1. This article is based on the author's book, LandandMaritimeZonesofPeaceinInternationalLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 2. Resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971, adopted by 61 votes to zero, with 55 absten- tions. 3. Resolution 41 / 11 of 1986, adopted by 124 votes to one, with eight absten- tions. 4. For instance, referring to the IOZP Declaration, the United States rejected the "view that a group of States in a certain region can establish a legal regime for the high seas in that region." UN document A/C/ 1 /PV.1849, p. 5.
5. See the views of Amerasinghe, the Sri Lankan ambassador to the United Nations and the President of UNCLOS III, in UN document A/8492 and Add. 1. 6. "US Drops Its Objections to Asia Nuclear-Free Zone," InternationalHeraldTyibune, 1 August 1995, p. 1. 7. "US to Back Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone," International HeraldTribune, 18 Sep- tember 1995, p. 1. 8. See O. Jankowitsch and K. P. Sauvant, eds., TheThirdWorldWithoutSuper�ow-ers:TheCollectedDocumentoftheNon-alignedCountries (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1978), 1:54-55. The conference condemned the intention of certain states "to establish bases in the Indian Ocean, as a calculated attempt to intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia." In Pt. 7 of the Cairo Declaration, the confer- ence recommended the establishment of denuclearized zones in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
9. Par. 8 (6) of Resolution (K) of the Lusaka Conference of the Non-aligned Countries reads as follows: "A declaration should be adopted calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition, ... either army, navy or air-force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons" (Jankowitsch and Sauvant, p. 105). 10. See UN document A/C.1/PV.1815 (2 November 197 1), Par. 39. 11. UN document A/8492 and Add. 1. 12. This resolution was adopted by 104 votes to zero, with 14 abstentions.
13. General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 26th Sess., 1962d Plenary Meeting, 12 October 1971, p. 3. 14. UN document A/C.1/PV.1815, p. 4. 15. Ibid. 16. See UN document A/C.1/PV.1802-1831 in OfficialRecordsof theGeneralAssembly,Twenty-SixthSession,FirstCommittee, Vol. I, and for UN document A/C.1/ PV.1832-1857 in Vol. 11. 17. UN document A/C.1/PV.1841, p. 9.
18. UN documentA/C.1/PV.1848, pp. 11-13. 19. UN documentA/C.1/PV.1849, p. 3. 20. Ibid., p. 5.
21. UN document A/C.1/PV.1842, p. 12. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 14. 24. GAOR (n. 13 above), p. 3.
25. In this sense, this provision can be likened to neutralization. The preven- tion of the use of the territory in question for military purposes by outside powers is a major principle of the doctrine of neutralization.
26. The rules that merely outlaw war as a national policy (for example, the rules laid down in the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928) can be regarded as first-genera- tion rules. The second-generation rules could be said to be those that are laid down in the Charter of the United Nations; they go much further than the first-generation rules. While Art. 2(4) of the Charter broadens the scope of the rule of the prohibi- tion of the use of force, Art. 51 limits the scope of the right of states to use force for self-defense; it requires the occurrence of an armed attack to invoke the right to use force for self-defense.
27. 634 UnitedNationsTreatySeries, p. 281. 28. See T. T. Poulose, "The United Nations and arms control: nuclear prolifer- ation," in United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), TheUnitedNationsandtheMaintenanceofInternationalPeaceandSecurity (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), p. 392. 29. UN document A/40/PV.4, pp. 14-15. 30. UN document A/41 / 143 (29 May 1986). It was reported in the press that during the Falkland Islands crisis the British deployed nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic and the Argentinians considered this to be a violation of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The reports said that two British ships that were sunk-the Sheffield and the Coventry-were carrying nuclear depth bombs. As cited in W. M. Arkin, "Ocean Space and Nuclear Weapons: The Geo-strategic Environment," in TheDenuclearisa-tionof theOceans, ed. R. B. Byers (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 21, 32. 31. UN documentA/41/143 (29 May 1986), p. 2.
32. UN document A/41/PV.50, p. 7. 33. Ibid., p. 8. 34. UN document ST/LEG/SER.E/7, pp. 756; 5 Laruof theSeaBulletin (1985), p. 46.
35. UN document A/41/PV.50, pp. 51-52. 36. See the statements by the representatives of Colombia in UN document A/43/PV.47, p. 16, and of Brazil in A/41/PV.50, p. 8. 37. Since the adoption of the 1986 declaration, the regional states of the South Atlantic have held two meetings for the furtherance of the declaration. The first meeting was held in Rio de Janeiro in July 1988 (see the Final Document of the meeting in UN document A/43/512) and the second in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1990 (see the Final Document of the meeting in UN document A/45/474). These two meetings focused more on economic, marine, and pollution issues than on the legal, political, and military implications of the ZOPC Declaration.
38. For instance, for the views of the delegation of the United Kindom on the creation of a ZOP in the Indian Ocean, see UN document A/C.1 /PV.1848, pp. 11- 12; of Sri Lanka, A/C.1/PV.1815, p. 5; of New Zealand, A/C.1/PV.1849, p. 5.
39. Resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 (emphasis added). 40. See the Statement made by the Sri Lankan representative in the First Com- mittee of the General Assembly in UN document A/C.1/PV.1815, Par. 38. 41. UN document A/8492 and Add. 1. 42. For instance, see the Statement made by the delegation of El Salvador, UN document A/C.1/PV.1849, Par. 35. 43. UN document A/C.1/PV.1848, Par. 122. 44. See the Statement made by the Sri Lankan representative when introducing the draft IOZP Declaration, UN document A/C.1/PV 1815 (2 November 1971), p. 5.
45. This may be the reason why India objected to a clause in the Final Docu- ment of the 1979 Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States, which called upon the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to uphold the principles of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 46. Among them include Argentina, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Brazil, which used to claim 200 miles territorial sea, recently changed its position and now its territorial sea claim is 12 miles.
47. That was also the intention of the sponsors of the IOZP proposal. See UN document A/C/1/PV.1815 (2 November 1971), p. 5. 48. Other articles of the LOSC incorporating this principle are 19(2), 27(1)(b), 39(1)(b), 58(2), 138, 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155(2) and (3), 240(a), 242(2), 246(3), 279, and 301 of the LOSC. This principle first found expression in the 1970 "common heritage" declaration of the General Assembly (Resolution 2749 [XXV], operative Par. 5), adopted by 104 votes to zero, with 14 abstentions. 49. K. Booth, Laru,Force and Diplo zacyatSea (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 82. 50. Paragraph 6 of the preamble to the 1986 declaration. An overwhelming majority of states members of the United Nations supported the 1986 declaration (the United States was the only state that voted against it).
51. Defending the proposal for a ZOP in the Indian Ocean, the Sri Lankan ambassador to the United Nations, Amerasinghe, said that the Sri Lankan proposal "seeks to apply the principle of the reservation of an area exclusively for peaceful purposes to one of the major oceans of the world" (UN document A/C.1 /PV.1815 [2 November 1971], p. 4).
52. For instance, the Political Declaration of the 1983 Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Countries (the NAM consists of more than 108 countries) states that any military presence in the zones of peace "constitutes a flagrant violation" of the 10ZP Declaration. See UN document A/AC.159/L.55/Add.l.
53. Compare Art. 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article embodies the principle expressed in the maxim "pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt."