1. L. W. Martin, TheSeainModernStrategy (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 133. 2. These five points were as follows: (1) there must have been a physical change in the disposition of at least part of the armed forces, (2) there had to be a conscious purpose behind this activity, (3) the aim must have been to attain objectives by influence rather than imposition, (4) the intention must have been to avoid significant violence, and (5) some specific behavior had to have been desired in the target states or actors. To be included an incident had to meet all five criteria (B. M. Blechman and S. S. Kaplan, "The Use of Armed Forces as a Political Instrument" [Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, December 1976]).
3. A study prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that over the period 1945-75 technological advances resulted in an average annual increase in the real cost of major ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers of 4.5 percent (U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, DepartmentofDefenseAuthorization forA�ropria-tions forFiscalYear1976:HearingsonMilitaryPostureandH.R.36891H.R.6674, 94th Cong. 1st sess., pt. 1, February, March, April, and May 1975, pp. 1826-29). 4. If there is a major conversion to missile armaments, then the value of the vessel is raised to the appropriate value per ton for missile-equipped vessels, and it is treated as a new vessel from the date of its major conversion. The old destroyers converted under the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization Program in the United States were treated as a special case. They were valued at 1955 values per ton before conversion; after conversion the values were raised to 1960 values per ton and were kept at those figures insubsequent years.
5. It is entirely possible that the rate of retirement of naval vessels has been faster than that shown by our principle source,JanesFightingShips. For example, our estimate of the total number of submarines in the Soviet navy at the end of 1976 is 390. An estimate provided by the U.S. secretary of the navy on February 9, 1976, was 325. Unfortunately, the latter figure was not broken down by class of vessel.
Souece.-Seetable 2. 6. Perhaps the only situation in which a numerical imbalance is significant would be if the breakthrough in ASW techniques dramatically raised the possibility of detecting and destroying these vessels. At the present time this probability is essentially zero. Moreover, the increasing range of submarine-launched ballistic missiles permits these vessels to remain in or close to their homelands, making ASW operations by the opponent exceedingly hazardous. 7. However, two submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with the U.S. designations SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18 and believed to have this capability, are under development in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the SS-NX-18 can deliver three independently targetable warheads.
8. This is true despite the Soviet numerical superiority in this category. Nearly 100 of the 274 major surface vessels in the Soviet navy in 1976 displace only 850-950 tons, too large to be classified as patrol boats, but not contributing very heavily to the Soviet stock of major warships.
9. It was suggested recently that the missile carrying the designation SSN-10 is, in fact, an antisubmarine rather than antiship weapon. If this is the case, the number of major surface units with antishipping missiles drops to 19 and the number of launchers on these ships to 90. The possibility must be considered, however, that the cannisters associated with SSN-10 are capable of launching two types of missiles, one antisub- marine and the other antiship.
10. The canal linking the Baltic and White Seas has been recently enlarged to permit transit by vessels displacing up to approximately 5,000 tons. 11. The commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy, Admiral Gorshkov, agrees with the latter observation (NavalDigest [March 1972], p. 22).
12. A large number of navies, of course, have ships and landing craft suitable for more limited amphibious operations. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 demonstrated that, given suitable conditions, vessels of this kind are of great importance.
13. Sir Arthur Hezlet, TheSubmarineandSeaPower (New York: Stein & Day, 1967), p. 259.
14. L. I. Smith, "New Naval Tactics," Ordnance (November-December 1972).
15. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, "Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Navy," Budget Issue Paper (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).