1 Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia Dr. Schofield is the recipient of an Australian Research Council QEII Fellowship (DP0666273). The authors are indebted to Andi Arsana for preparing the accompanying map.
1. J.R.V. Prescott, TheGulfofThailand (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1998), p. 10; A. Snidvongs, "The Oceanography of the Gulf of Thailand: Research and Management Priority," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesoftheGulfofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 1 (Bangkok: Southeast Asian Programme on Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL), 1998), pp. 1-68 at 11. 2. Approximate coastlines on the Gulf of Thailand for each State are as follows: Malaysia (ca. 10.8 NM/20 km), Thailand (ca. 783 NM/1,450 km), Cambodia (ca. 151 NM/280 km), and Vietnam (ca. 184 NM/340 km). 3. The terms "shelf-locked" and "zone-locked" are taken to mean that a vessel belonging to one of the States mentioned must transit the continental shelf or EEZ of its neighbors in order to gain access to the high seas. On the complexity of the coastal geography of the Gulf of Thailand, see also K. Kittichaisaree, TheLawoftheSeaandMaritimeBoundaryDelimitationinSouth-EastAsia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 97-99.
4. See also T.L. McDorman, "Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand," HogakuShimpo [The Chuo Law Review], CIX, no. 5-6 (Mar. 2003): 253-280 at 264-265. 5. See "ChevronTexaco Finds Oil in Four Wells Drilled in Offshore Cambodia Block A," press release Qan. 12, 2005), available online: . 6. "Cambodian Windfall Sparks Corruption Concern," Radio Free Asia (July 14, 2005), available online: .
7. A Cambodian Economic Forum analysis funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that total reserves could be in the region of 2 billion barrels of oil and 10 trillion cubic feet of gas. However, this report did emphasize the uncertainties inherent in this estimate and there have also been indications that technical challenges exist in relation to exploiting these finds. See Cambodian Economic Forum, ASWOTAnalysisoftheCambodianEconomy (A UNDP- funded discussion paper in cooperation with the Supreme National Economic Council and Harvard Kennedy School, 17 Jan. 2006, available online: ), p. 9, and "Blow for Cambodian Hopes," Upstream Online, 7 June 2007, available online: . 8. M.I.H. Mohamed, "Overfishing in the Gulf of Thailand: Issues and Resolution," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesof theGulfofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 2, (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1998), p. 4. 9. T.L. McDorman, "Thailand and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention," MarinePolicy9, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 292-309, p. 298; T.L. McDorman, "International Fishery Relations in the Gulf of Thailand," ContemporarySoutheastAsia 12, no. 1 (June 1990): 40-54 at 41; M. Torell, "Thai Fisheries and Fishing Industry: Its Development and Prospects with Regard to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea," in SEAPOL, TheUnitedNationsConaentionontheLaroof theSeainSoutheastAsia:ProblemofImplementation (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1991), pp. 37-93. 10. By 1984, the export of fishery products from Thailand accounted for almost nine percent of Thailand's total exports. See M. Torell, "Thailand's Fishing Industry: Future Prospects," OceanYearbook 7, eds. E. Mann Borgese, N. Ginsburg and J.R. Morgan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): 132-144 at 132.
11. D. Menavesta, "Fisheries Management Needs and Prospects for the Countries Bordering the Gulf of Thailand," in SEAPOI,IntegratedStudiesof theGeclf ofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 1 (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1998), pp. 205-224 at 209. 12. According to Mohamed (see n. 8 above, p. 3), long-term systematic surveys by the Thai Department of Fisheries indicates that the daytime CPUE has declined from 290 kg/hr in 1963 to approximately 50 kg/hr in 1993 while the night-time CPUE has declined from 57 kg/hr in 1976 to 21 kg/hr in 1995-less than half its previous value. The same author states that these findings are also supported by surveys conducted in Vietnamese waters. 13. R. Chuenpagdee and D. Pauly, "The Gulf of Thailand Trawl Fishers," ReportanddocumentationoflhelnternationalWorkshopontheImpleme�xtationofInternationalFisheriesInstrumentsandFuctorsofUnsustctinabilityandOverexploitationinFisheries (Mauritius, 3-7 Feb. 2003), available online: . 14. See n. 8 above, p. 4.
15. C. Ake-uru, "Thailand and the Law of the Sea," in 77zeLawoftheSea:Problems fromtheEastAsianPerspective, ed. C. Park and J.K. Park (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1987), pp. 414-425 at 418. 16. D.M. Johnston and D. VanderZwaag, "Towards the Management of the Gulf of Thailand: Charting the Course of Cooperation," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesof theGulfofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 1, (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1998), pp. 69-135 at 74. See also United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and East Asian Seas Regional Cooperation Unit, NationalReportofThailandontheFormulationofaTransboundaryDiagnosticAnalysisandPreliminaryofaStrategicActionProgramme fortheSouthChinaSea (Bangkok, Thailand: UNEP, 1996), p. 5, available online: . 17. Pollutants threatening the marine environment include sediments, litter and plastic, metal, radionuclide, and hydrocarbons. The latter three are of particular concern because they have a biomagnification effect on the aquatic food chain. See P. Chongprasith and V. Srineth, "Marine Water Quality and Pollution of the Gulf of Thailand," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesof theGvclfofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 1 (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1998), pp. 137-204 at 141. 18. For example, Samut Prakan, Chonburi, Map Ta Phut, Laem Chabang and Bang Poo, and especially along the Chao Phraya River. 19. M. Flaherty and P. Vandergeest, "Rice Paddy or Shrimp Pond: Tough Decisions in Rural Thailand," WorldDevelopment 27, no. 12 (1999): 2045-2060. 20. Chongprasith and Srineth, see n. 17 above, p. 176.
21. Johnston and VanderZwaag, see n. 16 above, p. 75. 22. V. Forbes, ConflictandCooperationinManagingMarilimeSpaceinSemi-enclosedSeas (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), p. 247. 23. M. Valencia, Shipping,Energy,andEnvironment:SoutheastAsianPerspectivesfortheEighties (proceedings of a workshop given in Honolulu, Hawaii, 10-12 Dec. 1980) (Halifax, Canada: Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, 1982). 24. In addition, leaks and spills of fuel (diesel) oil during filling and transfer occurred but the amount of such spillage is unknown. 25. UNEP, see n. 16 above, p. 6. 26. M. Torell, FisheriesinThailand,Geographical.StudiesabouttheUtilizationofResourcesinSemi-enclosedSeas (Sweden: University of Gothenburg, 1984), p. 19. 27. J.D. Fahn, ALandonFire-TheEnvironmentalConsequencesoftheSoutheastAsianBoom (Thailand: Si)kwonn Books, 2003), pp. 209-238. 28. Mercury is a neurotoxin that builds up in the food chain and, when ingested, can lead to reproductive problems including birth defects and chronic damage to the central nervous system.
29. UNEP, see n. 16 above, p. 7. 30. See UNEP, UIVEP/GEF Project"ReversingEnvironmentalDegradationTrendsintheSouthChinaSeaandGulf ofThailand," available at: . 31. Id. See also MJ. Valencia, J.M. Van Dyke and N.A. Ludwig, SharingtheResourcesofSouthChinaSea (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 220-221. 32. Article 122 of UNCLOS defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea as "a bay, basin, gulf, or sea surrounded by two or more states which has a narrow outlet to the ocean or whose waters consist entirely or primarily of the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states."
33. Three of the four Gulf of Thailand littoral States-Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand-are, however, parties to both the 1958 Conventions dealing with the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the Continental Shelf, respectively. 34. See, for example, T.L. McDorman, "Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim of 200- Mile Zones," OceanDevelopmentandInternacionalLaw 16, no. 2 (1986): 183-209; and McDorman, n. 4 above, p. 266. 35. Copy on file with the authors. 36. Through Kret no. 518/72/PRK dated 12 Aug. 1972 (copy on file with authors).
37. Through Council of State Decree dated 13 July 1982. In this legislation Cambodia's baselines were defined as being "straight baselines, linking the points of the coast and the furthest points of Kampuchea's [Cambodia's] furthest islands." Available online: . 38. The United States officially protested against the Cambodian claim in an AssertionofRight in 1986. See, J.A. Roach and R.W. Smith, UnitedStatesResponsetoExcessiveMaritimeClaims, 2d edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), p. 77. For its part, Thailand, the State most directly affected by Cambodia's straight baseline claims, did not recognize the legitimacy of the government in power in Phnom Penh at the time and therefore refused to recognize that regime's declarations, including its maritime claims of 1982. Cambodia's straight baselines claim of 1982 also gave rise to considerable criticism in academic circles. For example, Prescott describes the system in question as depending upon "a remarkably liberal interpretation of the concepts of fringing islands and enclosed waters linked closely to the land domain." See J.R.V. Prescott, TheMaritimePoliticalBoundariesof theWorld (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 212-213. 39. On the ground that Point "0" was "neither a high-tide elevation nor a low- tide elevation with a permanent structure." See U.S. Department of State, Straight
Baselines:Vietnam, LIS no. 99 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 12 Dec. 1983), p. 7. 40. For example, such floating basepoints exist in the boundaries between Denmark and Germany, Norway and Sweden, and Finland and Sweden. It is notable that these claims have not excited U.S. protests (Prescott, see n. 1 above, pp. 26-27). Point "0" is, however, located substantially further offshore the mainland coast (ca. 59 NM if determined on the basis of equidistance) than other examples of this type of State practice (all of which lie less than 12 NM offshore). 41. See U.S. Department of State, ContinentalShelfBoundary:Indonesia-Malaysia, LIS. no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 21 Jan. 1970), p. 2. 42. The PetaMenunjukkanSempadanPerairandanPelantarBenuaMalaysia or "Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia," often referred to as the PetaBaru ["New Map"], published by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping in two sheets. 43. Prescott, see n. 38 above, p. 214. For a critique of Malaysia's inferred straight baselines in the Malacca Strait, see MJ. Valencia, "Validity of Malaysia's Baselines and Territorial Sea Claim in the Northern Malacca Strait," MarinePolicy27 (2003): 367-373.
44. Notably Pulau Perehentian Besar, Pulau Redang, Pulau Yu Besar, Pulau Tenggol, Pulau Berhala (Pulau Varella), Pulau Tioman, and Pulau Aur. 45. The other area of straight baselines declared by Thailand in 1970 related to peninsula Thailand's western coast on the Andaman Sea and is therefore beyond the scope of this study. The announcement of the Prime Minister's Office concerning straight baselines and internal waters of Thailand was published in the Official Gazette, Special Volume 87, Chapter 52, 12 June 1970, available online: . 46. While Area 1 encloses a complex and numerous group of islands and rocks in the immediate vicinity of and masking approximately three-quarters of the relevant part of the Thai mainland coast, the U.S. analysis of these baselines raised some concerns over Area 2. Although this assessment acknowledged that the southern group of islands enclosed in Area 2 were fringing islands, with regard to the northern section of Area 2 the U.S. analysis stated that "the land/water ratio would be judged excessively high." See U.S. Department of State, .StraightBaselines:Thailand, LIS no. 31, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 24 Mar. 1971), pp. 5 and 8. 47.UNLawoftheSeaBulletin 25 (June 1994): 82-84, available online: .
48. The figures mentioned were calculated using British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 1:1,500,000. 49. Ko Kra is the more substantial of the two at 161 m (530 ft) elevation but both are small features with no human habitation and no man-made structures other than light beacons. Ko Losin in contrast is 1.5 m (5 ft) high and steep-to all round. 50. Measured on British Admiralty Charts 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 1:500,000 and 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of 1:240,000, respectively. 51. U.S. Department of State, StraightVaselineClaim:Thailand, Limits in the Seas, no. 122 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmen- tal and Scientific Affairs, 8 Sept. 2000), p. 9.
52. Through Vietnam's StatementsontheTerritorialSea,theContiguousZone,theExclusiveEcononaicZoneandtheContinentalShelf of 12 May 1977, available online: . 53.DeclarationonBaselineofTerritorialWaters of 12 Nov. 1982, available online: . 54. U.S. Department of State, StraightBaselines:Vietnam, LIS no. 99, (Washing- ton D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 12 Dec. 1983), p. 5. 55. Key points in the U.S. analysis were that the longest distance between basepoints is 161.8 NM, (the average being 84.6 NM), that island basepoints averaged 39.4 NM offshore with a maximum of 80.7 NM offshore, and that the internal waters claimed total approximately 27,000 NM2 (93,000 kM2). Id. 56. The U.S. note of protest stated that "there is no basis in international law for the system of straight baselines provided in the declaration of November 12, 1982" (Roach and Smith, see n. 38 above, p. 102). 57. The Thai note, dated 9 December 1985, stated that between points 0 and A7, Vietnam's claimed straight baselines were "at variance with the well-established rules of international law," referring to both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, and concluded that: "the Government of Thailand reserves all its rights under international law in relation to the sea areas in question and the airspace above them." See UN Laruof theSeaBulletin 7 (April 1986): 111.
58. UNCLOS Article 121 (2) provides that "the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory." This does, however, immediately raise the vexed question of distinguishing between a fully-fledged island under Article 121 (2) and a mere "rock" within the meaning of Article 121 (3). This subject has excited considerable academic debate. For a summary of the arguments see J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield, TheMaritimePoliticalBoundariesoftheWorld, 2d edition (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 57-91. 59. According to Ake-uru (see n. 15 above, pp. 420-21) of the Thai Foreign Ministry, Thailand's declaration of the Bight of Thailand as a historic bay did not meet with any protests because prior to declaring it Thailand had "sought out ideas in the first Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva in 1958." Thailand's claim is
therefore among the three claims to historic bays or waters (of eighteen) that the United States has not protested (Roach and Smith, see n. 38 above, pp. 33-34). 60. Prescott, see n. 1 above, p. 19. 61. J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander, eds., InternationalMaritimeBoundaries, vol. III (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), pp. 2364-2365. 62. The Brevie Line was defined by French Governor-General Jules Brevie on 31 January 1939 in order to resolve a dispute over mining rights on offshore islands between Vietnam's Ha-tien Province and the neighboring Cambodian Province of Kampot (see Figure 1). 63. It has therefore been noted that the international law doctrine of utipossidetis appears to have "determined the division of land territory": Charney and Alexander, see n. 61 above, pp. 2359 and 2361. See also C.H. Schofield, "Unlocking the Seabed Resources of the Gulf of Thailand," ContemporarySouthenstAsian 29, no. 2 (Aug. 2007): 286-308 at 296.
64. It has been argued that the key requirements for a valid claim to historic waters are the open assertion of the claim, effective, and long-standing exercise of jurisdiction and the acquiescence to the claim by other States. See Roach and Smith, n. 38 above, p. 31. 65. Thailand protested against the agreement in a note to the UN Secretary General dated 9 December 1985, stating that: "Regarding the claims to the so-called 'historic waters,' which purport to appropriate and subject certain sea areas in the Gulf of Thailand and in the Gulf of Tonkin (Gulf of Bac Bo) to the regime of internal waters, the Government of Thailand is of the view that such claims cannot be justified on the basis of the applicable principles and rules of international law": I1N Laruof theSeaBulletin 7 (Apr. 1986): 111. 66. In a note to the UN Secretary General dated 17 June 1987, the United States government protested against the Cambodian-Vietnamese agreement, stating that the claim was made known internationally "less than five years ago" and the short period of time that it had been in existence was "insufficient" to demonstrate the required effective exercise of authority for such a historic claim. Furthermore, with regard to the issue of acquiescence, the U.S. note continued, "the United States has not acquiesced in this claim, nor can the community of States be said to have done so. Given the nature of the claim first promulgated in 1982, such a brief period of time would not permit sufficient acquiescence to mature": UNLaruoftheSeaBulletin 10 (November 1987): 23. See also Roach and Smith, n. 38 above, pp. 39-40. 67. "Vietnam, Cambodia to share oil resources," BangkokPost (21 August 2006) .
68. United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) AnnualAdmiraltyNoticetoMarines, no. 12, NM12/07, (Taunton: UKHO, 2007), available online: . 69. Malaysia previously claimed a 3 NM-territorial sea, established by Britain as the former colonial power. Similarly, Cambodia and Vietnam inherited 12 NM- breadth fisheries zones from France. South Vietnam briefly claimed a 50 NM- territorial sea before being reunified with victorious North Vietnam. See also McDorman, n. 4 above, pp. 259-260. 70. An earlier claim was made through Kret No.77-70-CE of 6 February 1970, but this was swiftly superseded. 71. According to Ake-uru (see n. 15 above, p. 416), of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand's claim was made "in response" to those previously made by Cambodia and South Vietnam. 72. For discussion of these claims see also McDorman, n. 4 above, pp. 260-262.
73. McDorman (see n. 4 above, p. 261), however, notes that the Cambodian continental shelf claim with respect to Vietnam was altered "although in what precise manner was not made public."
74. See J.R.V. Prescott, Mapof Mainland Asia byTreaty (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), pp. 444-446. 75. Defined in the list of coordinates attached to the Kret as 11°32'N. 101°20'E. Similarly, Cambodia's Kret No.518/72-PRK of 12 August 1972 states that Cambodia's territorial sea "follows the division of maritime waters determined by the historic frontier stipulated in the Treaty of 23 March 1907 and confirmed by the map annexed thereto." 76. See, Prescott, n. 74 above, p. 445. The map annexed to the treaty illustrated this, shows a solid line connecting the highest point on Koh Kut to the first point of the international boundary between the two States on the mainland coast.
77. See n. 52 above. 78. Available online: . 79. See n. 37 above. 80. Available online: . 81.TreatybetweentheKingdomofThailandand(theRepublicoflMalaysiaRelatingtotheDelimitationoftheTerritorialSeasoftheTwoCountries of 24 October 1979. See J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander, eds., InternationalMaritimeBoundaries, vol. I (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 1096-1098, available online: . 82. 6° 14'.5N, 102° 05'.6 E to a point with coordinates 6° 27'.5 N, 102° 10'.O E. No definition was given as to the type of straight line employed. It is therefore unclear whether the line defined is a loxodrome (rhumb) line or a geodesic line. However, the text of the treaty states at Article 11(2) that the coordinates and points referred to were derived from British Admiralty Chart 3961, a copy of which was annexed to the original treaty. This implies that the straight line in question is a loxodrome or rhumb line. Article III ( 1 ) of the treaty did, however, state that "the actual location at sea of the points mentioned ... shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the competent authorities of the two Parties."
83. For an overview of the development of this boundary, see J.R.V. Prescott, MapofMainlandAsiabyTreaty (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), pp. 418-427. 84. The term "thalweg" is defined as follows: "The line of maximum depth along a river channel or lake but may be considered in any coastal channel." See International Hydrographic Organization (with the International Oceanographic Commission and the International Association of Geodesy), AManualonTechnicalAspectsof theUnitedNationsConnentionontheLamof IheSea,1982, Special Publication no. 51, 4th ed. (Monaco: International Hydrographic Bureau, 2006), chapter 6, p. 11, available online: . 85. Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 ed., at a scale of 1:240,000. 86. Memorandumof"UnderstandingBetweenMalaysiaandtheKingdom.ofThailandontheDelimitationoftheContinentalShelf BoundarybetweentheTwoCountriesintheGrclfofThailand was signed on 24 October 1979. See Charney and Alexander, n. 81 above, pp. 1105-1107, available online: . 87. The agreement consists of three points, (i)-(iii), with a slight deviation between points (i) and (ii), which are in close proximity to one another. As was the case with the territorial sea boundary, the type of "straight" lines was not defined, but the MoU did likewise provide that the actual location of the relevant points would be determined by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the parties.
88. Charney and Alexander, see n. 81 above, p. 1101. 89. In fact, this accord predates the territorial sea and continental shelf agreements in the Gulf by just over eight months, having been concluded on 21 February 1979. 90.AgreementbetweentheGonerrtmentof theKingdomofThailandandtheGovernmentof theSocialistRepublicofVietnamontheDelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundariesbetweentheTruoCountriesintheGulfofThailand. See J.I. Charney and R.W. Smith, eds., InterreationalMaritimeBoundaries, vol. IV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), pp. 2692-2694, available online: Maritimejurisdiction onSoutheastAsia:ACommentaryandMap (Hawaii: East West Center, 1981), p. 28; McDorman, see n. 9 above, p. 296. Exploratory talks were apparently held as early as 1972 but proved fruitless: TheNation (Mar. 3, 1998). 92. For a review of this negotiating process, see N.H. Thao, "Vietnam's First Maritime Boundary Agreement," BoundaryandSecurityBulletin 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 74-78.
93. Thao (Id., pp. 76-77) states that after the election of the new Thai Prime Minister, ties between Thailand and Vietnam were "boosted to a new level" and that the fourth meeting of the two sides' Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation coupled with the third meeting of their Joint Commit- tee on Fisheries and Order at Sea "did much to improve relations" between them. 94.Id., pp. 75-77. See also Charney and Smith, n. 90 above, p. 2687. 95. Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition, at a scale of 1:1,500,000. The agreement does not specify the type of straight line employed. 96. Latitude N 07° 49' 00".0000, Longitude E 103° 02' 30".0000. 97. Latitude N 08° 46' 54".7754, Longitude E 102° 12' 11 ".5342. Article 1 of the treaty refers these coordinates to Ellipsoid Everest-1830-Indian Datum. However, it is also stated that the "actual locations" of these points will be determined by hydrographic experts appointed by the two governments at an unspecified time in the future. 98. Prescott, see n. 1 above, p. 41.
99. Inquiries with Thai authorities revealed that Bangkok relied wholly on Vietnamese assurances that such an agreement existed. Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 18 December 1998. 100. Prescott, see n. 1 above, p. 43. Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition, at a scale of 1:1,500,000.
101. McDorman, see n. 4 above, p. 276. 102. According to a Thai Foreign Ministry report issued in 1996, 1,079 fishing vessels were operating legally while another 2,810 were operating "illegally" in the waters of Bangladesh, Bnmei, Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. 103. See N. Ganesan, "Illegal fishing and illegal migration in Thailand's bilateral relations with Malaysia and Myanmar," in Non-TrnditionalSecurityIssuesinSoutheastAsian, ed. A.T.H. Tan and J.D.K. Boutin (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 507-528.
104. For example, in 1995, a Malaysian patrol craft opened fire on Thai trawlers fishing illegally off Terengganu after the trawlers refused to surrender. Two Thai fishermen were fatally wounded in the incident and the trawler was seized and taken into port by Malaysian authorities. Id., p. 512. 105. D.Y. Coulter, "South China Seas Fisheries: Countdown to Calamity," ConlemporarySoutheastAsia 17, no. 4 (Mar. 1996): 383. 106. See Thao, n. 92 above, pp. 74-78. 107. "Dual Claims Are a Sticking Point," BangkokPost (March 15, 1997). 108. Some key constraints facing Cambodia's fishery managers are "the use of illegal fishing gear, illegal fishing, poaching by foreign vessels, piracy, and illegal detention of fishermen": H.M. Ibrahim, "Over-Fishing in the Gulf of Thailand," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesof theGulf ofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 2 (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1999), p. 66. 109. See V.L. Forbes, ConflictandCooperation,inManagingMaritimeSpace,inSemi-EnclosedSeas (Perth: University of Western Australia, 1997); K.I. Matics, "'The Law of the Sea and Fisheries Disputes in Southeast Asia," in SelectedPapersinCommemorationof theEntryintoForceof theIlNConvention.ontheLaruof theSea, ed. KI. Matics and T.L. McDorman (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1994), pp. 126-164. 110. D. Menasveta, "Fisheries Management Needs and Prospects for the Countries Bordering the Gulf of Thailand," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesoftheGulf ofThailand, ed. D.M. Johnston, vol. 1 (Bangkok: SEAPOI,, 1998), pp. 205-225.
111. Id.112.AgreementfortheImplementationoftheProvisionsofthe(invitedNationsConventionontheLamof theSeaof10December1982relatingtotheConservationandManagementofStraddlingFishStocksandHighlyMigratoryFishStocks (New York: United Nations, 1995). In force as of 11 Dec. 2001. Available online: . 113. Available online: . 114. Available online: . 115. "Prospective Management of Shared or Transboundary Fish in the Gulf of Thailand," in SEAPOLIntegratedStudiesof tlzeGulf ofThailand, ed. D.M.Johnston, vol. 3, (Bangkok: SEAPOL, 1999), pp. 34-38. 116. Id., p. 37. 117. A. Harakunarak, CooperationinMarineAffairs:EvidencefromtheGulfofThailand (Ph.D. thesis, University of Delaware, 1998), pp. 63-64. 118. See Prescott, n. 1 above; V.L. Forbes, "Cooperative Approaches to the Utilization of Marine Resources in the ASEAN Region," in TheNagaAwakens, ed. V. Savaga, L. Kong, and W. Neville (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1998), pp. 113-126; V.L. Forbes, ConflictandCooperationinManagingMaritimeSpaceinSemi-enclosedSeas (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001).
119. Editorial, "Cnmch Time for Thai Fishing Fleet," TheNation (Nov. 22, 2003). 120. S. Piumsombun, "The Impact of International Food Trade on Food Security in Thailand," 2003, available online: . 121. D. Pathan, "25th Anniversary of Diplomatic relations: The Fishermen's Friend: Thai-Vietnamese Ties in Sea Change," TheNation, (Aug. 4, 2001). 122. See n. 119 above.
123. A. Chircop, " 'Think-Piece' on the Current and Emerging Marine-Related Activities of APEC," (paper presented at APEC Integrated Ocean Forum Two, Australia, Canberra, 3-7 June 2002). 124. O.R. Young, ed., SciencesPlanfortheProjectontheInstitutionalDimensionsofGlobal EnlfironmentalChangp (Bonn: International Human Dimensions Programme GMa/ �MMYo7!??MK
125. M. Frank and S. Jeffrey, ThinkingaboutEnvironmentalSecurity:SoutheastAsiaandtheAmericasinComparativePerspective, Working Paper series, no. 2 (United States: North-South Center, University of Miami, October 2001). 126. Agreed Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Thai-Vietnamese Working Group on the Establishment of the Order at Sea, Hai Phong, Vietnam 8-13 September 2003. 127. N.H. Thao, ConservationandResponsibilitiesofResourcesinSouthChinaSea (Vietnam: Hanoi University, 2004).
128. UNCLOS, Arts. 74(3) and 83(3). 129. E.L. Richardson, ` Jan Mayen in Perspective," AmericanJournalofInterna-tionalLam 82 (1988): 443-458.
130. W.G. Stormont and I. Townsend-Gault, "Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?," in ThePeacefulManagement)ofTransboundaryResources, ed. G.H. Blake, C.L. Sien, C.E.R. Grundy-Warr, M.A. Pratt, and C.H. Schofield (London: Graham and Trotman, 1995), pp. 51-76. 131. Memorandumof(understandingBetweentheKingdomofThailandand[theRepublic,oflMalaysiaontheEstablishmentofaJointAuthorityfortheExploitationoftheResourcesof the Sea-BedinaDefinedAreaoftheContinental Shelf oftheTwoCountriesintheGulfofThailand, done on 21 Feb. 1979. See Charney and Alexander, n. 81 above, pp. 1107-1123, available online: .
132. The MoU defines the wedge-shaped area of the JDA through a list of seven points defined by coordinates and joined by "straight lines." As was the case for the agreements relating to the territorial sea and continental shelf between the two countries, no definition was provided for the term "straight lines." 133. AgreementBetrueentheGovernmentofMalaysiaandtheGoverizmentoftheKingdomofThailan.dontheConstitutionandOtherMattersRelatingtotheEstablishmentoftheMalaysia-ThailandJointAuthority. See Charney and Alexander, n. 81 above, pp. 1111-1123. 134. See Schofield, n. 63 above, pp. 292-293. 135. Production-sharing contracts were concluded with three contractors on 21 April 1994 and, following the discovery of several viable natural gas fields, two major gas supply agreements designed to give Malaysia and Thailand access to the estimated 10 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves within the JDA were signed, BangkokPost (Apr. 21, 1998); TheNation (Apr. 21, 1998).
139. BangkokPost (May 26, 2002). 140. T. Allison, "Special Report on Trans Thai-Malaysia Natural Gas Project," AsiaTimes (Aug. 5, 2000), available online: . 141. D. Ong and B.A. Hamzah, DisputedMaritimeBoundariesandClaimstoOffshoreTerritoriesintheAsia-PacificRegion (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1995). 142. MemorandumofIlnderstandingBetweenMalaysiaandtheSocialistRepublicofVietnamfortheExplorationandExploitationofPetroleuminaDefinedAreaoftheContinentalShelfInvolvingtheTwoCountries was signed on 5 June 1992 and entered into force on 4June 1993. See Charney and Alexander, n. 61 above, pp. 2335-2344. 143. The joint zone was defined by a list of six points, the locations of which were described by geographic coordinates said to be linked by "straight lines." These coordinates were referenced to the 1967 edition of British Admiralty Chart 2414, but no further technical information, for example concerning the datum used or what was meant by the tenn "straight line," was provided. The parties agreed that their "competent authorities" would determine the "actual locations" of the points concerned.
144. See Schofield, n. 63 above, p. 297. 145. The two governments do, however, retain a right of veto with regard to any agreements their national oil companies might reach. In practical terms, as Petronas had already issued production-sharing contracts for the overlapping area, PetroViet- nam agreed to a commercial arrangement whereby these existing contracts would remain valid and petroleum operations would be directly managed by Petronas. 146. In November 1996, it was reported that the joint zone was destined to become a "sizeable source" of oil with the combined potential of known structures put at 200 million barrels of oil with several other prospects yet to be explored. Further discoveries were reported in September 1997 and in January and September 1998. This led Malaysia's State-owned oil company, Petronas, and Petro Vietnam to sign a "pre-unitization agreement" relating to the extension of a discovery in the "Defined Area" into exclusively Vietnamese waters.
147. Vietnamese government sources indicated in October 1999 that the three states have reached agreement in principle on the joint development of the tripartite overlapping claims area. 148. D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith, InternntionalMaritimoBoundaries, vol. V (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 3743-3744. 149. The reduction of the area of overlap between the parties inferred by the resolution of Cambodia and Vietnam's sovereignty dispute over islands is confirmed. There is, however, still some uncertainty as to how the southern limit of the area covered by the MoU relates to Point K at the northwestern terminus of the Thai- Vietnamese maritime boundary agreement. See McDorman, n. 4 above, pp. 278-279.
150. Prescott, see n. 1 above, p. 12. 151.Offshore (Aug. 1993). 152.Offshore (Feb. 1994). 153. McDorman, see n. 4 above, p. 277. 154. "Cambodia Oil Exploration Pact Possible," BangkokPost (August 6, 2006).
155. A. Symon, "Cambodia and Thailand Struggle over Petroleum," AsiaTimes (June 13, 2007).
156. McDorman, see n. 4 above, p. 267. 157. See n. 30 above.