An Arms Race in the South China Sea?

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An Arms Race in the South China Sea?

in Ocean Yearbook Online

References

1. Reported by various sources, for example, Nayan Chanda, "Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economics Review, 13 August 1992, pp. 14-17, and M. Spick, "Dan- gerous Ground!" Air Forces Monthly (December 1993): 10-15. A fuller account of the action is provided by J. W. Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea: The Intersection of Bureaucratic and National Interests," China Quarterly 132 (December 1992): 1008-17.

2. Daniel J. Dzurek, "China Occupies Mischief Reef in Latest Spratly Gambit," Boundary and Security Bulletin 3, no. 1 (April 1995): 65-71. 3. Far Eastern Econorreic Review, 13 August 1992, pp. 14-17; (n. 1 above), p. 1001. 4. For instance Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Territorial Claims in the South China Sea: A Strategic Irrelevancy," paper presented at a conference on territorial claims in the South China Sea, Centre for Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 December 1990, pp. 4-5. 5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Unit, 1993-95).

6. T. M. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power, Pacific Strategic Papers no. 1 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 5; N. Lee, "Chinese Mari- time Power and Strategy in the South China Sea," paper presentd at a conference on territorial claims in the South China Sea, Centre for Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 December 1990, p. 7. 7. For example, Singaporean prime minister Goh Chok Tong recently com- mented that "in Asia, China's rising power and arms build-up has stirred anxiety.... It is important to bring into the open this underlying sense of discomfort-and even insecurity-about the political and military ambitions of China" (N. Holloway, "Jolt from the Blue," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 August 1995, pp. 20. 8. M. Vatikiotis, "Wings of Change," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 June 1994, p. 20.

9. Unless otherwise stated military figures are drawn from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance. 10. For example, Lee (n. 6 above), p. 7. 11. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 3. 12. Ibid., p. 4. 13. Lee (n. 6 above), pp. 4-5. 14. A. Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of China," in Stockholm Interna- tional Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Unit, 1995), pp. 359-86.

15. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 5. 16. Arnett (n. 14 above), p. 384. 17. Gheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), pp. 32-34. 18. For example, it was reported in April 1993 that China had "recently rede- ployed three Romeo-class conventional submarines from its North Sea Fleet where they were used to monitor Russian naval activity, to the South Sea Fleet. Their new mission is to patrol the contested areas of the South China Sea" (T. M. Cheung, "Sukhois, Sams, Subs," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1993, p. 23). 19. Garver (n. 1 above), p. 1024. 20. According to Lee (n. 6 above), p. 8: "The 'Iwo Jima' exercise of May 1986 demonstrates great progress made by the Chinese in joint operations. Success in con- ducting task force level exercises over 1,000 nautical miles from the coast demonstrate Chinese capability both in force projection and probable far-reaching consequences for the naval balance in the Asia-Pacific."

21. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), pp. 34-36; Lee (n. 6 above), pp. 7-8. 22. Lee (n. 6 above), p. 7. 23. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 23. 24. N. Chanda, "Fear of the Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995, p. 25. 25. Lee (n. 6 above), p. 7. 26. T. M. Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 Au- gust 1992, p. 20.

27. The first patrol of Chinese Hong-6 aircraft to the Spratlys area reportedly occurred on 8 November 1980, when two planes visited the area and undertook extensive aerial photography. By 1983 there were apparently frequent PLAN air patrols over the Spratlys (Garver [n. 1 above], p. 1008). 28. "Asia's Arms Race," Economist, 20 February 1993, pp. 21-24. 29. "Russian arms manufacturers are believed to have offered the supersonic Tu22M bomber to Peking, which would substantially increase China's military 'reach.' The Tu22M has a range of more than 4,000 km, has air-refueling capabilities, can carry heavy bomb and missile loads" (T. M. Cheung, "Loaded Weapons," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 September 1992, p. 21). 30. Cheung, "Sukhois, Sams, Subs" (n. 18 above), p. 23. 31. A. Higgins, "Beijing Divided on Taiwan Strategy," Guardian, 8 February 1996. 32. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 28; Garver (n. 1 above), p. 1014; Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14.

33. Lee (n. 6 above), p. 11; "Asia's Arms Race" (n. 28 above), p. 24. 34. Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14. 35. Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 27; Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14. 36. Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14; G. Greenwood, "Carried Away," Far Eastern Eco- rcomic Review, 9 July 1992, pp. 8-9; Cheung, "Loaded Weapons" (n. 29 above), p. 21; T. M. Cheung, "Arm in Arm," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 November 1992, p. 28. 37. According to Cheung, Growth in Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 27: "It is also estimated that it would cost at least two to five renminbi (US$420 million to $1.08 billion) to build a relatively modest 30,000-ton to 48,000-ton carrier." 38. Estimated at US$2-2.4 billion in Cheung, "Loaded Weapons" (n. 29 above), p. 21; Cheung, "Arm in Arm" (n. 36 above), p. 28. 39. Greenwood (n. 36 above), p. 8. 40. As Arnett (n. 14 above), p. 384, has noted: "A surface action group centred around a single helicopter-carrier and accompanying landing ships is vulnerable to air attack, even when supported with land-based fighters refueled in the air, unless warning and control systems were supporting them," something that China presently has a very limited capacity to provide.

41. Cheung, Growth in Chinese Naval Power (n. 6 above), p. 27. 42. Ibid.; Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14. 43. M. Vatikiotis, "Mix and Match," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 July 1993, p. 13. 44. Arnett (n. 14 above), p. 385 45. S. E. Speed, "Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security," Canadian Con- sortium on Asia Pacific Security Bulletin 7 (August 1995): 6-8.

46. G. Till, "Trouble in Paradise," Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report (Lon- don: Jane's Information Group, 1995), 7:18, quoting the 1990-91 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships. 47. Although there is growing interdependence between the Chinese and Tai- wanese economies and the threat of invasion has waned, the two parties' relationship is delicate, as Chinese testing of surface-to-surface missiles 140 km off Taiwan's north- ern coast in July 1995 illustrates. 48. Greenwood (n. 36 above), pp. 9-11. 49. J. Baum, "Arms and Greased Palms," Far Eastern Ecanorrcic Review, 3 March 1994, p. 15.

50. Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14. 51. Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon" (n. 26 above), p. 20. 52. S. E. Speed, Competing Interests in the South China Sea: An Overview of the Paracels and Spratlys Disputes (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establish- ment, Department of National Defence, 1989), p. 12, for example, assesses the Viet- namese navy as being "incapable of fighting a major naval engagement." 53. Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon" (n. 26 above), p. 20. 54. Spick (n. 1 above), p. 14. 55. For example, "To compensate for its lack of frontline equipment, Vietnam has been beefing up its garrisons on some of the islands in the Spratlys, including burying tanks into the ground and using them as gun emplacements" (Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon" [n. 26 above], p. 20).

56. C. A. Snyder, "Making Mischief in the South China Sea," unpublished paper.

57. N. Chanda, "Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economics Review, 13 August 1992, p. 17.

58. R. O'Neill, Security Challenges for Southeast Asia after the Cold War (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). 59. Holloway (n. 7 above), p. 22. 60. J. Lilley, "Far Eastern Satraps," Far Eastern Economics Review, 13 January 1994, p. 21.

61. Spick (n. 1 above), p. 15. 62. "Asia's Arms Race" (n. 28 above), p. 22.

63. K. Sridharan, "India-ASEAN Relations," in China, India, Japan, and the Secu- rity of Southeast Asia, ed. C. Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 138. 64. Ibid., p. 137. 65. B. Lintner, "Enter the Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 December 1994, p. 23.

66. A. Acharaya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 31. 67. F. S. Pearson, The Global Spread of Arms: The Political Economy of International Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1994), p. 45.

68. Till (n. 46 above), p. 23.

69. Dzurek (n. 2 above), p. 71. 70. Xinhua news agency, 30 July 1995, in British Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East Section 2370, August 1, 1995.

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