This article contends that many nt scholars have read the Stoics and their view of αὐτάρκης through a post-Enlightenment (specifically Kantian) ethical framework, which assumes notions like individualism and detachment are fundamental to the ethical subject. When Stoicism is not distorted with these modernist assumptions about the ethical subject, a fairer comparison can be made between the Stoics and Paul. This article demonstrates this by providing an outline of Stoicism in such a manner, emphasizing how their ethical theory is grounded in a teleological and communitarian framework and maintains a psychologically holistic view of the self, which then sets up an exploration of the Stoic understanding of αὐτάρκης not clouded by individualist strands of thinking. This provides material for a more equitable comparison with Paul’s use of this term in Phil 4:11, where it can be seen that the scope, sources, and basis of Stoic and Pauline contentment are similar.
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R.M. Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 3-5. Cf. J.Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1990) 43.
R. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting (London/New York: Thames and Hudson, 1956) 135-145. His contemporary influence can be seen in A.J. Malherbe’s work where he quotes Bultmann’s understanding of Stoicism with approbation. See his “Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3-19 Part i,” NovT 52 (2010) 376-405, p. 393; cf. idem “Paul’s Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11),” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (ed. J.T. Fitzgerald; NovTSupp 82; Leiden/New York: Brill, 1996) 125-126.
Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 137. It is commonplace among nt scholars to describe the Stoics (and Hellenistic moral philosophers in general) as maintaining an individualistic and essentially self-centered ethic. See, e.g., J.N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca (NovTSupp 4; Leiden: Brill, 1961) 106-107; H. Koester, History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age Vol. 1: Introduction to the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982) 147, 150; W. Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) 217-218; P.F. Esler, “Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case,” nts 50 (2004) 106-24, pp. 113-14, 116, 121; J.W. Thompson, Moral Formation according to Paul: The Context and Coherence of Pauline Ethics (Grand Rapids, mi; Baker Academic, 2011) 11; N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013) 234, who even suggests “the Greco-Roman philosophers as the real inventors of modern individualism.”
Ibid., 138.
Ibid., 144; see also p. 143.
See, e.g., J.B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians (London: MacMillan, 1868) 305; M.R. Vincent, The Epistle to the Philippians and to Philemon (icc; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1897) 143; Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, 114; J. Gnilka, Der Philipperbrief (hknt; Freiburg: Herder, 1968) 176; P.T. O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians (nigtc; Grand Rapids, mi: Eerdmans, 1991) 521; G.D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (nicnt; Grand Rapids, mi: Eerdmans, 1995) 432; M. Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians (bntc; London: A & C Black, 1998) 261; P.A. Holloway, Consolation in Philippians: Philosophical Sources and Rhetorical Strategy (sntsms 112; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 158 n. 64; G.F. Hawthorne and R.P. Martin, Philippians (wbc 43; rev. edn.; Thomas Nelson, 2004) 263-264. For a more positive treatment see T. Engberg-Pedersen (Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010] 121, 132), where he sees congruence between Epictetus’ and Paul’s understanding of self-sufficiency, arguing that for both it relates only to the body and the rest of the world, but not God, and that it does not exclude engagement with the world and others. Cf. W. Schenk (Die Philipperbriefe des Paulus: Kommentar [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984] 36-37) who also sees a closer relationship between Paul’s and Epictetus’ understanding of self-sufficiency. See also K.L. Berry (“The Function of Friendship Language in Philippians 4:10-20,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech, 115 n. 36), who notes that for some Stoics inner strength was viewed as coming from God, but he still maintains the common argument of difference between Paul’s and the Stoic’s understanding of self-sufficiency.
Ibid., 135-36. Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, who also argues for a difference with respect to the scope of contentment (“Security and Self-Sufficiency: A Comparison of Paul and Epictetus,” Ex Auditu 24 [2008] 60-72, p. 70).
Ibid., 137.
R.J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 45. For an analysis of this claim with respect to his epistemology see E. Bencivenga, Kant’s Copernican Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). Kant conceived of his Critique of Pure Reason in these terms, see his preface to the second edition B 16.
Ibid., 441 (88-89); 443-444 (93-94).
Ibid., 446-447 (97-98).
Ibid., 402 (17); 420-421 (51-52); 444 (95).
Ibid., 431 (70-71).
Ibid., 429 (66).
See Cicero, Fin. 3.20-22. Cf. Stobaeus 2.65.8; Diogenes Laertius 7.91. See the discussion of the first strand of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις in Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 129-131. My discussion of Stoicism in this essay has been greatly informed by Gill’s work, which has more than others sought to call attention to some of the differences between ancient and modern thought.
Cf. Cicero, Off. 1.107-115. See the discussion in A.A. Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 162-167, and Gill, “Personhood and Personality,” 176-199.
Long, Stoic Studies, 164. With the second strand of ethical development emphasizing the kinship bonds one has with others and how this provides ways of thinking that have significance for various social roles, it seems entirely inappropriate to say that the Stoics’ sense of mutuality is weak (Esler, “Paul and Stoicism,” 114) or is a fundamentally different vision of koinonia than Paul’s (Barclay, “Security and Self-Sufficiency,” 66).
Cf. A.A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 367: “Stoic philosophers do not envision a purely private or personal or introspective selfhood divorced from determinate roles.” See also Annas, Morality, 448-450.
For Stoic texts see, e.g., Epictetus, Diatr. 1.3; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.2; 5.26; Seneca, Ep. 65.18. For the individualistic understanding of these statements see Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 137; Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, 106-110. Sevenster argues that the individualistic turn in Stoic ethics is in large part attributable to Panaetius’ ethical theory (p. 106), which is preserved in Cicero, Off., especially 1.93-151. Gill’s discussion of Panaetius’ theory of the four-personae (“Personhood and Personality,” 169-199), however, provides a persuasive argument against Seventer’s position.
E.g., Epictetus, Diatr. 2.23.3; 3.3.22. See A.A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoics and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) 158.
See Gill, The Structured Self, 96-100; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy, 55.
E.g., Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy, 103-120; J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998); Gill, The Structured Self, 207-289.
See, e.g., Seneca, Ep. 59.2; Diogenes Laertius 7.94. For its description as “well-reasoned swelling” see Diogenes Laertius 7.115 (ls 65 F); cf. Cicero, Tusc. 4.6.13.
Andronicus, On Passions 6.2.1-2: Οἰκεῖαι δέ εἰσιν αὐτῆς• αὐστηρία• ἐγκράτεια• εὐτέλεια• λιτότης• κοσµιότης• εὐταξία• αὐτάρκεια.
Ibid., 6.2.14-15 = svfiii 272.10 (my translation).
Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 2.12.128 = svfiii 276.3: Αὕτη γοῦν τοι ἕξις ἐστὶν ἀρκουµένη οἷς δεῖ καὶ δι’ αὑτῆς ποριστικὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν µακάριον συντελούντων βίον.
Seneca, Ep. 9.5 (Gummere, lcl). Cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 3.13.5-8 (trans. Hard) who takes it for granted that humans are sociable, and then states: “But we ought to prepare ourselves nonetheless to be able to be self-sufficient (τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν), and to be able to live with ourselves (δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι).”
See, e.g., Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and the Self, 116-121.
See, e.g., Seneca, Ep. 41.1-2, 5; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.6.37-43; 2.8; 2.16.40-43; Marcus Aurelius 3.6.
Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel, 34. See, e.g., Polybius 3.31.2; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.15.4.
See, e.g., Epictetus, Diatr. 2.14.10 where it is associated with learning skills like carpentry and being a helmsman (cf. 2.9.10, where deeds are associated with learning particular skills). The idea of learning being associated with training is also found in the nt (see Matt 11:29 and Heb 5:8) and the lxx (see Sir. 8:8; 4 Macc. 1:17).
Cf. ibid., 520.
Cf. J.A.D. Weima, Neglected Endings: The Significance of the Pauline Letter Closings (JSNTSup 101; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 191.
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This article contends that many nt scholars have read the Stoics and their view of αὐτάρκης through a post-Enlightenment (specifically Kantian) ethical framework, which assumes notions like individualism and detachment are fundamental to the ethical subject. When Stoicism is not distorted with these modernist assumptions about the ethical subject, a fairer comparison can be made between the Stoics and Paul. This article demonstrates this by providing an outline of Stoicism in such a manner, emphasizing how their ethical theory is grounded in a teleological and communitarian framework and maintains a psychologically holistic view of the self, which then sets up an exploration of the Stoic understanding of αὐτάρκης not clouded by individualist strands of thinking. This provides material for a more equitable comparison with Paul’s use of this term in Phil 4:11, where it can be seen that the scope, sources, and basis of Stoic and Pauline contentment are similar.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 552 | 90 | 34 |
Full Text Views | 265 | 3 | 2 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 110 | 12 | 6 |