1 Cf. G. Mann, Wallenstein. Sein Leben erzdhlt von Golo Mann, 1974. 2 See C. Walter, "Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance", GYIL 44 (2001), 92 et seq.
3 J. Bodin, Six livres de la Republique, 1993 (first published in 1576). 4 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 2000 (first published in 1660). 5 J. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, 1999 (first published in 1690). 6 Ch.L. De Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois, 1998 (first published in 1748). 7 See e.g. J.P. Muller, "Wandel des Souverinititsbegriffs im Lichte der Grundrechte - dargestellt am Beispiel von Einwirkungen des internationa- len Menschenrechtsschutzes auf die schweizerische Rechtsordnung", in: R. Rhinow/ B. Ehrenzeller (eds), Fragen des internationalen und nationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes, Zeitschrift far Schweizerisches Recht 116 (1997), 45 et seq. (57 et seq.), who points out that the purpose of sovereignty was, historically speaking, to secure peace.
8 For a description of the so-called Westphalian System, see S. Hobe, "The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law", Duq. L. Rev. 40 (2002), 657 et seq.; A. Rosas, "Globaler Konstitutionalismus, Menschen- rechte und staatliche Souveranitat. Die Meilensteine von 1945 und 1948", in: H. Brunkhorst/ M. Kettner (eds), Globalisierung und Demokratie, Wirtschaft, Recht, Medien, 2000, 153 et seq.; D. Thurer, "Recht der Inter- nationalen Gemeinschaft und Wandel der Staatlichkeit", in: D. Thurer/ J.F. Aubert/ J.P Muller (eds), Das Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, 2001, 39 et seq., who uses the term state-"world" instead of Westphalian System. 9 P. Allot, "The Concept of International Law", EJIL 10 (1999), 31 et seq. (35). 10 J.A.C. Salcedo, "Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law", EJIL 8 (1997), 583 et seq. u Salcedo, see above, 583; see also Hobe, see note 8, 657. 12 The Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848 illustrates this point. Its article 2 ascribed the task to the Confederation to safeguard the independence and the security of the country "against foreign powers" ["contre 1'6tranger"]. See T. Cottier/ M. Hertig, "Das V61kerrecht in der neuen Bundesverfas- sung : Stellung und Auswirkungen", in: U. Zimmerli (ed.), Berner ?'age fur die juristische Praxis 1999: Die neue Bundesverfassung. Konsequenzen fiir Praxis und Wissenschaft, 2000, 2 et seq.; G. Malinverni, "L'independance de la Suisse dans un monde interdependant", Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches
Recht 117 (1998), 1 et seq. (7). Similarly, the founding fathers of the United States invoked the hostile international environment as one of the main rea- sons justifying the foundation of the federal state: "It is true, however dis- graceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to ag- grandize or support their particular families or partisans." Cf. A. Hamil- ton/ J. Madison/ J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, 1969 (first published in 1788), Paper No. 4 (Jay), 46; see also Paper No. 6 (Hamilton), 59 et seq. 13 J. Locke, The Treatises of Government 395-99, 1965, 411, quoted in E.U. Petersmann, "How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society", Mich. J. Int'l L. 20 (1998), 1 et seq. (25 et seq.). 14 For a definition of constitutionalism, see for example M. Rosenfeld, Con- stitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy, 1994, 3, according to whom "constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the powers of gov- ernment, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights.'' Similarly E.U. Petersmann, "Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration", Aussenwirtschaft 46 (1991), 247 et seq. (252 et seq.): "Constitutionalism" denotes the basic idea of limited gov- ernment under the rule law." See also U.K. Preuss, "Patterns of Constitu- tional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe", in: J.Hesse/ V. Wright (eds), Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe, 1995, 95 et seq. (95): "[C]onstitutionalism embraces essentially the idea of limited government". 15 T. Cottier/ D. Wuger, "Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf das Verfas- sungsrecht : Eine Diskussionsgrundlage", in: B. Sitter-Liver (ed.), Heraus- geforderte Verfassung, Die Schweiz im globalen Kontext, 1999, 241 et seq. (242 et seq.); the view according to which no constitutional constraints should be imposed in the field of foreign policy is also reflected in the Fed- eralist Papers: "The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be im- posed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circum- stances", Hamilton/ Madison/ Jay, see note 12, Paper No. 23 (Hamilton), 153. 16 Allot, see note 9, 35.
17 The term 'law of co-operation' was coined by W Friedmann, The Chang- ing Strudure of International Law, 1964, 60-68. t8 The term 'global law' instead of 'law of integration' is increasingly used, cf. Hobe, see note 8, 663, see also the series of 'Studies in Global Economic Law', Vol. I -VL, (Peter Lang). 19 See T. Cottier, "Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover", JIEL 5 (2002), 11 et seq. (116).
20 For a succinct description of the process of globalization, see K. Dicke, "Erscheinungsformen und Wirkungen von Globalisierung in Struktur und Recht des internationalen Systems auf universaler und regionaler Ebene sowie gegenlaufige Renationalisierungstendenzen", in: K. Dicke/ W. Hum- mer/ D. Girsberger et al. (eds), Public Law and Private International Law in a Globalising International System, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft fiir Volkerrecht 39 (2000), 13 et seq. (14 et seq.); P. Pernthaler, "Die Globa- lisierung als Herausforderung an eine moderne Staatslehre", in: H. Schaf- fer/ W Berke/ H. Stolzlechner/ J. Werndl (eds), Staat - Uerfassung - Uer- waltung: Festschrift anldsslich des 65. Geburtstages von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Friedrich Koja, 1998, 67 et seq. (69 et seq.); D. Held/ A. McGrew/ D. Goldblatt/ J. Perraton, "Rethinking Globalization", in: D. Held/ A. Mc Grew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2000, 54 et seq.; U. Beck, "What is Globalization?", in: Held/ McGrew, see above, 99 et seq. 21 Cf. in this context the seminal work of L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 1979, 12 et seq. 22 C. Tietje, "Global Governance and Inter-Agency Co-operation in Interna- tional Economic Law", JWT 36 (2002), 501 et seq. (502 et seq.); D. Thurer, "Die Bundesverfassung von 1848: Kristallisationspunkt einer Staatsidee",
Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 117 (1998), 163 et seq. (176); J. Del- briick, "Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets - Implications for Domestic Law - A European Perspective", Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 1 (1993), 10 et seq.; Dicke et al., see note 20, 14. 23 Hobe, see note 8, 656. 24 The concept of regime can be defined as a set of "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations con- verge in a given cause-area", S.D. Krasner, International Regimes, 1983, 1. 25 G. Biaggini, "Die Idee der Verfassung - Neuausrichtung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung?", Zeitschrift fiir Schweizerisches Recht 119 (2000), 445 et seq. (455) (translated by the authors). 26 Biaggini, see note 25, 454. 27 Biaggini, see note 25, 454 et seq. 28 Biaggini, see note 25, 454 et seq. 29 T. Cottier, "Structure-Substance Pairings in the EFTA Experience", in: M. Hilf/ E.U. Petersmann (eds), Nationals Constitutions and International Economic Law,1993, 409 et seq. (434 et seq.)
30 Biaggini, see note 25, 452. 31 G. Biaggini, "Die Offnung des Verfassungsstaates als Herausforderung fiir Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungslehre", in: B. Ehrenzeller et al. (eds), Der Verfassungsstaat vor neuen Herausforderungen: Festschrift fiir Yvo Hangartner, 1998, 957 et seq. (957); T. Cottier, "Globalisierung des Rechts - Herausforderung fiir Praxis, Ausbildung und Forschung", Zeitschrift des BernerJuristenvereins 133 (1997), 217 et seq. (224); D. Schindler, "Der Weg vom "geschlossenen" zum "offenen" Verfassungsstaat", in: Ehrenzeller, see above, 1027; S. Hobe, Der offene Verfassungsstaat zwischen Souveranititt und Interdependenz: eine Studie zur Wandlung des Staatsbegriffs der deutschsprachigen Staatslehre im Kontext iriternationaler institutionalisier- ter Kooperation, 1998. 32 C. Tomuschat, "Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Be- ziehungen", VVDStRL 36 (1978), 7 et seq. (9, 50); D. Thiirer, Perspektive Schweiz. Ubergreifendes Verfassungsdenken als Herausforderung, 1998, 86. 33 Hobe, see note 8, 659 et seq. 34 Hobe, see note 8, 661 et seq. 35 One of the first proponents of the concept of 'international community' was the judge of the ICJ Hermann Mosler, see H. Mosler, "The Interna- tional Society as a Legal Community", in: Collected Courses, The Hague Academy of International Law No. 4 (1974), 140 et seq. and id., The Inter- national Society as a Legal Community, 1980. For later works, see in par- ticular C. Tomuschat, "Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will", in: Collected Courses, The Hague Academy of International Law No. 4 (1993), 195 et seq. and A.L. Paulus, Die internationale Gemein-
schaft im Volkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des V61ker- rechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 2001. 36 Salcedo, see note 10, 588; Thiirer, see note 8, 44. 37 For these concepts, see, among the vast literature, for example the articles by J.H.H. Weiler/ A.L. Paulus, "The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?" EJIL 8 (1997), 545 et seq.; M. Koskenniemi, "Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch", EJIL 8 (1997), 566 et seq.; Salcedo, see note 10, 583 et seq. For a critical account, cf. P. Weil, "Vers une normativite relative en droit interna- tional ?", RGDIP 86 (1982), 5 et seq. 38 See J.A. Frowein, "Konstitutionalisierung des V61kerrechts", in: Dicke et al., see note 20, 427 et seq. (438 et seq.). 39 For Frowein, the 'constitutionalization of public international law means recognition of interests of the community of states and the introduction of mechanisms for their implementation", Frowein, see above, 447. 40 F. Snyder, "General Course on Constitutional Law of the European Un- ion", in: Academy of European Law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Acad- emy of European Law, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1995), 41 et seq. (56).
41 Snyder, see above, 56; J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe", in: J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 1999, 19 et seq., first published in Yale L. J. 100 (1991), 2403 et seq.; id., "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism", in: Weiler, see above, 221 et seq.; E. Stein, Thoughts from a Bridge, a Retrospective of Writings on New Europe and American Federalism, 2000, 15. The first account of the 'constitutionalization' of the EC treaties is generally attributed to an article written by Eric Stein in 1981: "Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass me- dia, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe. From its inception a mere quarter of a century ago, the Court has construed the European Community Treaties in a constitutional mode rather than em- ploying the traditional international law methodology". E. Stein, "Law- yers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution", AJIL 75 (1981), 1 et seq. (1), also published in: Stein, see above, 16 et seq. 42 H. Schloemann/ L. Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and Dispute Settle- ment in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence", AJIL 93 (1999), 424 et seq. (424) and footnote 1. Cf. also id., "Transcending the Na- tion State? Private Parties and the Enforcement of International Trade Law", Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), 675 et seq.
43 D.Z. Cass, "The 'Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judi- cial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade", EJIL 12 (2001), 39 et seq. (39). J.H. Jackson, "The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven 'Mantras' Revisited", JIEL 4 (2001), 67 et seq. (70 et seq.); for a summary of Jackson's view, see J.L. Duvigneau, "Die Konstitutionalisierung des WTO-Rechts. Zur juristischen Diskussion uber Verfassungsstrukturen im Bereich des Handelsv6lkerrechts", Aussenwirtschaft 56 (2001), 295 et seq. (300 et seq.). 45 Jackson, see note 44, 76 et seq. ab M. Krajewski, Verfassungsperspektiven und Legitimation des Rechts der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), 2001, 252 et seq. (261 et seq.). 47 C£ M. Krajewski, "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspec- tives of WTO Law", JWT 35 (2001), 167 et seq. (171). 48 The term "orthopolitics" describes a state-centered view of international law, according to which the individuals only participate in international policymaking through their own governments, S. Charnovitz, "WTO Cosmopolitics", N. Y. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 34 ( 2002), 299 et seq. (306). 49 Charnovitz, see above 48, 310 et seq.
50 Cf. E.U. Petersmann, "Time for a United Nations "Global Compact" for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Les- sons from European Integration", EJIL 13 (2002), 621 et seq., also pub- lished in The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12, 2002; ibid., "Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seri- ously : Rejoinder to Alston", EJIL 13 (2002), 845 et seq. 51 P. Alston, "Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law. A Reply to Petersmann", EJIL 13 (2002), 815 et seq., also pub- lished in The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12, 2002; R. Howse, "Hu- man Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? - Comment on Petersmann", EJIL 13 (2002), 651et seq., also published in The Jean Mon- net Working Paper No. 12, 2002; Krajewski, see note 47, 179 et seq.; D.K. Tarullo, "The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues", JIEL 5 (2002), 941 et seq. (942). 52 Alston, see note 51, 842 et seq. 53 R. Howse/ K. Nicolaides, "Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Con- stitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too far", in: R.B. Porter (ed.), Effi- ciency, equity and legitimacy: the multilateral trading system at the millen- nium, 2001, 227 et seq.; Thurer, see note 8, 43, defends a similar view as re- gards the constitutionalization of public international law, considering this strategy too ambitious. 54 A. von Bogdandy, "Law and Politics in the WTO - Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship", Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), 647 et seq. 55 E. Stein, "International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight", AJIL 95 (2001), 502 et seq. (533).
56 J.H.H. Weiler, "Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade", in: J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the Nafta. Towards a Common Law of International Trade, 2000, 230. s� J.H.H. Weiler, "Cain and Abel - Convergence and Divergence in Interna- tional Trade Law", in: J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the Nafta. Towards a Common Law of International Trade, 2000, 1 et seq. 58 T. Cottier, "Limits to International Trade: the Constitutional Challenge,'' ASIL Proceedings 94 (2000), 220 et seq. (221).
s9 For Swiss authors, see W Kagi, Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundord- nung des Staates. Untersuchungen uber die Entwicklungstendenzen im mo- dernen Verfassungsrecht, 1945; A. Auer/ G. Malinverni/ M. Hottelier, Droit constitutionnel Suisse, Vol. I, 2000, 1: "La constitution est un ensemble de normes qui ont trait a 1'Etat", ("The constitution is a set of legal norms which refer to the state"); for French legal doctrine, cf. G. Vedel, Manuel elementaire de droit constitutionnel, 1949, 3; A. Esmein, Elements de droit constitutionnel franfais et compare, 1921, 1; it is true that the concept of 'constitution' is, according to French legal theory, primarily related to the nation, and not to the state (see A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Ver- fassung Europas, 2001, 97 et seq.), but since the state is considered the legal personification of the nation, state and constitution are clearly connected; cf. Esmein, see above, 1: "L'Etat est la personnification juridique d'une na- tion : c'est le sujet et le support de I'autorit6 publique [...]. Le droit public consiste en ce qu'il donne a la souverainete, en dehors et au-dessus des per- sonnes qui 1'exercent a tel ou tel moment, un sujet ou titulaire ideal et per- manent, qui personnifie la nation entiere: cette personne morale, c'est I'Etat, qui se confond ainsi avec la souverainete, celle-ci etant sa qualite es- sentielle", ("The state is the legal embodiment of the nation: it is the subject and the underpinning of public authority. Public law consists in giving to sovereignty, apart and beyond the people who exercise it at a given mo- ment, an ideal and permanent subject or holder, which embodies the whole nation: this legal entity is the state, which herewith is identical with sover- eignty, the latter being its essential attribute"). For a similar approach, see, among Belgian scholars, YLejeune/ O. De Schutter, "L'adhesion de la Communaute a la Convention europeenne des droits de 1'homme. A pro- pos de 1'avis 2/94 de la Cour de justice des Communautes", Cahiers de Droit Europien 32 (1996), 556 et seq. (572), note 31: "Une constitution est [...] 1'expression souveraine de la volonte d'un peuple de se constituer en Etat [...]." ("A constitution is [...] the sovereign expression of the will of a people to be constituted in a State [...]"). It is the German constitutional doctrine which insists the strongest on a state centered concept of consti- tution. Cf. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 1928, 3: "Das Wort "Verfassung" muss auf die Verfassung des Staates, d.h. der politischen Einheit eines Vol- kes beschrankt werden, wenn eine Verstandigung moglich sein soll," (The term "constitution" has to refer to the constitution of the state, i.e. the po- litical unity of the people, if communication shall be possible"). P. Kirchhof, in: J. Isensee/ P. Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bun- desrepublik Deutschland, Vol. I, 1987, 776: "Die Verfassung ist das Funda- mentalgesetz eines Staates, das die Organisation und die Ausubung der Staatsgewalt regelt, die Entwicklung des Staatswesens und seines Rechts anleitet und die Rechtsposition des Einzelnen im Staat bestimmt", ("The
constitution is the fundamental charter of a state; it governs the organiza- tion and the exercise of state authority, guides the development of the state and its laws, and determines the legal position of the individuals in the state"). For a detailed description of the use of the term 'constitution' outside the context of the Nation State, see Biaggini, see note 25, 448 et seq.; Peters, see note 59, 46 et seq. 61 Cf. Petersmann, see note 13, 11 et seq. 62 Opinion 1/91, Referring to the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, ECR 1991 I, 6084; the terms "constitutional charter" and "Community based on the rule of law" have been first used in Case 294/83, Parti icolo- giste 'Les Verts'v. European Parliament, ECR 1986, 1339 et seq., 1365. 63 Decision Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey of March 4, 1991, Application Numbers 15299/89; 15300/89; 15318/89; see also the subsequent judgment in the same case of the European Court of Human Rights of May 23, 1995, Series A No. 310 § 75. ba A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, 1926. 65 G. Scelles, "Le Droit constitutionnel international", in: Melanges Carri de Malberg, 1933, 503 et seq. 66 Miiller, see note 7, 63 (translated by the authors). 67 C. Tomuschat, "International Law as the Constitution of Mankind", in: United Nations (ed.), International Law on the Eve of the T'wenty first Century. Views from the Interiiational Law Commission, 1997, 37 et seq. 68 Miiller, see note 7, 62 (translated by the authors). 69 S. Langer, Grundlagen einer internationalen Wirtschaftsverfassung: Struk- turprinzipen, Typik und Perspektiven anhand von Europdischer Union und
Welthandelsorganisation, 1995, 17 et seq.; T. Oppermann, "Die Europli- sche Gemeinschaft und Union und die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO)", RIW 41 (1995), 920 et seq.; for a critical assessment, see Krajewski, see note 46, 208 et seq. (translated by the authors). 70 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the Inter- national Community", in: Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 36 (1998), 529 et seq.; see also P.M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter Revis- ited", in: Max Planck UNYB 1 (1997), 1 et seq. 71 For an author warning against the risk that the meaning of the constitution may be diluted, cf. J.P. Muller, Die demokratische Verfassung, 2002, 91. 72 Biaggini, see note 25, 455, (translated by the authors). �3 Biaggini, see note 25, 455, (translated by the authors). �4 Cf. Krajewski, see note 46, 123; C. Dorau/ P. Jacobi, "The Debate over a 'European Constitution': Is it Solely a German Concern", European Public Law 6 (2000), 312 et seq. (417 et seq.); for the historical evolution of the term 'constitution', cf. H. Mohnhaupt/ D. Grimm, Verfassung. Zur Ge- schichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, 2002; J.F Aubert, "La Constitution. Son contenu, son usage", in: J.F. Aubert (ed.), La Cons- titution. Son contenu, son usage; K. Eichenberger, Sinn und Bedeutung der Verfassung, Referate zum 125. Schweizerisches Juristentag 1991, Schwei- zerischer Juristenverein No. 1/2, 1991, 1 et seq.; Peters, see note 59, 40 et seq. 75 See also, D. Grimm, "Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?" Juristen Zeitung 50 (1995), 581 et seq. (582); id., "Does Europe Need a Constitution?", ELJ 1(1995), 284 et seq.; the dichotomy 'normative' and 'descriptive' constitu- tion is sometimes used in a different sense than thereafter. According to J.F Aubert, for instance, the meaning of 'constitution' is normative as soon as it refers to a human collectivity, defining how it should be organized, whereas used in a descriptive manner, the constitution refers to an object or
a human being, describing what its disposition is like, J.F Aubert, "Notion et fonctions de la Constitution", in : D. Thiirer/ J.F Aubert/ J.P Miiller (eds), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, 2001, 3. For this distinction, see also Peters, see note 59, 40 et seq. �6 See B. Marquardt, Das Romisch-Deutsche Reich als Segmentares Verfas- sungssystem (1348-1806/48): Versuch zu einer neuen Verfassungstheorie auf der Grundlage der Lokalen Herrschaften, 1999. �� See R. Uerpmann, "Internationales Verfassungsrecht", Juristen Zeitung 56 (2001), 565 et seq. (566): "Nicht jedes Gemeinwesen hat eine geschriebene Verfassung, aber jedes Gemeinwesen hat Verfassungsrecht. Dieses Verfas- sungsrecht muss mindestens die Hauptakteure konstituieren und gewisse Verfahrensregeln enthalten. Theoretisch konnte sich eine Verfassung damit begnugen, ein Organ der Rechtssetzung einzusetzen und zu regeln, wie dieses Gesetze beschliesst." ("Not every polity has a written constitution, but every polity has constitutional norms. These constitutional norms must at least constitute the main actors and comprise certain procedural rules. Theoretically, a constitution could content itself with establishing one leg- islative organ and with regulating how the latter is to adopt the laws"). 78 See the work of T. Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, 1969. 79 D. Castiglione, "The Political Theory of the Constitution", in: R. Bellamy/ D. Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspective, 1996, 5 et seq. (9), stresses the close link between the concept and the function of the "constitution": "Indeed, what a con- stitution is can hardly be distinguished from what a constitution does".
Also Walter, see note 2, 2001, adopts a functionalist vision. He points out that the traditional constitution of the nation state "is characterized by a bundling of different functions in a single political unit and by means of a single text", ibid., 191. 80 Cf. N. Luhmann, "Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft", Rechtshi- storisches Journal9 9 (1990), 176 et seq. (181 et seq.). 81 Aubert, see note 74, 20 et seq. 82 D.P. Kommers/ W J.Thompson, "Fundamentals in the Liberal Constitu- tional Tradition", in: J.J. Hesse/ V. Wright, Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe, 1995, 35. 83 The integrative function of the constitution is stressed by R. Smend, Ver- fassung und Verfassungsrecht, 1928; contra: Aubert, see note 75, 15 et seq. 84 For the concept of 'teleological constitution', see U.K. Preuss, "Patterns of Constitutional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe", in: Hesse/ Wright, see note 82, 95 et seq.; N. Johnson, "Constitutionalism: Procedural Limits and Political Ends", in: Hesse/ Wright, see note 82, 46 et seq. (49, 54). For the distinction between a liberal and a teleological constitution, see also J.P Miiller, Soziale Grkndrechte in der Verfassung?, 2nd edition, 1981, 55 et seq., who distinguishes between the constitution as "instrument of government" and the constitution as a "material fundamental order" of a polity (translated by the authors).
85 For the normative concept and the functions of the constitution, cf. Muller, see note 71, 87 et seq.; Aubert, see note 75, 14; Grimm, see note 75, 584; id., see note 75, ELJ, 284 et seq.; Preuss, see note 84, 98. 86 See under II. 2. a. bb. 87 In the context of the EU, this point is stressed for example by J.F. Aubert, "Commentaire", Swiss Papers on European Integration 1 (1995), 48 et seq.; with regard to public international law, see S. Oeter, "Internationale Or- ganisation oder Weltfoderation? Die organisierte Staatengemeinschaft und das Verlangen nach einer "Verfassung der Freiheit", in: H. Brunkhorst/ M. Kettner (eds), Globalisierung urcd Demokratie, Wirtschaft, Recht, Medierc, 2000, 208 et seq. (215 et seq.).
88 On this issue, see under IV 4. 89 See also, Biaggini, see note 25, 465; Thnrer, see note 8, 49; the problem of setting the adequate standard is highlighted by G. Majone, "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': the Question of Standards", ELJ4 (1998), 5 et seq. 90 Tarullo, see note 51, 43. 91 This approach is for example chosen by Biaggini, see note 25, 459 et seq., who considers that the requirement of democratic legitimacy can also be fulfilled in the case of international organizations, since their founding treaties are legitimized, indirectly, by the consent of the peoples of the Member States. 92 For such an approach, cf. Peters, see note 59, 67 et seq., who argues, based on a functional analysis, that the democratic principle is not a necessary prerequisite of the concept of constitution but a question of its legitimacy.
93 N. Walker, "The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key", in: G. de Burca/ J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitu- tional Issues, 2001, 31 et seq. (33); Walker proposes seven criterias: (i) the development of an explicit constitutional discourse and constitutional self- consciousness ; (ii) a claim to foundational legal authority, or sovereignty, whereas sovereignty is not viewed as absolute; (iii) the delineation of a sphere of competences; (iv) the existence of an organ internal to the polity with interpretative autonomy as regards the meaning and the scope of the competences; (v) the existence of an institutional structure to govern the polity; (vi) rights and obligations of citizenship, understood in a broad sense; (vii) specification of the terms of representation of the citizens in the polity. 94 Cf. Biaggini, see note 25, 473; J. Trachtmann, "Summary", in: R. Porter/ P. Sauv6/ A. Subramanian/ A.B. Zampetti (eds), Efficiency, Equity, Legiti- macy, 2001, 353; In this sense also Walker, see note 93, 39. 95 Walker, see note 93, 33; similarly, Walter, see note 2, 173, 193, views con- stitutionalism as the bundling of different functions. 96 In this sense, G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1929, 282. 97 J.P Jacque, "Cours general de droit communautaire", in: Academy of European Law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Vol. I, 1991, 247, free translation by the authors. 98 Cf. D. K6nig, Die Ubertragung von Hoheitsrechten im Rahmen des euro- pdischen Integrationsprozesses, 1998, 268 et seq.
99 For an account of the 'statist' view, see the famous Maastricht decision by the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 89, 155, English translation in A. Oppenheimer, The Relationship between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases, 1994, 526 et seq.; Grimm, see note 75, 581 et seq.; id., see note 75, 282 et seq.; id., "Vertrag oder Verfassung: Die Rechts- grundlage der Europaischen Union im Reformprozess Maastricht II", Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 6 (1995), 509 et seq. (528); Konig, see note 98, 286 et seq.; A. Randelzhofer, "Souveranitat und Rechtsstaat: An- forderungen an eine Europaische Verfassung", in: H. Noske (ed.), Der Rechtsstaat am Ende?, 1995, 123 et seq.; P. Kirchhof, "Kompetenzauftei- lung zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und der EU", in: Vertretung der Euro- paischen Kommission in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ed.), Europai- sche Gesprdche 2/94, Europdisches Forum: Die kunftige Uerfassungsord- nung der Europaischen Union, 1994, 59. For a critique of the dichotomy between 'treaty' and 'constitution', see Peters, see note 59, 220 et seq.; Fassbender, see note 70, 560 et seq. loo Cf. Grimm, see note 75, 282: "Constitutions form the legal basis of States. Supranational institutions, by contrast, have their legal basis in interna- tional treaties". 101 The importance of sovereignty in the debate on whether the European Union is to be considered as a confederation or a federation is highlighted by J.H.H. Weiler, "European Democracy and Its Critics: Polity and Sys- tem", in: J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 1999, 264 et seq. (271): "But more profoundly, the vocabulary of Staat and Bund, of federation and federacy and confederation, is a reflection of a preoccupation, even an ob- session, mostly political and ideological, with sovereignty and its location in Europe. The so-called European "federalists" (often Jacobeans in dis- guise) adore the symbolism in the word "federalism" which obviates the need to talk of a state. And likewise, the shrill voices defending national "identity" and Member State rights will look to a terminology and classifi- cation which will patent and trademark the ultimate sovereignty of the Member States".
102 Walker, see note 93, 36. 103 Walker, see note 93, 36. 104 For a critique, see G. Hirsch, "EG: Kein Staat, aber eine Verfassung?" NJW 53 (2000), 46 et seq. (46): "Es erscheint an der Zeit, von Stereotypen und definitorischem Schubladedenken (Staat = Verfassung; Staaten-[ver]bund = Vertrag) Abstand zu halten, die bipolaren Unterstande zu verlassen, und der politischen und rechtlichen Realitat in Europa Rechung zu tragen." ("It is time to distance ourselves from stereotype thinking and conceptual pi- geon-holing (State = constitution; confederation = treaty) and to leave bi- polar stencils, taking into account the political and legal reality in Europe"). 105 See Miiller, see note 71, 92: "So stellt die EU, in der sich Staaten zu ver- bindlichen gemeinsamen Regelungen bestimmter Materien (Prinzip der Einzelermachtigung) geeinigt haben, nur einen Staatenverbund, noch nicht aber eine Verfassung dar, da ein entscheidendes Merkmal fehlt: die Zustan- digkeit der Organisation, des Verbundes zur Anderung der Gemein- schaftsordnung [...] ohne neue volkerrechtliche Vereinbarung nach dem Einstimmigkeitsprinzip". ("Hence the EU, in which the states have agreed on common compulsory regulations of certain determined policy fields (principle of enumerated powers) only represents a union of states, but not yet a constitution, because it lacks a fundamental attribute: the competence of the organization, or the federacy, to change the community order with- out a new international agreement concluded following the unanimity principle"). The argument that the EC does not have legislative 'competence compe- tence' is correct from a strictly legal perspective. Based on a political analy- sis, however, several authors have reached the conclusion that the attribu-
tion of powers has "over the years, lost its 'enumerative' and limited char- acter" ; A.V. Bausili, "Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: Reforming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments", The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9, 2002, 2 et seq.; see also Weiler, see note 41, 51 et seq. It is precisely the concern that the reach of EC law is limitless which incited the German Constitutional Court to insist in its Maastricht judgment, see note 99, on the principle of attributed powers: "In so far as the Treaties establishing the European Community grant sov- ereign rights in relation to certain well-defined situations on the one hand, and lay down rules for amending the Treaties [...] on the other, that dis- tinction also has significance for the future application of the specific attri- bution of powers. Hitherto any dynamic extension of the existing Treaties has been based on a liberal application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, along the lines of a "competence to perfect the Treaty", on the idea of the inherent competences of the European Communities ("implied powers'°) and on a interpretation of the Treaty as implying the fullest possible utilization of Community powers (effet utile) [...]. In future, however, when Commu- nity institutions and bodies interpret rules conferring competence, it will have to be borne in mind that the Union Treaty draws a fundamental dis- tinction between the exercise of a sovereign power granted on a limited ba- sis and amendment of the Treaty. Any interpretation of that Treaty must not, therefore, amount in effect to an extension of it. Such an interpretation of rules conferring competence would not give rise to any binding effect for Germany", quoted according to Oppenheimer, see note 99, 572, em- phasis added. Apart from its formal and legalistic approach, the 'statist' reasoning can also be criticized on the grounds that the 'statist' school does not object to federal entities (for example the Swiss cantons) having a 'constitution', al- though they do not have legislative 'competence-competence' and therefore cannot be considered as states, see P. Craig, "Constitutions, Constitution- alism, and the European Union", ELJ 7 (2001), 125 et seq. (138). 106 The inadequacy of a 'statist' vision of the EU is also stressed by P. Pierson, "The path to European integration: A historical institutional analysis", Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996), 123 et seq. (127): "What one makes of the EU depends on whether one examines a photograph or a moving picture". 107 Fassbender, see note 70, 564.
108 J.H.H. Weiler/ U.R. Haltern, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - Through the Looking Glass", Harv. Int'l L.J. 37 (1996), 411 et seq. (423). 109 The meaning and usage of the terms 'nation' and 'people' differ widely de- pending on the authors and the language. Whereas some authors use them interchangeably (see E.W Bockenforde, "Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes - Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts", in: E.W Bockenfor- de, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 1991, 90 et seq.; J. Marko, Autonomie und Integration. Rechtsinstitute des Nationalitdtenrechts im funktionalen Vergleich, 1995, 115, 37 et seq.), other schools differentiate between both concepts. According to French constitutional theory, for example, the con- cept 'people' (peuple) refers to the sum of all citizens, whereas the nation is an indivisible collectivity which cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate of citizens. Since the nation transcends the citizens, it can only express its will through its representatives, which justifies a system of representative gov- ernment. In contrast, the 'people', understood as the sum of the citizens, can express their will directly, which leads to a system of direct democracy, see D.G. Lavroff, Le droit constitutionnel de la Ve Republique, 2nd edition, 1997, 241 et seq. German authors often refer to the nation as "the people (Volk) which has become aware of its existence through the state", "people and state having merged into a unity", M. Brems, Die politische Integration ethnischer Min- derheiten, 1995, 8. A state in turn can consist of different peoples. Accord- ing to German scholars, the nation thus describes a political entity, com- posed of the citizens, whereas the people is a ethno-cultural community, see Brems, above, 8 and M. Kriele, Einfuhrung in die Staatslehre. Die ge- schichtliche Legitimitdtsgrundlage des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, 1994, 91. It is however important to stress that the nation is not only a po- litical, but also an ethno-national concept, the essential difference between 'Nation' and 'Volk' being that only the former has reached statehood. Anglo Saxon authors frequently use 'nation' as a political, 'people' as an ethno-cultural concept, see for instance J. Elster, "Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction", U. Chi. L. Rev. 58 (1991), 447 et seq.
(450), who defines the nation as a "political entity that is recognized by other countries and by international organizations" and the people "as a community with common traditions, common language, common religion [...]". In Slavonic languages, in contrast, the notion of 'narod', which ety- mologically corresponds to the English concept of 'nation', refers to an ethnic community, see V. Dimitrijevic, "The Absolute Nation State: Post- Communist Constitutions", in: D. Gomien (ed.), Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights, Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide, 1993, 257 et seq. (257). We will use the terms 'nation' and 'people' interchangeably and specify whether we refer to a legal or to a sociological concept. 110 J.H.H. Weiler, "Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg", The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10, 2000, 3; the relationship between the constituent power and the constitution is best described as dialectical, meaning that it is impossible to decide which comes first, the constituent power or the constitution, both terms supposing the existence of the other. The same holds true for the question as to whether the nation is prior to the state or the opposite, see Marko, see note 109, 38. French legal doctrine illustrates well the circularity between the terms 'constitution', 'state' and 'nation': Whereas the nation as 'pouvoir constituant' is deemed to be prior to the state and the constitution, "a population only forms a nation if the collectivity of individuals which it is composed of is subject to the same le- gal order of a state" [i.e. the same constitutional order]", G. Burdeau/ F. Hamon/ M. Troper, Droit constitutionnel, 25th edition, 1997, 30, translated by the authors; see also the references supra, note 59. l Kirchhof, see note 99, 59: "Wo kein Staat, da keine Verfassung, und wo kein Staatsvolk, da kein Staat". 112 As pointed out above, note 59 and 110, French legal theory also assumes the identity of the nation and the state. n3 See Marko, see note 109, 44. la For a critical account of this link, see U. Volkmann, "Setzt Demokratie den Staat voraus?" Archiv des offentlichen Rechts 127 (2002), 575 et seq. (582 et seq.).
115 The German constitutional Court, for instance, has defined the nation as a "cultural and linguistic entity rooted in the consciousness of the popula- tion", BVerfGE 36, 1, 19, translated by the authors. For a description of the German concept of nationhood, see for instance R. Brubaker, Citizenship in France and Germany, 1992, 51 et seq., N. Topperwien, Nation-State and Normative Diversity, 2001, 139 et seq.; M. Hertig, Die Auf losung der T'schechoslowakei, Analyse einer friedlichen Staatsteilung, 2001, 14 et seq. 116 For a critical account of this vision, see Marko, see note 109, 44. 117 see for instance J.K. Bluntschli, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1965 (first pub- lished in 1996), 107: "Jede Nation ist berufen und berechtigt, einen Staat zu bilden. Wie die Menschheit in eine Anzahl von Nationen geteilt ist, so soll die Welt in ebenso viele Staaten zerlegt werden. Jede Nation ein Staat. Jeder Staat ein nationales Wesen". (Each nation has the vocation and is entitled to form a state. In the same way as humanity is divided in a number of na- tions, the world should be divided in as many states. Each nation a state. Each state a national being".) 118 C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 1932, 14, who holds that democracy necessarily requires "firstly homogeneity and secondly - if necessary - the elimination and destruction of heterogeneity" (translated by the authors). 119 Grimm, see note 75, 587 et seq.; although this author distances himself from the Schmittian theory of a homogenous nation, he considers a com- mon language an important prerequisite of collective identity, thus adopt- ing one of the main criterions of the German ethno-cultural concept of na- tion. Grimm acknowledges, however, that in the case of other multilingual polities, such as Switzerland, a democratic system has been formed, but es- timates that the same would not be possible in the case of the EU, since the linguistic diversity is superior to Switzerland. This argument, however, ne-
glects the fact that multilingual polities, such as India, exist, whose linguis- tic diversity is largely superior to the 11 official languages spoken within the EU. izo For a critical account, see J. Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?' ELJ 1 (1995), 303 et seq. (306 et seq.); Craig, see note 105, 139. Both authors point out that a collective identity is not a prerequisite to a democratic process but is formed through the demo- cratic and constitutional process itself. 121 See on this issue under, note 122 and 136. 122 This point is stressed by Weiler, see note 110, 3: "One of the great fallacies in the art of 'federation building', as in nation building, is to confuse the ju- ridical presupposition of a constitutional demos with political and social reality. In many instances, constitutional doctrine presupposes the exis- tence of that which it creates: the demos which is called upon to accept the constitution is constituted, legally, by that very constitution, and often that act of acceptance is among the first steps towards a thicker social and po- litical notion of constitutional demos". The confusion between the con- ceptual link between state and nation, understood as a legal concept, which implies a reflexivity of both terms, and the relationship between the state and the nation, understood as a sociological concept, is also criticized by Marko, see note 109, 44: According to this author, building on the logical question whether the egg or the chicken came first a historical-evolutionary model results in the ideology of nationalism. Under those circumstances, "[t]he nation is, as postulated by the national principle of the ideology of German Romanticism - the "awakening" of the people, the people which has become politically aware of its own existence, and politically and col- lectively organized as a state". ("Die Nation ist dann - wie dies schon das Nationalitatsprinzip der Ideologie der deutschen Romantik postulierte -
das "Erwachen" des Volkes, das sich politisch seiner selbst bewusst gewor- dene Volk, das politisch-verbandlich als Staat organisiert ist"). 123 The examples of Canada and Belgium moreover show that the main crite- rion advanced by the 'statist' school to distinguish between a constitution and a treaty, i.e. the capacity to amend the founding document on the basis of a majority decision, does not always offer a useful criterion to distin- guish between a federation and a confederation. Indeed, the province of Quebec refused to sign the Constitution Act of 1982 and views constitu- tion making as a bilateral process, aiming at the conclusion of a constitu- tional contract between Quebec and the rest of Canada. This theory im- plies that Quebec has a veto right in constitutional matters. Subsequent ef- forts directed at obtaining Quebec's consent to the federal constitution have failed so far, see J.E. Fossum, "The Transformation of the Nation- state : Why Compare the EU and Canada?", Francisco Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism. Working Paper No. 1, 2003, 26 et seq. The distinction between confederate and federal arrangements is thus less clear than commonly assumed. Constitutions can for example confer to ethnic communities a veto right limited to the amendment of certain constitutional provisions, thus combining elements of unanimity with majority decision making procedures. In Belgium, for example, the borders of the linguistic communities and the division of competences be- tween the federal state on the one hand and the regions and communities on the other hand is subject to the approval of each linguistic group in the federal parliament, see arts 4 and 35 of the Belgian Constitution. Moreover, the material scope of unanimity revision can vary greatly depending on the material reach of the constitution. In the European Union, for example, the constitution-making process may well result in the adoption of a "consti- tutional treaty" whose content would be limited to fundamental principles, whereas a large number of the provisions currently enshrined in the founding treaties would be incorporated into secondary law. This would substantially limit the application of the unanimity principle. To conclude, the criterion as to whether the revision of the basic charter of a polity is subject to unanimity or majority procedure is less clear-cut than generally assumed. 124peters, see note 59, 704.
125 For a summary of the primordialist and essentialist school, see C. Emming- haus, Athiopiens ethnoregionaler Foderalismus. Modell der Konfliktbewdl- tigung fiir afrikanische Staaten?, 1997, 21. 126 This aspect is mainly stressed by the constructivist school, which considers nations not as given entities but as social constructions. For an account of the constructivist school, see Hertig, see note 115, 18 et seq. 127 For a definition of assimilation, see A. Addis, "Individualism, Communi- tarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities", Notre Dame L. Rev. 67 (1992), 615 et seq. (619 et seq.): "To assimilate means to mold, to the extent possible, the minority in the image of the dominant group [...]". 128 Integration is generally defined as building a new entity based on different constituent elements. The new entity has to represent more than the sum of the parts, but contrary to assimilation, it recognizes the specificities of the constituent parts, see Brems, see note 109, 5. 129 See Gellner's famous definition of nationalism as "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent", E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1993, 1.
130 See E. Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers etat ?, 1970; for an overview of Sieyes theory, see J. Isensee, Das Volk als Grund der Verfassung - Mythos und Relevanz der Lehre von der verfassunggebenden Gewalt, 1995, 26 et seq. i3i See Sieyes, see above, 180: "La nation existe avant tout, elle est l'origine de tout. Sa volonte est toujours legale, elle est la loi elle-meme. Avant elle et au-dessus d'elle il n'y a que le droit naturel" (The nation exists prior to eve- rything, it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal, it is the law it- self. Prior and superior to the nation, only natural law exists). 132 See H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1925, 249 et seq.; see also A. Auer, "L'adoption et la revision des constitutions: de quelques verites malmenees par les faits", in: R. Bieber/ P. Widmer (eds), Der europaiscbe Verfassungs- raum, 1995, 267 et seq. (271): "Etant necessairement en rupture avec l'ordre constitutionnel qui la precede, la constitution fonde, au moment de son entree en vigueur, un nouvel ordre constitutionnel auquel elle ne peut par definition pas se conformer" ("Being necessarily in breach with the previ- ous constitutional order, the constitution founds, at the moment of its en- try into force, a new constitutional order to which it can by definition not conform"). i33 The theory of revolutionary constitution making was also supported by Carl Schmitt, see note 59. For an analysis of Schmitt's theory of constitu- tion making, see A. Arato, "Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy", Cardozo L. Rev. 17 (1995), 202 et seq. i3a See Hertig, see note 115, 118 et seq.
135 See B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, 1992, 46 et seq.; in- stead of 'window of opportunity', the same author also uses the term °con- stitutional moment", ibid. 48. 136 Weiler, see note 110, 3; see also Stein, see note 55, 526, who points out that in many examples generally considered as traditional nation states (France, Spain, Portugal), the state and the constitution were established before people considered themselves as belonging to one community. As regards France, this is also stressed by A.D. Smith, National Identity, 1991, 76: "The nationalist ideal of Unity (La Republique une et indivisible) has had profound consequences. For one thing, it has encouraged the idea of the indivisibility of the nation and justified the eradication, often by force, of all intermediate bodies and local differences in the interests of cultural and political homogeneity. This has spawned mass-mobilizing policies of social and political integration in which the state becomes the agent of the "na- tion-to-be" and the creator of a "political community" and "political cul- ture" that must replace the various ethnic cultures of a heterogeneous population". 137 Even limited to the Nation State, the recourse to the sovereign and legally unbound nation as 'pouvoir constitutant' was plausible in a context of secularisation and democratization, when the God Given sovereignty of the monarch was replaced by the sovereignty of the nation; see on this subject, H. Kelsen, "Die Rechtswissenschaft als Norm- oder als Kulturwis- senschaft", in: H. Klecatsky et al. (eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, 1968, 37 et seq. (142): "Auf einer gewissen Stufe der religiosen und politischen Entwicklung fallen die Vorstellungen von Gott und Staat gera- dezu zusammen: Der National-Gott ist einfach die in der Personifikation vergottlichte Nation". ("At a certain stage of religious and political devel- opment, the idea of god and state have coincided: The national-god is sim-
ply the personified and deified nation".) In our time, and particularly in a plural context, revolutionary constitution making and setting aside existing institutional structures in the name of an omnipotent constituent power is more difficult to defend. 138 This solution, which emphasizes the principle of legal continuity and legal- ity, has been adopted in Central Europe after the revolutions of 1989. For Poland, see W Osiatynski, "A Brief History of the constitution", East European Constitutional Law Review 6 (1997), 66 et seq.; for Hungary, see A. Arato, "The Constitution-Making Endgame in Hungary", East Euro- pean Constitutional Law Review 5 (1996), 31 et seq.; for Czechoslovakia, see Hertig, see note 115, 108. After decades of homogenizing totalitarian- ism, the new political elites deliberately "renounced revolutionary consti- tution making legitimacy, which would have involved a claim of complete identity with the people in whose name and future interest a total rupture with the past would have been announced. This option, equivalent to a claim of full sovereign constituent power was unacceptable [...]"; A. Arato, "Dilemmas Arising From the Power To Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe", in: M. Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy, 1994, 165 et seq. (177). Instead, the political elites chose to adopt the new post-communist constitutions following the revision proce- dure of the socialist constitutions in force at that time. The break-down of communism did thus not lead to a return into the state of nature but to a constitutionally channelled transition process, commonly described as "self-limiting" or "legal and constitutional" revolutions, Arato ibid., 179, footnote 40; J.L. Cohen/ A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 1992, 31. A Czech author describes the emphasis on pluralism and diversity rather than unity and social homogeneity, in terms of the "absence of the people", see J. Priban, Legitimacy and Legality after the Velvet Revolution, in: J. Priban/ J. Young (eds), Rules of Law in Central Europe, 1999, 29 et seq. (38 et seq.). As he puts it, "[o]n streets and squares there was not the People, rather there were different people with their demands and ideals [...]", Priban, ibid. 40. The Czech constitution, which was adopted on 16 December 1992, a few weeks before the break-up of the Czechoslovak federation, is an interesting example that constitution-making does not necessarily require recourse to a collective actor, a nation. After the adverse experience with nationalism, a reference to the Czech nation in the preamble was deliberately renounced in favour of the more plural and individualistic concept of citizenship: "We,
the citizens of the Czech Republic in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia [...] adopt this Constitution of the Czech Republic". 139 This will be exemplified below IV. 4., using the protection of human rights as an example. 140 T. Schilling, "The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations", Harv. Int'l L. J. 37 (1996), 389 et seq. (390). 141 For such a view, see Schilling, see above, who argues that the European Union does not have a constitution because the ratification of the founding treaties did not amount to a legal revolution and the creation of a legal or- der with original autonomy. 142 For different models of constitution making, see Arato, see note 133, 197 et seq. 143 This aspect is stressed by a Canadian author, who points out that Canada "has undergone the longest and most comprehensive constitutional debate experienced anywhere", Fossum, see note 123, 3, a process he calls "mega- constitutional politics", ibid., 23. Mega-constitutional politics refers to a process which, from a substantive point of view, is more appropriately de- scribed as constitution-making than constitutional revision, but takes place within the established constitutional framework, ibid., 23.
144 Fossum, see note 123, 37. 145 Scelles, see note 65, 510: "Entre I'Etat et les autres societes politiques, il n'existe que des differences de degre, d'integration ou de desintegration". 146 J.H.H. Weiler, "Introduction: The Reformation of European Constitution- alism", in: id., The Constitution of Europe, 1999, 221 et seq. (223). 147 Weiler, see above, 223. 148 Walker, see note 93, 39. 149 Weiler, see note 146, 223. 150 Walker, see note 93, 39. 151 Walker, see note 93, 33.
152 Castiglione, see note 79, 21. 153 See under IV. 6. 154 See also C. Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?", EJIL 4 (1993), 447 et seq. (453): "Rather than grope for the seat of sovereignty, we should adjust our intellectual framework to a multi-layered reality consisting of a variety of authoritative structures. Under this functionalist approach what matters is not the for- mal status of a participant (province, state, international organization) but its actual or preferable exercise of functions. For instance, it is not mean- ingful to attempt to isolate the point at which the European Community will be transformed from an international organization into a European State. Rather, we will have to examine in detail exactly what functions and powers it has assumed from its Member States". 155 A theory of global constitutionalism which considers all levels of govern- ance is also supported by Rosas, see note 8, 172.
156 The following draws from T. Cottier, "Reforming the Swiss Federal Con- stitution : An International Lawyer's Perspective", in: M. Butler/ M. Pender/ J. Chalrey (eds), The Making of Modern Switzerland, 1948-1998, 2000, 75 et seq. 157 I. Pernice, "Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?", CML Rev. 36 (1999), 703 et seq. 158 I. Pernice, "Die Dritte Gewalt im europaischen Verfassungsverbund", Eu- roparecht 31 (1996), 29 et seq., (translated by the authors).
159 H.J. Blanke, "Der Unionsvertrag von Maastricht", Die offentliche Ver- waltung 46 (1993), 412 et seq. (422) (translated by the authors); see also Hobe, see note 31, 392, 422; Konig, see note 98, 274 et seq., 662; Schreuer, see note 154, 453. 160 Cottier, see note 156; T. Cottier, "Einleitung und Synthesen", in: T. Cot- tier/ A. Achermann/ D. Wnger/ V. Zellweger, Der Staatsvertrag im schwei- zerischen Verfassungsrecht. Beitrdge zum Verhdltnis und methodischer An- gleichung von V61kerrecbt und Bundesrecht, 2001, 1 et seq.; T Cottier, "The Impact from Without: International Law and the Structure of Federal Government in Switzerland", in: P. Knoepfel/ W Linder (eds), Verwaltung, Regierung und Verfassung im Wandel. Geddcbtnisscbrift fiir Raimund E. Germann, 2000, 195 et seq. (227 et seq.). 161 In a country like Switzerland, where the communes enjoy a substantial de- gree of constitutionally protected autonomy (see article 50 of the Swiss Federal Constitution), it is in our view justified to consider them as an in- dependent level of governance, although this has not been a traditional way of looking at the matter. The expansion of constitutional notions beyond the traditional levels of the Canton and the Federal Government towards regional and global structures also suggests refining domestic levels, so as to give a complete picture of the entire building. 162 See Cottier, "The Impact from Without", see note 160; R. Mallepell, "Der Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die schweizerische Gesetzgebung", Swiss Papers on European Integration No. 21 (1999); W Wiegand/ M. Briihlhart, "Die Auslegung von autonom nachvollzogenem Recht der Eu- ropaischen Gemeinschaft", Swiss Papers on European Integration No. 23 (1999).
163 The interaction and relationship of different international regimes raises it- self difficult constitutional questions of how to establish coherence be- tween those segments of international law. An example in point is the dis- cussion on the relationship between international trade law and human rights law (see Cottier, see note 19; Petersmann, see note 50; Alston, see note 51, Howse, see note 51). Those issues are beyond the scope of this ar- ticle. But as we will see below (IV. 4), the interaction between 'lower' and 'higher' levels of governance also contributes to further developing a mate- rial hierarchy within international law, based on general principles of law and human rights norms. 164 See article 48 of the Swiss Federal Constitution, which confers on the can- tons the power to conclude inter-cantonal treaties and to set up common organizations or institutions. 165 See article 56 of the Swiss Federal Constitution, empowering the cantons to conclude treaties with other states within the scope of their powers.
166 For such an approach, see for instance the 'Maastricht judgment' of the German Constitutional Court, see note 99. 167 J. Shaw, "Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-National Membership", in: European University Institute (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Vol. VI, No.l (1995), 245 et seq. (271). 168 The banana regulations have triggered over 30 cases in the EC; for the main cases, which in substance upheld the validity of the EC banana regime, see Case 280/93 R, Germany v. Council, ECR 1993, 483; Case 466/93, Atlanta, ECR 1995, 836; Case C-122/95, Federal Republic of Ger»zany u. Council, ECR 1998, I 973 and Joint Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95, T. Port GmbH lll u. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Jonas, ECR 1998, I 1023.
169 See the case 2 BVLl/97. The Constitutional Court declared the complaint for violation of the constitutional rights of property, free exercise of a pro- fession and equal treatment inadmissible, reverting to its "Solange II" ju- risprudence (BVerfGE 73, 339), according to which complaints are only admissible if the mandatory fundamental-rights standard is generally not observed in the EC, as opposed to allegations of a breach of human rights in an individual case. 170 The first two dispute settlement procedures were brought against the EC under the GATT'47 and concluded that the EC regime was incompatible with the GATT; the panel reports were however vetoed by the EC (see Un- adopted Panel Report on European Economic Community Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, 1993 GATTPD Lexis 11 2, DS32/R of 3 June 1993 and Unadopted Panel Report on the European Economic Commu- nity 'Import Regime for Bananas', 181 DS38/R of 18 January 1994, ILM 34 (1995), 177 et seq.; under the negative consensus rule of the WTO 1995, the EC was prevented from blocking the adoption of the subsequent panel re- port, which found the EC in breach of its obligations under the GATT (see Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA of 22 Mai 1997). 171 For an analysis of the banana dispute, see for example J.H. Jackson/ M. Salas, "Procedural Overview of the WTO EC-Banana Dispute", JIEL 3 (2000) 145 et seq.; U. Schmid, "All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision", ELJ 7 (2002), 95 et seq.; J.C. Cascante/ G.G. Sander, Der Streit um die EG-Bananenmarktordnung, 1999; E. Everling, "Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice and National Courts", CML Rev. 33 (1996), 401 et seq. 172pernthaler, see note 20, 79; P. Saladin, Wozu noch Staaten, 1995, 237 et seq.; Hobe, see note 8, 663; Scelles, see note 65, 509 ; Konig, see note 98, 274 ; Snyder, see note 138, critically calls the idea that the state is the sole source of law the "myth of the state".
173 Cf. under II. 2. a. 174 Peters, see note 59, 208 et seq.; Walter, see note 2, 194. 175 For a critique of the concept of absolute sovereignty in an interdependent world, cf. Saladin, see note 172, 28 et seq.; C. Gusy, "Demokratiedefizite postnationaler Gemeinschaften unter Berucksichtigung der Europaischen Union", in: H. Brunkhorst/ M. Kettner (eds), Globalisierung und Demo- kratie, Wirtschaft, Recht, Medien, 2000, 131 et seq. (142 et seq.); N. Walker, "Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union", ELJ 4 (1998), 356 et seq. (358); K. Jayasuriya, "Symposium: The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization: Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance", Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 6 (1999), 425 et seq. (426); T. Fleiner-Gerster, "Probl�mes de la souverainete interieure et exterieure", in: T. Fleiner/ S. Hutter (eds), Feder- alism and Decentralisation, 1987, 63; T. Fleiner/ L.R. Basta, "Federalism, Federal States and Decentralization", in: L.R. Basta/ T. Fleiner (eds), Fed- eralism and Multiethnic States, The Case of Switzerland, 1996, 27; N. MacCormick, "Beyond the Sovereign State", Modern Law Review 56 (1993) 1 et seq. (12 et seq., 16); id., "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post- sovereign State", in: R. Bellamy/ D. Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives, 1996, 143 et seq.; id., "The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now", ELJ 1 (1995), 259 et seq. (265 et seq.); J.A. Frowein, "Verfassungsperspektiven der Europaischen Gemeinschaft", Europarecht Beiheft No. 1, 1992, 63 et seq. (67 et seq.); Schreuer, see note 154, 453; see also III. 2. a. 176 Cf. Gusy, see above, 142 et seq.; Pernice, see note 157, 706; Fleiner/ Basta, see note above, 27.
ln Hamilton/ Madison/ Jay, see note 12, Paper No. 33 (Hamilton), 198 (em- phasis added). 178 Hamilton/ Madison/ Jay, see note 12, Paper No. 33 (Hamilton), 201 (em- phasis added). 179 See Gusy, see note 175, 143. 180 Jayasuriya, see note 175, 427. 181 Weiler, see note 110, 6.
182 Cf. MacCormick, see note 175, 147 et seq. who discusses the monistic theo- ries on whether the 'Grundnorm' is located on the international, European or national level and advocates a pluralistic point of view; see also Frowein, see note 175, 67 et seq. 183 On the idea of multiple loyalties, see also III. 2. a and IV. 3. a. The idea of multiple identities is well known to the theory of federalism, understood as a principle of organizing unity in diversity, cf. P. Pernthaler, Allgemeine Staatslehre und Verfassungslehre, 1996, 289; H. Kilper/ R. Lhotta, F6dera- lismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutscbland, 1996, 30. Without overarching loyalties, federal systems tend to be inherently unstable. As regards the re- gional and the global level, it is obvious that the corresponding identities are much 'weaker' than on the national or local levels. This should however not lead to the conclusion that transnational identities are impossible to achieve. An interesting theory to conceive of identity formation beyond the Nation State has been advanced by Breton, who uses the term 'prag- matic solidarities', referring to the identification with systems resulting from institutionalized factual interdependencies, cf. R. Breton, "Identifica- tion in Transnational Political Communities", in: K. Knop/ S. Ostry/ R. Simeon/ K. Swinton (eds), Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World, 1995, 41 et seq.; for a summary of Breton's theory, see Shaw, see note 167, 266 et seq. The identification with the system depends on the efficiency of the institutions, the "participation in collective achievements, and on the perceived fairness of the distribution of costs and benefits". The increased interest of non-state actors in global issues, coupled with the demands for greater transparency and participation rights can be viewed as signs that transnational identities are gradually emerging. ts4 PL. Lindseth, "'Weak' constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology and Transnational Governance in the European Union," Oxford Journal of Le- gal Studies 21 (2001), 145 et seq. (148); see also J.H.H. Weiler/ U. Haltern/ F. Mayer, "European Democracy and Its Critics - Five Uneasy Pieces", Swiss Papers on European Integration No.l (1995), 22 et seq.
185 Lindseth, see above, 148. 186 Pernice, see note 157, 713 et seq. 187 Walker, see note 175, 361 et seq. 188 MacCormick, see note 175, 264; sociological realism refers to the fact that the institutions of a given legal system look to this legal order to assess their competences and the validity of their actions and do not regard those issues as being dependent on another legal order.
189 See for example the decisions "Solange I" (BVerfGE 37, 271); "Solange II" (BVerfGE 73, 339), "Maastricht", see note 99, the decision referring to the 'Banana dispute' (2 BVL1/97) of the German Constitutional Court, and the decisions 'Frontini' (Foro italiano 1974, Vol. I, 314), 'Granital' (Giurispru- denza costituzionale 1984, Vol. I, 1098), und 'Fragd' (Giurisprudenza co- stituzionale 1989, Vol. I, 1001) of the Italian Constitutional Court; for a summary of the case law, including decisions of other Member States, see Oppenheimer, see note 99; T. De Berranger, Constitutions nationales et construction communautaire, 1995. 190 Hamilton/ Madison/ Jay, see note 12, Paper No. 44 (Madison), 286 et seq. 191 G. Pescatore, "Aspects judiciaires de 1' acquis communautaire", RTDE 17 (1981), 617 et seq. (632), "C'est en vertu de sa nature propre que le droit communautaire - et la meme chose est d'ailleurs vraie du droit internatio- nal - affirme sa superiorite; c'est parce qu'il est le droit du tout et que
1'ensemble ne peut exister qu'a la condition que les parties integrantes su- bordonnent leurs interets a ceux de 1'ensemble". t92 The two reasons justifying the supremacy of 'higher' levels of governance are also implicit in Pernice's reasoning: "[...] primacy of European law in the multilevel constitutional system of the European Union is founded on the common decision of the peoples of the Member States to achieve a functioning structure of political action above the State level", Pernice, see note 157, 719, (emphasis added). 193 On the issue of participation in the higher level of governance, see T. Cot- tier/ C. Germann, "Die Partizipation bei der Aushandlung neuer volker- rechtlicher Bindungen: verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen und Perspekti- ven", in: D. Thiirer/ J.E Aubert/ J.P. Miiller (eds), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, 2001, 77 et seq. (94 et seq.).
194 Cottier, "The Impact from Without", see note 160, 219; Saladin, see note 172, 246 et seq. 195 J.P Muller, "Kants Entwurf globaler Gerechtigkeit und das Problem der republikanischen Reprasentation im Staats- und V61kerrecht", in: P. Zen- Ruffinen/ A. Auer (eds), De la Constitution. Etudes en I'honneur de Jean- Franfois Aubert, 1996, 133 et seq. (151). 196 See the decisions 'Solange I', 'Solange II', 'Maastricht' and the decision re- ferring to the 'Banana dispute', see note 189.
19� See Cottier/ Hertig, see note 12, 25. 19s On this issue, see Cottier, "Einleitung und Synthesen", see note 160, 9 et seq. and D. Wuger, "Die direkte Anwendbarkeit staatsvertraglichen Rechts", in: T. Cottier/ A. Achermann/ D. Wiiger/ V. Zellweger, Der Staatsvertrag im schweizerische Verfassungsrecht. Beitrdge zum Verhilltnis und methodischer Angleichung von V61kerrecht und Bundesrecht, 2001, 95- 253 ; a very concise summary can be found in Cottier/ Hertig, see note 12, 25 et seq. 199 In Switzerland, an amendment of the federal Constitution, accepted on 9 February 2003, extends the facultative referendum to all state treaties which contain important legislative provisions or the implementation of which require the adoption of a federal statute (see the new article 141a § 1 of the Federal Constitution). So as to secure the effective legislative implementa- tion of ratified treaties, the Federal Constitution enables the Parliament to include the implementing legislation in the vote on the state treaty itself (new article 141a § 2). This solution avoids the contradictory situation where an international treaty is ratified but cannot be complied with be- cause the implementing legislation is challenged in a subsequent referen- dum.
200 On this issue, see Cottier/ Hertig, see note 12, 18 et seq. 201 Arts 194 § 2 and 129 § 3 of the Swiss Federal Constitution. 202 Cf. article 49 of the Swiss Federal Constitution; article 6 of the Constitu- tion of the United States; article 31 of the German Constitution; article 109 of the Australian Constitution. 203 In Canada, for example, the Canadian Charter of fundamental rights con- tains, as a concession to Quebec, the so called 'notwithstanding clause', which enables a province to derogate from a provision of the Charter for a limited period of time. Quebec has used this derogation so as to uphold the validity of its famous 'French only' legislation, see M. Nemni, "Ethnic Na- tionalism and the Destabilization of the Canadian Federation", in: B. de Villiers (ed.), Evaluating Federal Systems, 1994, 148 et seq. In Belgium, no supremacy clause was introduced into the federal constitution, which was explained by the centrifugal character of the Belgium federation. The rela- tionship between federal law and the law of the regions is viewed not in terms of a hierarchy but as two distinct coordinated legal orders, which op- erate in their respective spheres of competencies, see A. Alen, Der Foderal- staat Belgien: Nationalismus-Foderalismus-Demokratie, 1995, 35; F. Ler-
quin-De Vischer, "Les r6gles de droit", in: E Delperee (ed.), La Belgique federale, 1994, 210 et seq. (210). The constitutional courts of some Member States of the European Union have adopted a similar view with regard to the relationship between the EC legal order and the national legal order (see for example the decision 'Granital' of the Italian Constitutional Court, Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1984, Vol. I, 1098).
Zo4 Among the vast literature on this issue, see for a succinct summary, P Craig/ G. De Burca, EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 2003, 317 et seq.; for a comprehensive study on the EU's human rights policy, see P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, 1999. The development of the protection of fundamental rights within the EC re- sembles the advent of human rights protection in Switzerland, in as much that the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848/1874 did not comprise a com- prehensive catalogue of fundamental rights. Similarly to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaties of Rome, the fundamental rights pro- tected by the Swiss Federal Constitution, in particular the freedom of es- tablishment and the economic freedom, were mainly rights aimed at elimi- nating trade barriers between the cantons, see T Cottier/ B. Merkt, "La fonction federative de la liberte du commerce et de l'industrie et la loi sur le marche interieur Suisse: influence du droit europeen et du droit interna- tional economique," in: P. Zen-Ruffinen/ A. Auer (eds), De la Constitution. Etudes en l'honneur de Jean-François Aubert, 1996, 449 et seq. 205 See note 189.
206 Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, ECR 1969, 41. See also Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide und Futter- mittel, ECR 1970, 1125 : "Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of na- tional law in order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the insti- tutions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law. [...] Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formu- lated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national consti- tutional structure. [...] However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law protected by the Court of Justice". 207 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide und Futtermittel, ECR 1970, 1125 at § 4. zos Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, ECR 1974, 491 § 13. 209 See for example Case 222/84, Johnston v. Royal Ulster Constabulary, ECR 1986, 1651, § 18; Case C-260/89, Ellinki Radiophina Tiliorassi AE (ERT') v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and others, ECR 1991, I 2925, § 41. 210 See the judgment Matthews v. UK, of 18 February § 34-35.
211 Hobe, see note 8, 663; an interesting example in this respect is article 23 of the German Constitution, which subordinates the delegation of powers to the EU to the respect of core principles: "To realize a unified Europe, Germany participates in the development of the European Union which is bound to democratic rule of law, social, and federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity and provides a protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that of this Constitution. The federation can, for this purpose and with the consent of the Senate, delegate sovereign pow- ers". 212 Article 6 in relation with article 7 and 49 of the EU Treaty. z13 Article 7 of the EU Treaty.
214 Peters, see note 59, 213; Frowein, see note 175, 66, who talks about the "dialectical homogenizing effect of the EC" (translated by the authors). 215 The following passage draws on Cottier, see note 156. 216 Most federal systems know the category of implied powers, which are however rarely used in Switzerland. z1� See article 3 of the Swiss Federal Constitution.
218 On this point and related matters see Cottier, see note 31, 217 et seq. 219 A good and telling example in this context is the regulation of government procurement in Switzerland. Overall rights and obligations are defined by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Since the Federal Government has very limited powers to regulate the matter for the Can- tons, it only enacted a comprehensive bill on government procurement for the federal entities. Limited rules on non-discrimination are contained in
the internal market bill, partly with differing rules (in social standards) from the Federal Procurement Act. The Cantons undertook to harmonize the matter in an interstate compound, partly inconsistent with the internal market bill, and further legislation exists within the Cantons on the matter, see T. Cottier/ B. Merkt, "Die Auswirkungen des Welthandelsrechts der WTO und des Bundesgesetzes uber den Binnenmarkt auf das Submissions- recht der Schweiz", in: R. von Buren/ T. Cottier (eds), Die neue schweize- rische Wettbewerbsordnung im internutionulen Umfeld, 1996, 35 et seq., with an Annex containing the WTO Agreement on Government Procure- ment in English, 163 et seq. Since the entry into force of the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the European Union on 1 June 2002, public procurement has also been governed by a specific agreement on this issue, which builds on and complements the WTO agreement on public procurement, see T. Cottier/ E. Evtimov, "Die sektoriellen Abkommen der Schweiz mit der EG: Anwendung und Rechtsschutz", Zeitschrift des Ber- nerJuristenvereins 139 (2003), 84 et seq. 220 A good example is the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, which also contains a substantial portion on civil and administrative procedures, for which the EC does not have any internal jurisdiction to regulate. These provisions enlarge responsibilities of the EC in external re- lations, but leave the matter to Member States domestically, the EC having no jurisdiction to enforce these rules contained in a so-called mixed agree- ment.
221 See T. Straubhaar, "Auswirkungen des freien Personenverkehrs auf die Mi- gration in Westeuropa", Swiss Papers on European Integration, No. 4 (1996), 13 et seq.; and D. Chambovey, "L,'impact potentiel de la libre circu- lations des personnes avec les pays de l'Espace economique europeen sur les flux migratoires en Suisse", Swiss Papers on European Integration No. 4 (1996), 37 et seq. 222 See Dicke et al., see note 20, 27 et seq.
223 The principle of subsidiarity, which plays an important role in the Euro- pean Union, is increasingly also referred to with a view to limiting compe- tences of the global level. See R. Howse, "Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime", AJIL 96 (2002), 94 et seq. (112); J. Bour- geois, "Subsidiarity" in the WTO Context from a Legal Perspective", in: M. Bronckers/ R. Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law. Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson, 2000, 35 et seq.; R.O. Keohane/ J.S. Nye Jr., "Introduction", in: J.S. Nye Jr./ J.D. Donahue (eds), Govern- ance in a Globalizing World, 2000, 37 et seq. 224 see the Declaration 23 of the Treaty of Nice (Declaration on the Future of the European Union), which enumerates, among the issues to be addressed, "how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers be- tween the EU and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiar- ity". 225 See G. De Burca, "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance after Amster- dam", The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7 (1999), 4 et seq.; id., "Setting Constitutional Limits to EU Competence?", Francisco Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism, Working Paper No. 2 (2001), 15 et seq. and R. Dehousse, "Reflexions sur la naissance et 1'evolution du principe de subsidiarite", in: F. Delperee (ed.), Le principe de subsidiarite, 2002, 361 et seq. (364 et seq.). 226 See also N. MacCormick, "A Comment on the Governance Paper", The Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6 (2001), 172; Lerquin-De Vischer, "Existe-t-il un principe de subsidiarite", in: F. Delperee (ed.), Le principe de subsidiarite, 2002, 21 et seq.
227 Dehousse, see note 225, 364, translated by the authors.
zza See for instance De Burca, "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance", see note 225, 9. zz9 See A. Dubach, "Integration und Subsidiaritat", Swiss Papers on European Integration No. 8 (1996), 1 et seq. (18). z3� De Burca, see note 225, 12. z3i For the distinction of 'process' and 'outcome', see De Burca, "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance", see note 225, 4. 232 For a definition of the subsidiarity principle taking into account both the democratic principle of governance as close to the citizens as possible and efficiency, see MacCormick, see note 226, 172: "governmental tasks should be carried out at a level as close to the citizens affected as is consistent with equity and with efficiency in the pursuit of common goods." z33 See Cottier, see note 156, 88.
234 The example of shoe labelling was mentioned in the first report of the Commission on subsidiarity as an example in which EC legislation was abandoned, cf. Dehousse, see note 225, 363. 235 See De Burca, "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance", see note 225, 4. 236 MacCormick, see note 226, 172. 237 Dehousse, see note 225, 365. 238 By direct participation, we refer for example to the Council of Ministers, which enables the Member States to take part in the law-making procedure on the EC level. 239 By indirect participation, we mean for example procedures allowing sub- - national entities to influence the position national authorities will defend on the regional and international level. 240 P. Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s, 1996, 181.
241 Cottier, see note 156, 88 et seq.; Dehousse, see note 225, 362. 242 See Bausili, see note 105, 8; De Burca,, "Reappraising Subsidiarity's Signifi- cance", see note 225, 33 et seq. z43 See Weiler/ Haltern, see note 108, 443; So far, the ECJ annulled acts of Community institutions for breach of the principle of proportionality or legality, but never for violation of the principle of subsidiarity, cf. Bausili, see note 105, 10, footnote 24. The teleological interpretation of EC law by the ECJ, expressed in the `ef fet utile' doctrine, has, as pointed out above, met with resistance from na- tional constitutional courts. See on this subject the Maastricht decision by the German Constitutional Court, see note 105. On the global level, in the framework of the WTO, the concern of the Member States to prevent a dynamic interpretation of WTO law by the panels resulted in the adoption of article 3 § 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This provision reads as follows: "The dispute set- tlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agree- ments in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public inter- national law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements". (emphasis added). The same obligation is also laid down in art. 19 § 2 DSU. 244 Such proposals have been made by Weiler/ Haltern, see note 108, 447; MacCormick, see note 226, 181; the need for external control is also stressed by Bausili, see note 105, 5 et seq. 245 MacCormick, see note 226, 181; Bausili, see note 105, 6. 246 The following section is drawn on T. Cottier/ M. Oesch, "The Paradox of Judicial Review in International Trade Regulation: Towards a Comprehen- sive Framework", in: T. Cottier/ P.C. Mavroidis (eds), P. Blatter (associated editor), The Role of the judge in International Trade Regulation: Experi- ence and Lessons for the WTO, The World Trade Forum Vol. 4 (forthcom- ing). 247 See under II. 1.