International criminal courts (icts) frequently refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). While this practice is often regarded as cross-fertilisation, in this paper cross-fertilisation is used in a more demanding way and refers to the “transmission of meaning from one (legal) context to another”. For such a cross-fertilisation to ensue legal norms or concepts need to be translated from original to the borrowing legal system without losing its normative meaning. However, a translation from ECtHR-language into ict-language is problematic because of the specific contexts in which both courts operate. Since those obstacles primarily affect the outcome and not the method of the translation process, this paper concludes with an attempt to develop a coherent and transparent method of translating human rights into ict-language taking the frequent characterisation of ECtHR jurisprudence as “persuasive authority” as a starting point.
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Slaughter, supra note 1, p. 101. According to Slaughter’s "geometry of transjudicial communication", the cross-referencing of icts to the ecthr case law would be horizontal (the icts are not bound to follow or even take account of the ecthr’s jurisprudence under a formal relationship) and, as regards the degree of reciprocal engagement rather take the form of a monologue than a dialogue (the ecthr is not an active participant in the communication process). On this last point, see infra.
Wiener and Liste, supra note 2, pp. 264 and 267 et seq. Wiener and Liste argue that only when such effective cross-fertilisation ensues one can speak of a "global community of courts". For a less demanding concept of cross-fertilisation, see Slaughter, supra note 1, p. 117, who argues that cross-fertilisation is the dissemination of ideas from one legal system to another with the purpose to provide inspiration for the solution of a particular legal problem.
Wiener and Liste, supra note 2, p. 270 ("These enactive practices include, for example, translating other normative meanings into one’s own normative structure to the effect that domestic structures of meaning are challenged and may – over the ensuing course of contestation – become subject to change").
Walker, supra note 8, pp. 37–38, cited according to Wiener and Liste, supra note 2, pp. 265 and 269.
Vasiliev, supra note 18, p. 49, with further references in fn. 318; G. McIntyre, ‘Defining Human Rights in the Arena of International Humanitarian Law: Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the icty’, in G. Boas and W. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the icty (Nijhoff, Leiden, 2003) p. 194; Cassese, supra note 18, pp. 26–30 and 49; E. Møse, ‘Impact of Human Rights Conventions on the Two Ad hoc Tribunals’, in Bergsmo (ed.), supra note 18, p. 208; C. Deprez, ‘Extent of Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Proceedings before the International Criminal Court: On Possible Reductive Factors’, 12 International Criminal Law Review (2012) p. 723; Fedorova and Sluiter, supra note 11, pp. 30, 33 and 51. But see J. Nicholls, ‘Evidence: Hearsay and Anonymous Witnesses’, in R. Haveman et al. (eds.), Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003) p. 287 ("it is difficult to find reasons why the international norms embodied in the European Court’s jurisprudence should not guide, and to an extent bind, the decisions of the icty").
McIntyre, supra note 19, p. 194.
Møse, supra note 19, p. 189 (the principle of equality of arms must be given a more liberal interpretation than is normally upheld with regard to domestic proceedings).
Fedorova and Sluiter, supra note 11, pp. 34 and 46 et seq.; G. Sluiter, ‘Human Rights Protection in the icc Pre-Trial Phase’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009) p. 461.
Fedorova and Sluiter, supra note 11, pp. 33 and 55 et seq.
Vasiliev, supra note 18, p. 50, argues that the re-interpretation of human rights could also have an opposite effect and invite the application of higher standards of protection for the accused. However, as Sluiter, supra note 23, p. 461, observes there does not seem to be a decision of a contemporary ict in which the conclusion is reached that the circumstances surrounding the functioning of these tribunals should result in increased defence rights.
Tulkens, supra note 26, p. 593, quoting authors who describe this development as a "turnaround in human rights", or "Copernican revolution".
Sluiter, supra note 23, p. 461 (re-interpretation by definition results in reduced protection and always favours the interests of the prosecution and/or the victims over those of the accused). A number of authors noticed an erosion of the principles that traditionally ensured the protection of the rights of the accused; see only Tulkens, supra note 26, p. 593 with further references in fn. 70.
McIntyre, supra note 19, p. 199 (unique subject matter with which [the icty] deals).
Similarly Vasiliev, supra note 18, p. 57.
Gradoni, Human Rights Dimension, supra note 11, p. 88 et seq.; R. Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’, 14 Human Rights Law Review (2014) p. 493.
Van de Heyning, supra note 50, p. 68. Thus, arguably, human rights (principles) are universal in abstraction, but to a certain extent national in application; see L. Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, 125 Law Quarterly Review (2009) p. 420.
Van de Heyning, supra note 50, p. 68.
Besson, supra note 55, p. 129 et seq.
Greer and Wildhaber, supra note 57, p. 663 et seq.
Krisch, supra note 46, p. 184, who, however, argues that the "constitutional narrative" is not reflected in reality; see infra.
Besson, supra note 55, p. 143 et seq.
Krisch, supra note 46, who examines the cases of Spain, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Greer, supra note 51, p. 193.
Krisch, supra note 46, p. 206.
Kratochvíl, supra note 72, p. 327.
Greer, supra note 51, p. 223 et seq.
Letsas, supra note 74.
Spano, supra note 47, p. 494 et seq. ("in light of the open-ended character of the fair trial guarantee under Article 6, and the subsidiary nature of the Convention, the Member States are, in principle, free to fashion their criminal justice systems in accordance with their traditions and policy choices, so long as the execution of domestic rules in individual cases are, in general, applied in a manner that respects, as a whole, the right of the accused to a fair trial").
Trechsel, supra note 27, p. 87; W. Gollwitzer, Menschenrechte im Strafverfahren (de Gruyter Recht, Berlin, 2005) p. 132.
Gollwitzer, supra note 86, p. 324 et seq.
Lemmens, supra note 83, p. 313; S. Swoboda, ‘Die emrk in Strafverfahren vor Internationalen Strafgerichtshöfen’, in A. Höland (ed.), Wirkungen der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im deutschen Recht (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2012) p. 100.
Lemmens, supra note 83, p. 313.
According to Trechsel, supra note 27, p. 87, Article 6 is "left in a cloud of ambiguity".
Krisch, supra note 46, pp. 185, 196 et seq., and 209 et seq.
Greer and Wildhaber, supra note 57, p. 677.
Besson, supra note 55, p. 152 et seq. See also Arai-Takahasi, supra note 78, p. 95 ("joint ‘ownership’").
Schauer, supra note 98, p. 1935.
Schauer, supra note 98, p. 1941 et seq.
Lammond, supra note 99, p. 19 et seq.
Similarly Vasiliev, supra note 18, p. 60 et seq.
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International criminal courts (icts) frequently refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). While this practice is often regarded as cross-fertilisation, in this paper cross-fertilisation is used in a more demanding way and refers to the “transmission of meaning from one (legal) context to another”. For such a cross-fertilisation to ensue legal norms or concepts need to be translated from original to the borrowing legal system without losing its normative meaning. However, a translation from ECtHR-language into ict-language is problematic because of the specific contexts in which both courts operate. Since those obstacles primarily affect the outcome and not the method of the translation process, this paper concludes with an attempt to develop a coherent and transparent method of translating human rights into ict-language taking the frequent characterisation of ECtHR jurisprudence as “persuasive authority” as a starting point.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 440 | 59 | 11 |
Full Text Views | 256 | 11 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 113 | 14 | 0 |