We assessed how self-motion affects the visual representation of the self. We constructed a novel virtual-reality experiment that systematically varied an avatar’s motion and also biological sex. Participants were presented with pairs of avatars that visually represented the participant (‘self-avatar’), or another person (‘opposite avatar’). Avatar motion either corresponded with the participant’s motion, or was decoupled from the participant’s motion. The results show that participants identified with (i) ‘self-avatars’ over ‘opposite-avatars’, (ii) avatars moving congruently with self-motion over incongruent motion, and importantly (iii) with the ‘opposite avatar’ over the ‘self-avatar’ when the opposite avatar’s motion was congruent with self-motion. Our results suggest that both self-motion and biological sex are relevant to the body schema and body image and that congruent bottom-up visual feedback of self-motion is particularly important for the sense of self and capable of overriding top-down self-identification factors such as biological sex.
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All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 727 | 103 | 24 |
Full Text Views | 39 | 17 | 3 |
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We assessed how self-motion affects the visual representation of the self. We constructed a novel virtual-reality experiment that systematically varied an avatar’s motion and also biological sex. Participants were presented with pairs of avatars that visually represented the participant (‘self-avatar’), or another person (‘opposite avatar’). Avatar motion either corresponded with the participant’s motion, or was decoupled from the participant’s motion. The results show that participants identified with (i) ‘self-avatars’ over ‘opposite-avatars’, (ii) avatars moving congruently with self-motion over incongruent motion, and importantly (iii) with the ‘opposite avatar’ over the ‘self-avatar’ when the opposite avatar’s motion was congruent with self-motion. Our results suggest that both self-motion and biological sex are relevant to the body schema and body image and that congruent bottom-up visual feedback of self-motion is particularly important for the sense of self and capable of overriding top-down self-identification factors such as biological sex.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 727 | 103 | 24 |
Full Text Views | 39 | 17 | 3 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 62 | 19 | 0 |