Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct ‘sensory’ contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Alsmith, A. J. T. (2015). Perspectival structure and vestibular processing: a commentary on Bigna Lenggenhager and Christophe Lopez, in: Open MIND: 23(C), T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (Eds). MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. DOI:10.15502/9783958570559.
Angelaki, D. E. and Cullen, K. E. (2008). Vestibular system: the many facets of a multimodal sense, Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 31, 125–150. DOI:10.1146/annurev.neuro.31.060407.125555.
Block, N. (2011). Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access, Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 567–575. DOI:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001.
Britton, Z. and Arshad, Q. (2019). Vestibular and multi-sensory influences upon self-motion perception and the consequences for human behavior, Front. Neurol. 10, 63. DOI:10.3389/fneur.2019.00063.
Clifford, C. W. G., Arabzadeh, E. and Harris, J. A. (2008). Getting technical about awareness, Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 54–58. DOI:10.1016/j.tics.2007.11.009.
Crystal, J. D. and Foote, A. L. (2009). Metacognition in animals, Comp. Cogn. Behav. Rev. 4, 1–16. DOI:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40001.
Day, B. L. and Fitzpatrick, R. C. (2005). The vestibular system, Curr. Biol. 15, R583–R586. DOI:10.1016/j.cub.2005.07.053.
De Vignemont, F. (2014). A multimodal conception of bodily awareness, Mind 123, 989–1020. DOI:10.1093/mind/fzu089.
Deroy, O. (Ed.) (2017). Sensory Blending: on Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Deroy, O. and Auvray, M. (2012). Reading the world through the skin and ears: a new perspective on sensory substitution, Front. Psychol. 3, 457. DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00457.
Deroy, O., Chen, Y.-C. and Spence, C. (2014). Multisensory constraints on awareness, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 369, 20130207. DOI:10.1098/rstb.2013.0207.
Deroy, O., Faivre, N., Lunghi, C., Spence, C., Aller, M. and Noppeney, U. (2016). The complex interplay between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness, Multisens. Res. 29, 585–606. DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002529.
Dienes, Z. and Seth, A. (2010). Gambling on the unconscious: a comparison of wagering and confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task, Consc. Cogn. 19, 674–681. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.009.
Ellis, A. W. and Mast, F. W. (2017). Toward a dynamic probabilistic model for vestibular cognition, Front. Psychol. 8, 138. DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00138.
Fairhurst, M. T., Travers, E., Hayward, V. and Deroy, O. (2018). Confidence is higher in touch than in vision in cases of perceptual ambiguity, Sci. Rep. 8, 15604. DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-34052-z.
Ferrè, E. R. and Harris, L. R. (2015). Introduction to vestibular cognition special issue: progress in vestibular cognition, Multisens. Res. 28, 393–396. DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002508.
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry, Am. Psychol. 34, 906–911. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.34.10.906.
Fleming, S. M., Weil, R. S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R. J. and Rees, G. (2010). Relating introspective accuracy to individual differences in brain structure, Science 329, 1541–1543. DOI:10.1126/science.1191883.
Fleming, S. M. and Lau, H. C. (2014). How to measure metacognition, Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 443. DOI:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00443.
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J. and Frith, C. D. (2012). Metacognition: computation, biology and function, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 367(1594), 1280–1286. DOI:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021.
Foote, A. L. and Crystal, J. D. (2007). Metacognition in the rat, Curr. Biol. 17, 551–555. DOI:10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.061.
Fulkerson, M. (2014). Rethinking the senses and their interactions: the case for sensory pluralism, Front. Psychol. 5, 1426. DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01426.
Garzorz, I. T. and MacNeilage, P. R. (2017). Visual–vestibular conflict detection depends on fixation, Curr. Biol. 27, 2856–2861. DOI:10.1016/j.cub.2017.08.011.
Glasauer, S. and Knorr, A. G. (2020). Physical nature of vestibular stimuli, in: Reference Module in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology. DOI:10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.23909-6.
Goldberg, J. M., Wilson, V. J., Cullen, K. E., Angelaki, D. E., Broussard, D. M., Büttner-Ennever, J. A., Fukushima, K. and Minor, L. B. (2012). The Vestibular System: a Sixth Sense. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Grice, H. P. (1962). Some remarks about the senses, in: Analytical Philosophy, First Series, R. J. Butler (Ed.), pp. 133–153. Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
Hoover, A. E. N. and Harris, L. R. (2015). Disrupting vestibular activity disrupts body ownership, Multisens. Res. 28, 581–590. DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002472.
Kahane, P., Hoffmann, D., Minotti, L. and Berthoz, A. (2003). Reappraisal of the human vestibular cortex by cortical electrical stimulation study, Ann. Neurol. 54, 615–624. DOI:10.1002/ana.10726.
Karmali, F., Lim, K. and Merfeld, D. M. (2014). Visual and vestibular perceptual thresholds each demonstrate better precision at specific frequencies and also exhibit optimal integration, J. Neurophysiol. 111, 2393–2403. DOI:10.1152/jn.00332.2013.
King, A. J. and Calvert, G. A. (2001). Multisensory integration: grouping by eye and ear, Curr. Biol. 11, R322–R325. DOI:10.1016/S0960-9822(01)00175-0.
Lenggenhager, B. and Lopez, C. (2015). Vestibular sense and perspectival experience — a reply to Adrian Alsmith, in: Open MIND: 23(R), T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (Eds). MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. DOI:10.15502/9783958570825.
Lopez, C. (2015). Making sense of the body: the role of vestibular signals, Multisens. Res. 28, 525–557. DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002490.
MacNeilage, P. R., Turner, A. H. and Angelaki, D. E. (2010). Canal–otolith interactions and detection thresholds of linear and angular components during curved-path self-motion, J. Neurophysiol. 104, 765–773. DOI:10.1152/jn.01067.2009.
Macpherson, F. (2011a). Individuating the senses, in: The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, F. Macpherson (Ed.), pp. 3–43. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Macpherson, F. (2011b). Taxonomizing the senses, Philos. Stud. 153, 123–142. DOI:10.1007/s11098-010-9643-8.
Maniscalco, B. and Lau, H. (2012). A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive sensitivity from confidence ratings, Consc. Cogn. 21, 422–430. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.021.
Massoni, S., Gajdos, T. and Vergnaud, J.-C. (2014). Confidence measurement in the light of signal detection theory, Front. Psychol. 5, 1455. DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01455.
Matthen, M. (2015). The individuation of the senses, in: Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, M. Matthen (Ed.), pp. 567–586. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Nanay, B. (2018). Multimodal mental imagery, Cortex 105, 125–134. DOI:10.1016/j.cortex.2017.07.006.
Nudds, M. (2004). II — the significance of the senses, Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 104, 31–51. DOI:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00080.x.
Overgaard, M. and Sandberg, K. (2012). Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 367, 1287–1296. DOI:10.1098/rstb.2011.0425.
Persaud, N., McLeod, P. and Cowey, A. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness, Nat. Neurosci. 10, 257–261. DOI:10.1038/nn1840.
Redford, J. S. (2010). Evidence of metacognitive control by humans and monkeys in a perceptual categorization task, J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 36, 248–254. DOI:10.1037/a0017809.
Reichenbach, A., Bresciani, J.-P., Bülthoff, H. H. and Thielscher, A. (2016). Reaching with the sixth sense: vestibular contributions to voluntary motor control in the human right parietal cortex, NeuroImage 124, 869–875. DOI:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.09.043.
Rozin, P. (1982). “Taste–smell confusions” and the duality of the olfactory sense, Percept. Psychophys. 31, 397–401. DOI:10.3758/BF03202667.
Shimojo, S. and Shams, L. (2001). Sensory modalities are not separate modalities: plasticity and interactions, Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 11, 505–509. DOI:10.1016/S0959-4388(00)00241-5.
Smith, B. C. (2015). The chemical senses, in: Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, M. Matthen (Ed.), pp. 314–352. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.045.
Spence, C. and Deroy, O. (2013). Crossmodal mental imagery, in: Multisensory Imagery, S. Lacey and R. Lawson (Eds), pp. 157–183. Springer, New York, NY, USA. DOI:10.1007/978-1-4614-5879-1_9.
White, T. P., Wigton, R. L., Joyce, D. W., Bobin, T., Ferragamo, C., Wasim, N., Lisk, S. and Shergill, S. S. (2014). Eluding the illusion? Schizophrenia, dopamine and the McGurk effect, Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 565. DOI:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00565.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 806 | 279 | 17 |
Full Text Views | 40 | 14 | 1 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 73 | 24 | 2 |
Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct ‘sensory’ contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 806 | 279 | 17 |
Full Text Views | 40 | 14 | 1 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 73 | 24 | 2 |