Nations, Nation-Building, and Cultural Intervention: A Social Science Perspective

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Nations, Nation-Building, and Cultural Intervention: A Social Science Perspective

in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online

References

I J. Hippler, "Gewaltkonflikte, Konfliktpravention und Nationenbildung - Hintergrunde eines politischen Konzepts", in: J. Hippler (ed.), Nation- Building: Ein Schliisselkonzeptfiirfriedlicbe Konfliktbearbeitung?, 2004, 14 et seq.; J. Dobbins et. al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Ger- many to Iraq, 2003.

2 One word on the terminology which will be used throughout this paper: the term 'nationalism' has acquired a thoroughly negative connotation in popular usage and even in academic discourse. It is commonly associated with the aggressive phenomenon of mass nationalism which spread through Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, culmi- nating in the explosions of hatred and violence of the two World Wars. In analytic terms, however, this does not appear to be satisfactory. National- ism did not start at mass level and what we are actually looking at is a par- ticular and later stage in the history of nationalism. What is meant by a 'na- tionalist' here is someone who is an adherent of the nation: someone who believes and accepts that nations exist and who is part of a society with a national collective identity. In this, the terminological usage of recent scholarship in history, political science, and sociology on nationalism fol- lowing Liah Greenfeld is adopted.

3 For a concise summary of the literature on the problem of nationalism and democracy, see P.A. Kraus, Nationalismus und Demokratie: Politik im spanischen Staat der Autonomen Gemeinschaften, 1996, 56 et seq. 4 E. Renan, Was ist eine Nation?...und andere politische Schriften, 1995, 56 et seq. (58). 5 For a concise summary of the debate (and a different grouping), see R. Wo- dak et al., Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identitdt, 1998, 20 et seq.

6 Renan, see note 4. See also E. Balibar, "Die Nation: Form, Geschichte, Ideologie", in: E. Balibar/ I. Wallerstein (eds), Rasse, Klasse, Nation: Am- bivalente Identitdten, 1990, 107 et seq. 7 R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 1992, 11; D. Richter, "Der Mythos der "guten" Nation: Zum theoriegeschicht- lichen Hintergrund eines folgenschweren Mif3verstandnisses", Soziale Welt 3 (1994), 304 et. seq; A.F. Reiterer, Die unvermeidbare Nation: Ethnizititt, Nation und nachnationale Gesellschaft, 1988, 1. I would follow Maxim Silverman's critique of the Staatsnation-Kulturnation dichotomy, since both nationalist historiographies make use of "objective criteria" and both concepts depend on popular acceptance or "will" in order to acquire ideo- logical and political power, see M. Silverman, Rassismus und Nation: Ein- wanderung und die Krise des Nationalstaats in Frankreich, 1994, 34. 8 E. Gellner, Nationalismus und Moderne, 1995, 85; E. Hobsbawm, Nationen und Nationalismus: Mythos und Realitdt seit 1780, 1991, 16. 9 Gellner, see above, 86-87. 10 Ibid., 39.

11 Hobsbawm, see note 8, 21; F. Heckmann, Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie inter-ethnischer Beziehungen, 1992, 41-43. 12 E. Gellner, Thought and Change, 1964, 169. 13 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1991, 6. 14 Ibid., 7.

15 Ibid., 36. 16 Ibid., 19-36. 1� See also G. Delany/ P. O'Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory: Moder- nity and the Recalcitrance of the Nation, 2002, 4. 18 Anderson, see note 13, 19 et seq. 19 Ibid., 22. See also, for example, R. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 1995 and 2000, Vol. I, 255-296, 379-404, Vol. II, 159-306. 20 Anderson, see note 13, 36.

21 R. Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, 1989, 261, 266, 315; R. Bubner, Geschichtsprozesse und Handlungsnormen: Untersuchungen zur praktischen Philosophie, 1984, 74. 22 L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 1992, 3, 18, 21. For her critique of Anderson and Gellner, see footnote 16, 496 et seq. and L. Greenfeld, "The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France", Re- search in Political Sociology 5 (1991), 333 et seq.

23 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see above, 4-14. See also G. Zernatto, "Nation: The History of a Word", Review of Politics 6 (1944), 351 et seq.; H.D. Kahl, "Einige Beobachtungen zum Sprachgebrauch von natio im mittelal- terlichen Latein mit Ausblicken auf das neuhochdeutsche Fremdwort Na- tion", in: H. Beumann/ W Schroder (eds), Aspekte der Nationenbildung im Mittelalter. Ergebnisse der Marburger Rundgespräche 1972-1975, 1978, 63 et seq. (104-105). 24 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see note 22, 3.

25 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see note 22, 14. 26 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see note 22, 26; W Bloom, Personal Identity, Na- tional Identity, and International Relations, 1990, 59. In this context, Max Weber's famous definition of "subjective meaning" is also worth looking at again, as is Georg Simmel's idea of the individual finding a place in a more general identity, and that, in fact, this general identity from the outset al- lows for individuality. See M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 1984, 19; G. Simmel, Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, 1992, 61.

27 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see note 22, 15. zg Ressentiment as a sociological and psychological phenomenon has first been described by Friedrich Nietzsche in the late 19th century, and it has been elaborated by Max Scheler just before the Great War. Ressentiment is an "imaginary revenge" by those who feel inferior to the original creators. Their denial of the superiority of the model is, according to Nietzsche, a creative act, but it is always a reaction to some kind of pre-established model. Scheler takes this a step further. He, too, writes that frustrated at- tempts to realize a certain value lead to a tendency to resolve the tension between desire and inability by denigrating the value which had been at- tempted to realize. In certain cases, Scheler continues, this process can re- sult in a positive evaluation of a value negating the original value. This transvaluation of values, meaning the replacement of the values of the model by counter-values, is of tremendous importance in the history of na- tionalism. Greenfeld even concludes that "ressentiment was the single most important factor in determining the specific terms in which national iden- tity was defined." See F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift, 1991, 30; M. Scheler, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, 1978, 26, 29; Greenfeld, see note 22, 16. For more recent attempts to apply the concept, see K.H. Bohrer/K. Scheel (eds), Ressentiment! Zur Kritik der Kultur, 2004. For a review of this volume pointing out the anti- semitic nature of Nietzscbe's argument and the anti-democratic connota- tions of ressentiment, see P. Burger, 'Herren unter sich', Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie 1 (2005), 168 et seq.

29 Greenfeld, Nationalism, see note 22, 227 et seq.; 257 et seq., 266 et seq. 30 Recent sociological thinking on this question supports this view. What is seen as modernity or the modern condition essentially takes on the charac- ter of a project rather than a particular institutional reality. Peter Wagner, for example, emphasizes that there is a difference between the discourse about the modern project and the practices and institutions of modern so- cieties, implying that the debates and ideological sea changes were much more revolutionary than any structural layout of a modern or modernizing society would reflect. Wagner even uses a term very familiar to any student of Anderson and Greenfeld when he writes about the "imaginary meaning of modernity" in order to describe the revolution in human self-perception at the beginning of the project - which is a new and fundamentally autonomous image of man. This autonomy would apply in relation to oth- ers as well as to his rule over his own body, nature, and to his capability to act in order to further his own aims. Thus, the constitutive moment of modernity is individuals seeing themselves as the makers of social order

and imagining the future. By doing this, Kurt Imhoff writes, they devalue transcendental reasons for contingency and religious legitimation of social order. In consequence, they lose traditional landmarks guiding their ac- tions. See P. Wagner, Soziologie der Moderne: Freiheit und Disziplin, 1995; 25, 82; K. Imhoff/ G. Romano, Die Diskontinuitdt der Moderne: Zur ?'heo- rie des sozialen Wandels, 1996, 12. 31 On nationalisms outside of Europe, see J. Breuilly, "The State and Nation- alism", in: M. Guibernau/J. Hutchinson (eds), Understanding Nationalism, 2001, 32 et seq., 45-48.

32 N.M. Karamzin, Istoria gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, 1892; quoted in: N.M. Karamzin/ G.P. Makogonenko (ed.), Predaniya vekov: Skazaniya, legendy, rasskazy iz "Istoria gosudarstva Rossiiskogo ", 1988, 31. My translation. 33 H. v. Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 1895-1897, Vol. 1, 1. My translation. 34 j�aramzin had been appointed official historiographer in 1803, and in 1818, he dedicated his monumental work to the tsar, thus symbolically placing

Russian history at the disposal of the autocracy. See H. Lemberg, Die na- tionale Gedanken�rvelt der Dekabristen, 1963, 127-128; E.C. Thaden, The Rise of Historicism in Russia, 1999, 56. In 1888, Treitschke positioned him- self very firmly in the camp of anti-liberal opinion in Germany when he published a brochure belittling and ridiculing the personality and politics of Frederick III, the father of the last Kaiser, who had been the symbol of potential liberal reforms in the late 19th century and had therefore stood for an alternative vision of German nationhood. See J.C.G. Rohl, Wilhelm ll: Der Aufbau der Persdnlichen Monarchie 1888-1900, 2001, 76. 35 J.J. Linz/ A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 1996, 451- 452. For a usable past as an approach to cultural history without attempts at systematization, see W J. Bouwsma, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History, 1990. 36 The concept of a usable past can be traced back to Nietzsche. His essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", introduces the no- tion that it is methodically impossible to look at history unfiltered and in toto. In fact, he writes, it is imperative to deconstruct and reconstruct his- tory if it is to be of any political use at all. Nietzsche goes on to say that not only individuals like politicians can benefit from creating their own usable pasts but societies as a whole, too. See F. Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fiir das Leben, 1989, 40, 43.

37 A. Brown, "Introduction", in: A. Brown/ J. Gray (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 1977, 1 et seq. (1). 38 For example, Catherine II of Russia employed enlightenment thinking as the foundation of a new, national legitimation of autocratic Russian monar- chy. She found ample evidence for her assertion that autocracy was the form of government most attuned to the Russian national character in early Russian chronicles. Translating this usable past into foreign policy, the em- press drew on the Byzantine heritage and the traditions of the Orthodox Church in establishing the 'liberation' of Constantinople as Russia's 'his- toric mission' which remained on the Russian foreign policy agenda until 1916. On this, see S.H. Cross/ O.P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (eds), The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text, 1973; H. Riig, "Die Waragerfrage", in: M. Hellmann/ G. Schramm/ K. Zernack (eds), Handbucb der Geschichte Ruf3lands, 1981, Vol. 1, I, 267 et seq.; Wortman, see note 19, Vol. 1, 5-6, 22- 29, 133, 138 f.; F. Gopfert (ed.), Katharina-Lesebuch: Literarisches aus der Feder der russischen Zarin Katharina IL, 1996, 149 et seq.; C. Scharf, Katharina II., Deutschland und die Deutschen, 1995, 252; Ch.L. de Mon-

tesquieu, De I'Esprit des Lois, Book 8, Chapter 19, in: CEuvres completes, Vol. 2, 1976, 365; Catherine II, Instruction fiir die zu Verfertigung des Entwurfs zu einem neuen Gesetzbucbe verordnete Commif3ion, 1768 (re- print 1970), 5; A. Lentin, '"Une Ame Republicaine?" Catherine, Montes- quieu, and the Nature of Government in Russia: The nakaz through the eyes of M.M. Shcherbatov, in: Filosofskii Vek: AI'manakh, 11. Ekaterina II i ee vremia. Sovremmenyi Vzgliad, Sankt-Peterburgskii Tsentr Istorii Idei, 1999, 79 et seq.; E. Hosch, "Das sogenannte "griechische Projekt" Kathari- nas II.", in: Jahrbiicher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas XII (1964), 168 et seq.; V C. Vasyukov, " Glavniy priz ": S.D. Sasonov i soglashenie o Konstantino- pole i prolivakh, in: A.V. Ignatiev/ 1.S. Rybachenok/ G.A. Sanin (eds), Rossiskaya diplomatiya v portetakh, 1992, 355 et seq. 39 On the question of a 'European' identity replacing a traditional German identity, see D. Langewiesche, Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa, 2000, 190; T.G. Ash, In Europe's Name: Ger- many and the Divided Continent, 1994, 19-25. On the Historikerstreit, see R.J. Evans, "The new nationalism and the old history: perspectives on the West German Historikerstreit", Journal of Modern History 59 (1987), 761 et seq.; G.A. Craig, "The war of the German historians", The New York Review of Books of 15 January 1987; G. Eley, "Nazism, Politics, and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986- 1987", Past and Present 121 (1988), 171 et seq.; C.S. Maier, The Unmaster- able Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity, 1988; R.J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to es- cape from the Nazi Past, 1989. See also an entire volume published in 1989 by the Federal Agency for Political Education on history and conscious- ness of the Federal Republic of Germany, which almost exclusively deals with the relationship of contemporary Germans with the Nazi past, thus establishing the Nazi experience as the only source of a historical con- sciousness of West Germans in the year of reunification. Bundeszentrale fiir politische Bildung, Bundesrepublik Deutschland.� Geschichte, Bewuj3t- sein, 1989. On the role of the presidents of Western Germany in public his- torical discourse, see D. Langewiesche, "Geschichte als politisches Argu- ment : Vergangenheitsbilder als Gegenwartskritik und Zukunftsprognose: Die Reden der deutschen Bundesprasidenten", Saeculum 1992, 36 et seq.; R. von Weizsacker, Von Deutschland aus: Reden des Bundesprasidenten, 1987, 7-8.

40 A usable past need not take the form of historical writing. The role of art and architecture in visualizing the nation is a particularly interesting one. See S. Bozdodan, Modernism and Nation-building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic, 2001. 41 Elite is classically defined as those individuals "occupying positions at the top of a group, organisation, or institution [...] and who are, because of the role of their positions, sufficiently powerful or influential beyond the con- cerns of their groups to contribute directly to the preservation or change of the social structure, its founding norms; or who can be, because of their prestige, an example to others beyond their group and thus normatively codetermining their actions." See H.P. Dreitzel, Elite-Begriff und Sozial- struktur: Eine soziologische Begriffsanalyse, 1961, 71. 42 On the role of intellectuals in the German nation-building process, see B. Giesen/ K. Junge/ C. Kritschgau, "Vom Patriotismus zum volkischen Den- ken : Intellektuelle als Konstrukteure der deutschen Identitat", in: H. Ber- ding (ed.), Nationales Bewuf3tsein und kollektive Identitdt: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewuf3tseins in der Neuzeit, 1996, 345 et seq. 43 G. Moyser/ M. Wagstaffe, "Studying elites: theoretical and methodological issues", in: G. Moyser/ M. Wagstaffe (eds), Research Methods for Elite Studies, 1987, 1 et seq. (3). 44 On the importance of educational policies, see E. Donnert, "Volksbildung und Elitenbildung: Kulturpolitische Mal3nahmen Katharinas II.", in: E. Hiibner/ J. Kusber/ P. Nitsche (eds), Ruf.iland zur Zeit Katharinas IL, 1998, 215 et seq.; J.L. Black, Citizens for the Fatherland: Education, Educa- tors, and Pedagogical Ideals in Eighteenth Century Russia, 1979, 70-71. On the role of the educated noble elite in the French nation-building process, see Greenfeld, see note 22, 148; E Furet, Interpreting the French Revolu- tion, 1981; S. Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution, 1989; G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French Nobility in the Eightteenth Century:

From Feudalism to Enlightenment, 1985; F. L. Ford, Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV, 1953; P. Higonnet, Class, Ideology and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution, 1981. On the role of education in enlightenment thought, see U. Im Hof, Das Europa der Aufkldrung, 1995, 139-142, 179-194. 45 Simmel, see note 26. 46 G. Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy", in: L. Diamond/ M.F. Plattner, (eds), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, 1994, 3 et seq. (4). On this, see also, S. Rokkan, "Dimensions of State-Formation and Nation- Building : A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe", in: C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 1975, 562 et seq. For an interesting view on the difficulties involved in theories of global democracy without nation-states, see I. Maus, "National- staatliche Grenzen und das Prinzip der Volkssouveranitat", in: M. Graser/

C. Lammert/ S. Schreyer (eds), Staat, Nation, Demokratie: Traditionen und Perspektiven moderner Gesellschaften, 2001, 11 et seq. 4� On this, see C.A. Wallander (ed.), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy af ter the Cold War, 1996. 48 F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2004.

49 R. Pipes (ed.), Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and Analysis, 1959. 50 N. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia 1801-I855, 1976. 51 Essentially, framing describes the establishment of a pattern of interpreta- tion which determines the intellectual (and political) organization of ex- perience. A particular frame would therefore determine perception, classi- fication, and interpretation of events or facts according to a particular per- spective. There are three key elements making up the internal structures of any given interpretational pattern: diagnostic framing identifies a particular phenomenon as problematic and establishes it as a unifying topic or con- cern of the group. In our context, this would be an elite group acquiring a national identity and identifying the lack of national identity among the wider elite and the population as a problem. Usually, this would be com- bined with a critical perception of social and political conditions at the time. The basis for such a belief could very well be a perceived discrepancy between a glorious past and a rather more disappointing present. The Ger- man romantics and their love of the Middle Ages are a case in point. The next step is called prognostic framing which describes the conviction that a

remaking of the social and political order along the lines of - in our case - nationalism would be capable of resolving the problems and leading to a brighter future. There are numerous examples of such a process in history, the most prominent certainly being the French estates general declaring themselves to be the national assembly and promising to give the country a constitution. This phase is followed by motivational framing which focuses on convincing potential members of the initial group that their individual contribution would make a difference, and that the benefits of participation would outweigh possible negative consequences. This would be particu- larly difficult for participants coming from groups with a clearly defined previous identity, such as, for example, the nobility. It is therefore no coin- cidence that Greenfeld has consistently argued for the importance of a cri- sis of noble identity as a decisive element in the process of adopting the new, national identity among members of the nobility. Of greater interest, however, is the question of finding allies and partners outside the initial group. Again, the concept of frames can be helpful as it describes two proc- esses, frame-bridging and frame-extension as establishing "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" and enlarging the group's "adher- ent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending or being con- gruent with the values or interests of potential adherents". See T. Kliment, "Durch Dramatisierung zum Protest? Theoretische Grundlagen und em- pirischer Ertrag des Framing-Konzepts", in: K.U. Hellmann/ R. Koop- mans (eds), Paradigmen der Bewegungsforschung: Entstehung und Entwicklung von Neuen Sozialen Be7vegungen und Rechtsextremismus, 1998, 69 et seq. (70-72). See also: D.A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation", American So- ciological Review 51 (1986), 464 et seq. (467, 472); D.A. Snow/ R.D. Ben- ford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization", in: B. Klandermans (ed.), International Social Movement Research 1 (1988), 197 et seq.; J. Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, 1973; B. Klandermans, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus", in: Klandermans, see above, 173 et seq. (183); Greenfeld, see note 22.

52 On this, see L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 1992, 195- 236. On George V working with the first Labor government, see K. Rose, King George V, 1983, 325, 328-330. For an interesting appraisal of constitu-

tional monarchy in 20th century Britain see B. Pimlott, The Queen: A Bi- ography of Elizabeth 11, 1996. The classic text on the political and symbolic role of the British monarchy is still W Bagehot, The English Constitution, 1937. 53 On the royal powers in democratic Spain, see K.M. Rogner, Die Befugnisse der Krone im spanischen Uerfassungsrecht: Umfang und Grenzen des staats- rechtlichen Handlungsermessens der Krone, 1999. On the role of Juan Car- los in particular, see C. Powell, Juan Carlos of Spain: Self Made Monarch, 1996 and P. Preston, Juan Carlos: A People's King, 2004. One of the prob- lems is the demand of many regions in Spain to be recognized as nations and the country as a whole to be redefined as a multi-national state. On this, see M. Guibernau, "Catalonia: A Non-secessionist Nationalism?", in: M. Seymour, (ed.), The Fate of the Nation-State, 2004, 234 et seq., 241 et seq.; J. Diez Medrano, Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia, 1995; C. L. Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, 1999; Kraus, see note 2. There is no doubt that the restoration of the monarchy was extremely helpful in making the Spanish transition to democracy a peaceful one, as this appealed to the more traditionally conservative ele- ments of Franco's victorious civil war coalition. In his proclamation ad- dress, therefore, Juan Carlos justified his accession to the throne in terms of historical tradition - which is a good example of constructing a usable past without too much adherence to historical fact. Very generally speaking, Spain did have a tradition of monarchy, and in this respect, Juan Carlos' statement rang true and was able to become a cornerstone of a new way of dealing with the Francoist period in Spanish history. By suggesting, how- ever, that his accession signified a return to tradition, the king made a con- siderable contribution to the coalition of silence, the widespread determi- nation to forget and to ignore the civil war and the entire Franco era in or- der not to jeopardize the first steps towards democracy. It is an interesting and, perhaps, unique example of silence being a usable past. Ironically, this does not diminish the achievement of both Juan Carlos and of Spanish de- mocracy - in 1981, the king successfully defended the new constitution against a military coup d'etat.

s4 Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, article 54 paras 1 and 3.

55 B. Tibi, Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat: Islam und panarabischer Na- tionalismus, 1987, 113-126. 56 G.B. Helman/ S.R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Pol'y 89 (1992/1993), 3 et seq. s� On this, see P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in 20th Century Spain, 1995. 58 Preston, Juan Carlos, see note 53, 245-246. For the alternative vision con- tained in a speech to the republican Cortes in 1931 by the minister of jus- tice, Fernando de los Rios, see J.S. Vidarte, Las Cortes Constituyentes de 1931-1933: Testimonio del Primer Secretario del Congreso de los Diputados, 1976, 192-195. s9 L. Silber/ A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 1995.

60 Linz/ Stepan, see note 35; G. O'Donnell/ P.C. Schmitter (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democra- cies, 1986; A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Eco- nomic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, 1991; A. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 1995. 61 Kraus, see note 2, 19.

62 A.S. Tuminez, "Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy", in: Wallander, see note 47, 41 et seq. 63 K. Barkey, "Thinking about Consequences of Empire", in: K. Barkey/ M. von Hagen (eds), After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building, 1997, 99 et seq. (102 et seq.). 64 R. Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples", in: Barkey/ von Hagen, see note 63, 155 et seq. (157). 65 Barkey, see note 63, 103.

66 According to the definition of elite employed in this paper (see note 41), a counter-elite differs from an elite in so far as its members have the same po- tential for leadership as members of the elite do, but are not in positions to exercise this leadership. 67 Y Shain/ J.J. Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, 1995, 75. 68 Brubaker, see note 64, 158.

69 Barkey, see note 63.

70 Barkey, see note 63, 110. 71 Ombudperson Institution in Kosovo, Second Annual Report 2001-2002, , quoted in: S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Adninistration, and State- Building, 2004, 126.

�2 Fukuyama, see note 48, 160. A perfect example of this claim is G.W. Bush, "State of the Union Address" (Washington, DC, 29 January 2002), . �3 On India, see R.L. Hardgrave, Jr., "India: The Dilemmas of Diversity", in: Diamond/ Plattner, see note 46, 71 et seq. See also: R.B. Inden, Imagining India, 1990; V. Das (ed.), Tradition, Pluralism, and Identity, 1999; G.D. Sontheimer/ H. Kulke (eds), Hinduism Reconsidered, 1989. �4 B.S. Cohn, "Representing Authority in Victorian India", in: B.S. Cohn, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays, 1987, 632 et seq. (678). See also A. Appadorai, Documents on Political Thought in Modern India, 1977. 75 Fukuyama, see note 48, 138.

76 Chesterman, see note 71, 145-146. 77 Quoted in Chesterman, see note 71, 141-142.

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