the State which they serve; see Jaffe v. Miller, ILR 95 (1994), 446 and Walker v. Bank of New York, ILR 104 (1997), 277 (Canada), Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ILR 65 (1984), 193 (Germany), Propend Finance Limited v. Sing, to be pub- lished in Vol. 111 of the ILR (1998), (England) and Herbage v. Meese, ILR 98 (1994), 101 (United States).

45 One surprising feature of the Blaskic decision is that the Appeals Cham- ber considered that a State off icial who was part of a United Nations force or other United Nations operation could be required to give evidence because he was not acting in his capacity as a State official but rather as an official of the United Nations (paras 46-51). This decision has already led to friction with the Government of France which has refused to allow members of the French armed forces to testify; see ICTY Press release 275-E, Statement of Judge Louise Arbour, Prosecutor, 15 December 1997. 46 Statute of the Tribunal, arts. 1, 6 and 8. In contrast to the position at Nuremberg, there is no jurisdiction in respect of organizations; see article 6 and the express rejection of such jurisdiction in the Secretary-General's Report, Doc. S/25704, para. 51.

47 Doc. S/25704, para. 29. Indeed, the Secretary-General considered that the principle nullum crimen sine lege required that the Tribunal should have jurisdiction only in respect of crimes well established in customary international law, para. 34. 48 Case IT-96-21-AR72.5, Decision of the bench of the Appeals Chamber, 15 October 1996.

49 ILR 105 (1997), 419 (Decision of 10 August 1995), paras 46-56. so Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 2 October 1995, ILR 105 (1997), 419, (453), paras 79-85. Judge Abi-Saab dissented on this point, ILR 105 (1997), 534-538. For further discussion of this point, see below, p. 126-127. On the relationship between the Statute and the substantive law, see also the discussion of crimes against humanity in Part VI, below. 51 Article 21 para. 4, lit. c. 52 The Secretary-General maintained that trials in absentia would be con- trary to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Secretary-General's Report, Doc. S/25704, para. 101. The rejec- tion of trials in absentia has been criticised by A. Pellet, "Le Tribunal criminel pour 1'ex-Yougoslavie. Poudre aux yeux ou avancee decisive?" RGDIP 98 (1994), 7 et seq., and Tavernier, see note 33.

53 This is true of the law regarding grave breaches under article 2 of the Statute and war crimes under article 3. 54 See Part VI, below. ss ILR 105 (1997), 419 (453). For comment, see C. Greenwood, "Interna- tional Humanitarian Law and the Tadic case," EJIL 7 (1996), 265 et seq.

56 Decision of 2 October 1995, ILR 105 (1997), 419 (453), para. 70. 57 For a review of that literature and the State practice on the subject, see C. Greenwood, "The Concept of War in Modern International Law", ICLQ 36 (1987), 283 et seq.

s8 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1958, 20. s9 See, e.g., the claim by the United States that the act of Syria in shooting down a US aircraft over Lebanon and taking the pilot prisoner created an armed conflict between Syria and the United States, thus making the pilot a prisoner of war, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981-88, Vol. III, 3456. 60 See Additional Protocol II, 1977, to the Geneva Conventions, article 1. 61 ILR 105 (1997), 419 et seq., para. 77. 62 Ibid., para. 72. 63 See, in particular, the important and highly influential article by T. Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", AJIL 89 (1995), 554 et seq., (556).

64 1st interim report of the Commission, 10 February 1993; Doc. S/25274, para. 45. The Commission expressed the same view in its final report of May 1994, Doc. S/1994/674, para. 44. 65 Doc. S/25704. 66 See Meron, see note 63.

67 See especially, resolutions 764 (1992), 771 (1992), 780 (1992) and 787 (1992). 68 See C. Gray, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterization and Consequences", BYIL 67 (1996),155 et seq. which, though concerned primarily with considerations of jus in bello, offers a penetrating and very thorough analysis. 69 Doc. S/25704, para. 62. 70 ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq., (114); ILR 76 (1988), 1 et seq., (448). 71 For example, the ICRC Annual Report for 1988 treats the armed conflict in Angola as an international armed conflict in so far as it involved South Africa but as an internal conflict in other respects; pp.16-17. See also H.P. Gasser, "International Non-International Armed Conflicts", Am. U. L. Rev. 31 (1982), 911.

72 The Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia fixed the date on which Bosnia-Herzegovina became a State as 6 March 1992, the date on which the result of the referendum on independence was announced; Opinion No. 11, ILR 96 (1994), 719. Possible alternative dates are the date of recognition by the European Community Member States, 6 April 1992, or the date on which Bosnia- Herzegovina became a member of the United Nations, 22 May 1992. The acts alleged to have been committed by the defendant in Tadic occurred after all these dates. 73 The November 1991 agreement is summarized in: Int. Rev. of the Red Cross 31 (1991), 610. 74 Article 6, Conventions I, II and III; article 7, Convention IV Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 73.

75 Case IT-94-2-R61, ILR 108 (1998), 21 (Decision of 20 October 1995), para. 30. For comment on this decision, see R. Maison, "La decision de la Chambre de premiere instance no. 1 du Tribunal penal international pour 1'exYougoslavie dans I'affaire Nikolic", EJIL 7 (1996), 284 et seq. 76 Case IT-95-13-R61, ILR 1'OS (1998), 53 (Decision of 3 April 1996), paras 22-25. In 1997, however, a fourth defendant, Dokmanovic, a Croatian Serb, was charged in respect of the same offences. 77 Cases IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, ILR 108 (1998), 85 (Decision of 11 July 1996), para. 88. 78 Case IT-95-12-R61, ILR 108 (1998),141 (Decision of 5 July 1996). For comment, see O. Swaak-Goldman, AJIL 91 (1997), 523 et seq.

79 Case IT-94-1-T, Decision of 7 May 1997. This decision will be reported in Vol. 112 of the ILR. Compare also the decision of the Supreme Court of Bavaria in the case of Djajic, 23 May 1997, NJW 51 (1998), 392. 80 See Part IV, below.

81 See paras 118-120 and 577-608 of the majority opinion and paras 5-34 of Judge McDonald's Dissenting Opinion. 82 See especially para. 115, where the majority noted that the Government of the FRY provided the supplies for the Bosnian Serb forces which had been formed from units of the JNA. Compare the decision of the Euro- pean Court of Human Rights in Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 1996, ILR 108 (1998), 443, holding that Turkey was responsible for the acts of the unrecognized "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".

83 ILR 108 (1998), 85. 84 On this subject, see C. Greenwood, "International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations", to be published in Vol. 1 (1998) of the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 85 That is true, for example, in Tadic, where the Defendant is accused of the torture and ill treatment of detainees and Erdemovic (Case IT-96-22-T), Decision of the Trial Chamber of 29 November 1996, ILR 108 (1998), 180, and Case IT-96-22- A, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 7 October 1997, to be published in Vol. 111 of the ILR (1998), which concerns the massacre of prisoners following the fall of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia.

86 ILR 108 (1998), 39. 87 See above, p. 113 et seq. 88 See, e.g., A.PV Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 1996, 9-17. 89 See also arts. 52 para. 1, 53 lit. (c) , 54 para. 4, 55 para. 2 and 56 para. 4.

90 For an eloquent argument regarding the significance of article 1, see L. Condorelli and L. Boisson de Chazournes, "Quelques remarques a propos de I'obligation des Etats de "respecter et faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire "en toutes circonstances", in: C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, 1984, 17 et seq. 91 Article 4 para. 1. See also the discussion of this requirement in Rajic. 92 A. Roberts, "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation", in: Euro- pean Commission, Law in Humanitarian Crises, 1996, Vol. I, p. 13, (30-32).

93 The issue is discussed in greater detail by F. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, 1973. See also C. Greenwood, "The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals", NYIL 20 (1989), 35 et seq. and Rogers, see note 88, 11 and 14. 94 See, e.g., the written statements on the General Assembly's request by the United Kingdom (at pp. 58-60), the United States (at pp. 30-31) and the Netherlands (at para. 29). While these views were challenged by a number of other States, the differences on this issue undermine the theory that there is a well established principle of customary law prohibiting such reprisals, since the State practice lacks the requisite consistency. 9s Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports, 1996, 226 et seq. See para. 46 of the Opinion. 96 ILR 108 (1998),141.

97 This aspect of the decision has to be seen in the light of its own particular facts and should not be taken as suggesting that the civilian population of a town or village under attack are always to be regarded as protected persons. Stupni Do was surrounded by territory held by the HVO and could be subdued at will. The case of the civilian population of a town bombarded from a distance or defended by a substantial garrison is quite different. 98 Decision of the Trial Chamber of 7 May 1997, para. 606. 99 Ibid., para. 607.

100 Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 76; for criticism see EJIL 7 (1996), 265 et seq., (272-4). lol ppinion No. 2, ILR 92 (1993), 167.

102 Appeals Chamber Decision, paras 96-127; ILR 105 ( 1997), 419 et seq., (504-520). 103 Professor Rowe, in an article coauthored with Professor Warbrick, finds this denial unconvincing, ICLQ 45 (1996), 691 et seq., (701).

104 Ibid. para. 126. 105 On this subject, see A. Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 and Customary International Law", UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 3 (1984), 55 and C. Greenwood, "Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Proto- cols", in: A.J.M. Delissen and G. Tanja (eds), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead, 1991, 93. lob ILR 52 (1979), 494.

low Rwanda Statute, article 4. 108 Doc. S/1994/674, para. 52. 109 On this subject, see L.G. Maresca, "Prosecutor v. Tadic: the Appellate Decision of the ICTY and Internal Violations of Humanitarian Law as International Crimes", LJIL 9 (1996), 219 et seq. 110 See, e.g., E. Kussbach, "The International Humanitarian Fact-finding Commission", ICLQ 43 (1994), 174 et seq., (177) and D. Plattner, "The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law ap- plicable in non-international armed conflicts", Int. Rev. of tbe Red Cross 30 (1990), 409, (410).

111 Thus, exposing prisoners of war to humiliation and insults would be a violation of article 13 para. 2 of the Third Convention but would not amount to a grave breach. In T. Maelzer, AD 13 (1946), 289 a US Military Commission convicted the German commander of Rome of a war crime for an act of this kind. 112 Manual of Military Law, Part III ,1958,para. 626. The United States Field Manual, 1956, paras 499 and 506 and the Canadian Draft Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 1988, para. 1704, take a similar position. 113 Doc. A/49/10, pp. 70-79. 114 See note 110, 414. lls Preliminary Remarks of the ICRC, 25 March 1993, unpublished. 116 Final Report, see note 108, para. 52.

117 Doc. S/1995/134, para. 12. 118 Meron, see note 63. 119 See note 113. 120 Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, GAOR 50/22, para. 74.

121 That was the approach taken by the courts in the United Kingdom when they decided that a husband could be convicted of raping his wife, Regina v. R. [1992] 1 AC 599 (House of Lords). The European Court of Human Rights rejected a complaint against the United Kingdom in respect of this change in the criminal law, SW v. United Kingdom, Decision of 27 No- vember 1995, ECHR Reports, Series A, Vol. 335-B. See also Meron, see note 63. 122 Statement to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 1 November 1995, p. 3. lz3 ILR 108 (1998), 39.

124 Article 4 para. 2. See also the Convention on the Prevention and Punish- ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, article II. For discussion of this requirement of the offence, see the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case, ICJ Reports 1996, 226 et seq., at para. 26. 125 ILR 108 (1998), 85, para. 95. It must be emphasised, of course, that this is only a provisional conclusion. 126 See above p. 111-112.

127 This is in contrast to the corresponding provision of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal, which stipulates that that Tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only if they are committed "as part of a wide- spread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds" (Rwanda Statute, article 3). In this respect, the jurisdictional provisions of the Rwanda Statute are closer to the substantive law on crimes against humanity than are those of the Yugoslav Tribunal. 128 The Secretary-General's Report on the establishment of the Tribunal (see note 34, para. 48) recognised this requirement of a widespread and systematic attack but it was not expressly incorporated into article 5 of the Statute. Contrast the express provision in article 3 of the Statute for the International Tribunal on Rwanda, adopted by the Security Council in 1994. 129 ILR 108 (1998), 53, para. 30. See also the Decision of the Trial Chamber in Tadic (Trial), decision of 7 May 1997, para. 649. �3o Ibid., para. 652.

131 Doc. S/25704, para. 48. l3z ILR 78 (1988), 124. 133 ILR 108 (1998), 64, para. 29. 134 ILR 105 (1997), 419 at 453, paras 138-42. i3s See, e.g., R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I (9th edition), p. 996. 136 See note 113, at p. 76.

137 Thus, on 10 March 1998 the Prosecutor issued a press release to the effect that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extended to "the current violence in Kosovo" (Press Release CC/PIO/302-E). On 31 March 1998 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1160, para. 17 of which urged the Prosecutor to "begin gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within [the Tribunal's] jurisdiction." 13s Para. 689.

139 Para. 692. 140 Respectively the political leaders of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. 141 See the Decision of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutorv. Blaskic, (IT-95-14- T), 4 April 1997, paras 10-12. ia2 ILR 108 (1998), 21, para. 24 and ILR 108 (1998), 39, para. 21. 143 ILR 108 (1998), 53, para. 17. 144 ILR 108 (1998), 141, paras 58-61. 14S ILR 108 (1998), 85, paras 81-85.

146 Case IT 96-22-T (Sentencing), Decision of the Trial Chamber of 29 November 1996, ILR 108 (1998), 180 and Case IT-96-22-A, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 7 October 1997, to be published in Vol. 111 of the ILR (1998). lay ILR 108 (1998), 180, para. 19. 148 When the case was remitted to the Trial Chamber II, Erdemovic pleaded guilty to war crimes. On 5 March 1998 the Trial Chamber sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.

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