The Peaceful Purposes Reservation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea*

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The Peaceful Purposes Reservation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea*

in Ocean Yearbook Online


* EDITORS' NoTE.-This is a condensed version of the paper prepared for Pacem in Maribus XV, Malta, September 7-11, 1987. An earlier article to which readers are referred is Boleslaw A. Boczek, "The Concept of Regime and the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment," Ocean Yearbook 6, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 271- 97. 1. The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexed and Index (New York: United Nations, 1983), Sales n. E. 83.v.5. (hereafter referred to as "the Convention"). 2. This list is based on the following literature: for a useful chronology of naval nuclear developments in the years 1946-85, see William M. Arkin et al., "Naval Nu- clear Weapons Developments: A Selective Chronology," in The Denuclearisation of the Oceans, ed. R. B. Byers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 237-63. The geo- strategic environment of the nuclearization of the oceans is reviewed in William M. Arkin et al., "Ocean Space and Nuclear Weapons: The Geostrategic Environment," in Byers, ed., pp. 21-40. The extent of nuclearization in terms of nuclear capabilities, roles, and missions of the nuclear powers is presented in Williams M. Arkin et al., "The Nuclearisation of the Oceans: Roles, Missions and Capabilities," in Byers, ed., pp. 41- 74. For some other analyses see, e.g., Jonathan Alford, "Some Reflections on Technol-

ogy and Sea Power," 38 InternationalJournal (1983): 397-408; Neville Brown, "Military Uses of the Ocean Floor," in Pacem in Maribus I (Malta: Royal University of Malta Press, 1971), pp. 115-21; Roger Villar, "Weapon Developments in the 1980s: Sea," in 1982 RUSI f� Brassey Defence Yearbook (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1982), pp. 18-193; O. Wilkes, "Ocean-based Nuclear Deterrent and Anti-submarine Warfare," Ocean Yearbook 2, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 226-49. Military uses of the seabed are summarized, .with rich references to further literature, in Patrizio Merciai, "La demilitarisation des fonds marins," 88 Revue ginirale de droit internationale public (RGDIP) (1984): 46-113. See also Rex J. Zedalis, " 'Peaceful Purposes' and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Composite Negotiating' Text: A Comparative Analysis of the Existing and Proposed Military Regime for the High Seas," 7 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (1979): 1-35; and Rudiger Wolfrum, "Restricting the Use of the Sea to Peaceful Purposes: Demilitarization in Being?" 24 German Yearbook of International Law (GYIL) (1982): 200-41. 3. The latter aspect of the use of the oceans has been widely discussed in politico- strategic literature. For a recent analysis of naval strategy within the context of the Convention see Ken Booth, Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), esp. bibliog. 4. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Others Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (hereafter cited as the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty), February 11, 1971, 955 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), p. 115; also in International Legal Materi- als (ILM) 10 ( 1971 ) : 145. 5. See, e.g., Jens Evensen, "The Military Uses of the Deep Ocean Floor and Its Subsoil," in Proceedings of the Symposium on the International Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed,

ed. L. Stucki (1970), pp. 535-56; R. W. Gehring, "Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the Sea," Military Review (1971), pp. 168-224; F. Kriiger-Sprengel, "Militarische Aspekte der Nutzung des Meeresbodens," in Die Nutzung des Meeresgrundes ausserhalb des Festlandsockels (Tiefsee) (Leyden, 1970); W.Kuhne, Das Vdlkerrecht und die militarische Nutzung des Meeresbodens (Leyden, 1975); and P. S. Rao, "Legal Regulation of Maritime Military Uses," 13 Indian Journal of International Law (1973): 425-54. 6. See Sec. II A of this article. This is also discussed by Joseph R. Morgan, "Naval Operations in the Antarctic Region: A Possibility?" in this volume, pp. 362-377. 7. The Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71.

8. Antarctic Treaty, Art. 1(1). For a comprehensive examination of this clause see F. M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 94-98. 9. Antarctic Treaty, Art. 1(2). 10. Ibid., Art. 5(1). 11. Ibid., Art. 7. 12. Earlier examples of demilitarization of certain areas include the Treaty Relat- ing to Spitzbergen, February 9, 1920, 2 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) 7; and the Convention Concerning the Non-fortification and Neutralization of Aaland Islands, October 20, 1921, 9 LNTS 217. 13. Antarctic Treaty, Art. 6. 14. Ibid. 15. W. M. Bush, Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents (New York: Oceania, 1982), p. 67. 16. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, 610 UNTS 205 (hereafter referred to as Outer Space Treaty). Readers are referred to an article by Nicholas Mateesco Matte, "The Law of the Sea and Outer Space: A Comparative Survey of Specific Issues," Ocean Yearbook 3, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 13- 37.

17. Outer Space Treaty, Art. 4(2). 18. See Sec. II A of this article. 19. Outer Space Treaty, Art. 4(2). 20. Carl Q. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space pp. 25-26; Eric Stein, "Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements," 66 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (1972): 255, 260-61. 21. Outer Space Treaty, Art. 4(1). 22. Outer Space Treaty, Art. 1. 23. See Motte (ed.), Space Activities and Emerging International Law (Montreal: McGill University, Institute and Centre of Air and Space Law, 1984), p. 290. 24. See Stein, pp. 262-63. 25. Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes- tial Bodies (hereafter referred to as the Moon Treaty), Art. 3 in 18 International Legal Materials (ILM) (1979): 1434. The Moon Treaty entered into effect on July 11, 1984. See Carl Q. Christol, "The Moon Treaty Enters into Force," 79 AJIL (1985): 163.

26. See the accompanying Memorandum of the Maltese Government, UN docu- ment A/6695, August 18, 1967. 27. UN document A/C.1/P.V. 1515 and P.V. 1516. Readers are also referred to an article by Arvid Pardo, "The Evolving Law of the Sea: A Critique of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1977)," Ocean Yearbook'l, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 9-37. 28. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereafter cited as Declaration of Principles). UN General Assembly Resolution 2794 (XXV) (1970). 29. See n. 4 above. 30. See, e.g., statements by: the Soviet Union, UN document A/AC.125/SR.16 (1968); Bulgaria, UN document A/AC.135/SR.16 (1968); Peru, UN document A/ AC.135/SR.17 (1968); and Malta, A/AC.1/PV.1582 (1968).

31. For the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway, see UN document A/AC.135/SR.17 (1968) (n. 30 above). 32. For the Soviet position see the Soviet draft treaty prohibiting the use of the seabed for military purposes. UN document Endc/240 (1969). For Soviet comments on this issue at that time see, e.g., G. F. Kalinkin, "Ob ispol'zovanii morskogo dna isk- luchitelno v mirnykh tsel'akh" (On the use of the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes), Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 10 (1969), pp. 117-22; G. M. Melkov, "Yuridicheskoe znachenie termina 'iskluchitel'no v mirnykh tsel'akh'" (The legal meaning of the term "exclusively for peaceful purposes"), Sovetskiy Ezhegodnik Mezh- dunarodnogo Prava 1971 (1973): 153-60; V. I. Vaneyev, "Demilitarizatsia dna morey i okeanov" (Demilitarization of sea and ocean bed), in Strategia imperializma i bor'ba SSSR za mir i razoruzhenie, ed. V. Ya. Aboltin et al. ( 1974):258-72. As discussed below in Sec. IV A of this article ("The Specific Reservations: Debate in the Plenary"), the Soviet Union changed its position at UNCLOS III, virtually joining the United States against the Third World demands for demilitarization of the oceans. For the U.S. draft of the seabed treaty see UN document Endc/249 (1969). 33. The Declaration of Principles (n. 28 above) proclaimed the area of "the sea- bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ... as well as the resources of the area" as the common heritage of mankind, reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. 34. Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty (n. 4 above). The early drafts of the treaty are reprinted in ILM 8 (1969): 659 and ILM 9 (1970): 392. For a summary review of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the treaty see Merciai (n. 2 above), pp. 68-72; Wolfrum (n. 2 above), pp. 220-23; and, generally, L. Migliorino, Fondi marini e armi di distruzione di massa (Milan: Giuffre, 1980). Only El Salvador and Peru voted against the treaty. Ecuador and France abstained and 19 other countries were absent (ILM 10 [1971]: 151). Documents leading to the treaty are collected in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, International Negotiations on the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (Wash- ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). 35. Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty, Art. 5. It has been emphasized that this clause introduces into the treaty a dynamic aspect of time dimension indicating clearly that

the ultimate objective of the process, of which the treaty is only one stage, is demilitari- zation of the seabed. See Elisabeth Mann Borgese, "The Sea-Bed Treaty and the Law of the Sea," in Byers, ed. (n. 2 above), pp. 88, 91. 36. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter cited as the Nonproliferation Treaty), July 1, 1968, Art. 4(1), 729 UNTS 161; ILM 7 (1968): 811. Cf. the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 26, 1956, 276 UNTS 3.

37. Nonproliferation Treaty, Art. 2(4). 38. Further elaboration of this fundamental problem is, of course, far beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 39. Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, February 6, 1922, 25 LNTS 202. For the other examples see generally R. A. Hoover, Arms Control: The Intenuar Naval Limitation Agreements, Monographs in World Affairs, vol. 17 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1980). 40. See "Verification, Naval Disarmament Discussed by 1987 Disarmament Com- mission," 24 United Nations Chronicle, no. 3 (August 1987), p. 16.

41. Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, May 25, 1972, 852 UNTS 151; Protocol, May 22, 1973, ILM 12 (1973): 1108; and U.K.- U.S.S.R., Agreement of 15 July 1986 Concerning the Prevention of Incidents at Sea beyond the Territorial Sea, Naval Forces 8, no. 1 (1987): 14-15. , 42. Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty, Arts. 1 and 2. 43. This rule was maintained by the Second Review Conference of the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty. See Eric P. J. Myjer, "The Law of Disarmament and Arms Control: Implications for the Law of the Sea," in Byers, ed. (n. 2 above), pp. 104, 108. 44. This results from Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty, Art. 1(1). ). 45. For the existing system see Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty, Art. 3.

46. This issue is analyzed in Borgese (n. 35 above). 47. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (hereafter cited as the Partial Test Ban Treaty), August 8, 1963, 48 UNTS 43. See also Egon Schwelb, "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law," 58 AJIL ( 1964): 642. 48. Partial Test Ban Treaty, Art. l(l)(a)(b). 49. See Brown (n. 2 above), pp. 60, 73. See also Tullio Treves, "Military Installa- tions, Structures, and Devices on the Sea-bed" (hereafter cited as "Military Installa- tions"), 74 AJIL 808, 820-2. 50. Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (hereafter cited as ABM Treaty), May 26, 1972, Art. V(I), ILM 11 (1972): 784. 51. Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty, Art 9. Cf. the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 UNTS 161.

52. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (hereafter referred to as the Tlatelolco Treaty), February 14, 1967, 634 UNTS 281; ILM 6 (1967): 521. For a detailed analysis see Alfonso Garcia Robles, "Mesure de desarmement dans les zones particulieres: le Traite visant 1'interdiction des armes nucleaires en Amerique latine," 133 Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International (RCADI no. 2 (1971): 43- 134; J. R. Redick, "Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America," 29 International Organization (1975): 415-45; Jozef Goldblat and Victor Millan, "Militarization and Arms Control in Latin America," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 393-425. 53. South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (hereafter referred to as the Rarotonga Treaty), with three Protocols, August 6, 1985, in Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 6 (October 1985), p. 24, and reproduced in Ocean Yearbook 6, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 594- 605. The publication of the entry into force of this treaty appears in Ocean Yearbook 7, eds. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Norton Ginsburg, and Joseph R. Morgan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 529. See also, United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (New York: United Nations, 1987), pp. 192-207. 54. The concept of the zone of peace is analyzed in M. Malita, "The Concept of 'Zone of Peace' in International Politics," 10 Revue roumaine d'Etudes internationales (1976): 680-91. Nuclear-free zones in general are reviewed in G. Delcoigne, An Over- view of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (Bologna: Johns Hopkins University Center, 1982). Regional approaches to denuclearization are discussed in contributions to Part 4 of Byers, ed. (n. 2 above). Zones of peace and nuclear-free zones are examined in great detail in Sandra Szurek, "Zones exemptes d'armes nucleaires et zones de paix dans le tiers-monde," 88 RGDIP (1984): 114-203. The UN General Assembly declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, A/Res. 2832 (XXVI) Dec. 16, 1971, was adopted by 61 votes, with 55 abstentions (including the United States and the Soviet Union). The declaration and its follow-up are discussed in Barry Buzan, "Naval Power, the Law of the Sea, and the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," 5 Marine Policy (1981):194- 204; M. C. W. Pinto, "The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," in Byers, ed. (n. 3 above), pp. 145-56. In 1979, the UN General Assembly decided to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean. Originally scheduled for 1981, it was postponed and was then prepared by a special ad hoc committee for the year 1988. See "Ad Hoc Committee on Indian Ocean Concludes First Session in 1987," 24 UN Chronicle, no. 2 (1987):53. For a possibility of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Black Sea, see Dumitru Mazilu, "The Black Sea and Demilitarisation," in Byers, ed. (n. 2 above), pp. 157-63. For further information on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, see Stanley D. Brunn and Gerald L. Ingalls, "Voting Patterns in the UN General Assembly on Uses of the Seas," Ocean Yearbook 7, eds. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Norton Ginsburg, and Joseph R. Morgan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 52-64.

55. Tlatelolco Treaty, Art. 3. The phrase "in accordance with its legislation" means that for some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, EI Sal- vador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) the nuclear-free zone extends 200 miles from the base lines. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of not recognizing such extravagant claims to the territorial sea. See Treves, "Military Instal- lations," pp. 808, 826. 56. Tlatelolco Treaty, Art. 5. 57. Ibid., Art. 18. 58. Ibid., Additional Protocol I, February 14, 1967, 634 UNTS 362. 59. Ibid., Additional Protocol II, Feburary 14, 1967, 634 UNTS 364. 60. Ibid., Art. 4(2), indicating the geographical limits of the future zone. For the 200-mile claims see n. 55 above. 61. Tlatelolco Treaty, Arts. 4(2) and 28(1). 62. Cuba, Guyana, and some other Caribbean countries are not yet parties to the treaty. Argentina has not ratified it and Brazil and Chile have ratified it but, unlike the other parties, have not agreed to be bound by the treaty before the conditions of Art. 28(1) are fulfilled. As noted, France has not yet ratified Protocol I. See Merciai (n. 2 above), p. 102, n. 93. 63. Rarotonga Treaty; See n. 53 above. This treaty is analyzed in detail in

Georges Fischer, "La zone denuclearisee du Pacifique Sud," 1985 Annuaire Frangais du Droit International (AFDI) (1986): 23-57; and Elizabeth L. Gibbs, "In Furtherance of a Nuclear-Free Zone Precedent: The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty," 4 Boston University International Law Journal (1986): 387-431. 64. Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 1. This Art. also gives a definition of the "nuclear explosive device." 65. Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 7. 66. Rarotonga Treaty, Art. 5. State practice varies among the parties to the treaty. For example, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu firmly refuse visits by warships carrying nuclear weapons. Western Samoa bars visits by nuclear-powered ships. On this and on the controversy surrounding the antinuclear stand of New Zealand's Labour Government of Prime Minister Lange, see Fischer, pp. 37-39. 67. For the texts of these Protocols see United Nations The Law of the Sea Bulletin (n. 53 above), pp. 205-07. While China and the Soviet Union view favorably the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, the United States decided not to sign the Protocols. See 87 Dep't State Bull. (no. 2121), (April 1987): 53. The position of France, whose nuclear tests prompted the negotiations for the treaty, is also negative. 68. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 450 UNTS 82. 69. Ibid., Art. 1.

70.Ibid. See also Bernard H. Oxman, "The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," 24 Virginia Journal of International Law (1984): 809. And see, generally, Willem Riphagen, "La navigation dans le nouveau droit de la mer," 84 RGDIP (1980): 144; D. Momtaz, "Les forces navales et fimperatif de securité dans la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer," in Essays on the New Law of the Sea, ed. Budislav Vukas (Zagreb: SveuÓlišna naklada Liber, 1985), pp. 230-43. 71. See the proposal of Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, in fourth session UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, UN document A/Conf.l3/C.2/L. 32. The proposal was rejected by 43 votes to 13, with 9 abstentions. 72. This problem is extensively discussed in Uwe Jenisch, Das Recht zur Vornahme' militarischer Ubungen und Versuche auf Hoher See in Friedenszeiten (Hamburg, 1970). 73. See UNTS 48, (n. 47 above). 74. This problem is analyzed at length in Boleslaw A. Boczek, "Peace-Time Mili- tary Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Third Countries," 19 Ocean Develop- ment and International Law (1988): 445-68.

75. The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High Seas (450 UNTS 82) and on the Continental Shelf (499 UNTS 311) do not deal with this subject. 76. "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), pp. 851-52. Among the arguments cited in support of this position are: (1) the legislative history of Art. 2 of Geneva Convention on the High Seas (rejection of the Brazilian proposal to use the term "waters of the high seas" instead of "high seas"); (2) analogy to the right of laying submarine cables and pipelines on the deep seabed as one of the High Seas freedoms; (3) the fact that even relatively permanent uses of the High Seas are not perceived as conflicting with the prohibition of claims to sovereignty; and (4) the fact that if military activities on the seabed violated its res communis nature under general international law, there would have been no need to conclude the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty. See Zedalis (n. 2 above), pp. 23-24; and see, generally, Jenisch. 77. Convention, Art. 88. (in the French text: "used exclusively"). See discussion of the deep seabed Area reservation in Sec. V C below. 78. Convention, Art. 77(1).

79. Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), p. 817, and "La notion d'utilisa- tion des espaces marins a des fins pacifiques dans le nouveau droit de la mer [1980] (hereafter cited as "La notion"), 26 AFDI (1981): 687-99. 80. Convention, Art. 141(1). ). 81. Ibid., Art. 143(1). 82. Ibid., Art. 147(2) (d). 83. Ibid., Art. 155(2). 84. Ibid., Art. 240(a) discusses scientific research for peaceful purposes; Conven- tion, Art. 242(2) addresses international cooperation in pursuit of such research. 85. Convention, Art. 246(3). 86. This debate is ably summed up in the intervention by the delegate of Iran. 5 Official Records (1976): pp. 65-66. 87. Ibid., p. 56.

88. Ibid., p. 62. 89. See, e.g., the Philippines, in 5 Official Records (1976): 65; Tunisia, ibid., p. 67. 90. See statements by the delegates of Madagascar, 5 Official Records (1976): 57- 58; Iraq, ibid., p. 59; United Arab Emirates, ibid., pp. 63-64; the Philippines, ibid., pp. 64-65; Iran, ibid., pp. 65-66; Somalia, ibid., p. 66; Pakistan, ibid., pp. 66-67; and Tunisia, ibid., pp. 67-68. The position of Romania came closer to that of the Third World countries than to the Soviet stand on the matter. See Romania, ibid., p. 57. 91. 5 Official Records (1976): 59. This position coincided with that of the United States and was also supported by Bulgaria, ibid., pp. 60-61, and Cuba, ibid., p. 61. The evolution in the Soviet attitude is traced in Anthony P. Allison, "The Soviet Union and UNCLOS III: Pragmatism and Policy Evolution," 16 ODIL (1985): 109-36.

92. Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter requires all members to "refrain in their interna- tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." However (unlike the original proposal), Art. 301 of the Con- vention uses the phrase "principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations" instead of "purposes," in order to make reference not just to Chap. 1 of the Charter (Purposes and Principles) but to all international law of the Charter. Another reason may have been the desire to avoid any subjective considerations of "purposes" of the Charter being included in the Convention. See Treves, "La notion" (n. 79 above), pp. 688. Provisions almost identical to Art. 301 are found in Arts. 19(2)(a), 39(l)(b), also applying to the context of Arts. 52 and 54. 93. UN Charter, Art. 103. 94. In the English text there is a difference between the wording of the title of Art. 301, which reads "peaceful uses of the seas" and the wording of the specific reservations using the phrase "peaceful purposes." But both mean the same. As a matter of fact, there is no such difference in the French text, using "for peaceful purposes" (eft des fins pacifiques) in both.

95. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN document A/Conf.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL (1969): 875, Art. 31(1). ). 96. In the French text "reserved" is rendered by "used exclusively" (utilisee exclu- sivement). 97. Convention, Art. 87.

98. Convention, Arts. 32, 95, 236. Also in the Convention, see references to warships in Arts. 29, 30, 31, 102, 107, 110, 111, 224, and submarines in Art. 20. See, generally, Oxman (n. 70 above). 99. Convention, Art. 19(2)(b)(e)(f ). 100. Convention, Art. 298(1)(b). See also Sec. VI of this article. 101. Ibid. 102. There is general consensus on this among the commentators. See, among others, Pyotr Barabolya, "Changes in the Legal Regime of the Sea and Their Influence on Navigation," in Vukas, ed. (n. 70 above), p. 189; Isaak I. Dore, "International Law and the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer Space as Zones of Peace," 15 Cornell International Law Journal (1982): 1-61; Jens Evensen, "The Law of the Sea Regime," in Byers, ed. (n. 2 above), pp. 77-87; Francesco Francioni, "Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities and the Law of the Sea," 18 Cornell International Law Journal (1985): 203-26; Stepan V. Molodtsov, "The Exclusive Economic Zone: Legal Status and Regime of Navigation," Ocean Yearbook 6, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 203-16, esp. p. 214 (not a "complete" ban); Momtaz (n. 70 above); R. W. G. de Muralt, "The Military Aspects of the UN Law of the Sea Convention," 32 Netherlands International Law Review (1985): 78-99; Oxman (n. 70 above); Jean-Pierre Queneudec, "Zone economique exclusive et forces aeronavales," in Rene-Jean Dupuy, ed., La gestion des ressources pour l'humanite: Le droit de la mer-The Management of Humanity's Resources: The Law of the Sea (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Elmar Rauch, "Militarische Aspekte der Seerechtsentwick- lung," in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, ed., Aspekte der Seerechtsentwicklung (Munich: Hochschule der Bundes Wehr, 1980), pp. 75-121; Elliot L. Richardson, "Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional Security Considerations," 19 San Diego Law Review (1982): 553, and "Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea," 58 Foreign Affairs (1980): 902-19; Riphagen (n. 70 above); Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), and "Le nouveau regime des espaces marins et la circulation des navires," in Vukas, ed., pp. 202-21 (n. 70 above); and Zedalis (n. 2 above). 103. Convention on the High Seas, Art. 2 (n. 68 above).

104. "Reasonable regard" of the 1958 Convention is replaced in the 1982 Con- vention by "due regard," but this change does not seem to have any substantive meaning. 105. This is admitted by Evensen in "The Law of the Sea Regime" (n. 102 above), pp. 85-86. 106. Convention, Art. 58(1). 107. See, e.g., Evensen, "The Law of the Sea Regime" (n. 102 above), pp. 85-86. 108. Convention, Art. 87(2) cross-reference in Art. 58(1). 109. Convention, Art. 58(3). 110. Convention, Art. 58(2). 111. See the interpretative declarations of Brazil, Cape Verde, and Uruguay, made under Art. 310 of the Convention in, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 5 (July 1985), p. 45. "Declarations" are possible under Art. 310 although reservations and exceptions are not allowed (Art. 309). Declarations or statements can be made, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of the declaring state's laws and regulations with the provi- sions of the Convention, "provided that such declarations or statements do not pur-

port to exclude or to modify the legal effects of the provisions of [the] Convention in their application to that State" (Art. 310). 112. Law of the Sea Bull., no. 5 (July 1985), p. 45. For Brazil, see also Declaration of December 22, 1988, made upon ratification of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, in Law of the Sea Bull., no. 12 (December 1988), p. 8. 113. Law of the Sea Bull., no. 5 (July 1985), p. 45; and Law of the Sea Bull., no. 4 (February 1985), p. 13. Similar considerations apply to the problem of installations and structures in the EEZ. 114. On "due regard," see Boczek, "Peace-Time Military Activities" (n. 74 above); and generally Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above"). 115. Convention, Arts. 56(l)(b)(i); 60(l)(a). See Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), pp. 840-48; Merciai (n. 2 above), pp. 102-06. 116. Convention, Art. 58(3). 117. This issue, generally regulated in Art. 59, is not directly related to the topic of the present inquiry.

118. Convention, Art. 1(1). ). 119. Convention, Art. 141. This Article has virtually the same wording as para. 5 of the Declaration of Principles of 1970 (n. 34 above). 120. Zedalis (n. 2 above), pp. 26-27. 121. For example, Treves does not even raise this problem. See Treves, "La notion" (n. 79 above). 122. Convention, Art. 320.

123. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n. 95 above), Art. 33 in connec- tion with Arts. 31 and 32. 124. Convention, Art. 136. 125. Convention, Art. 140(1). 126. See nn. 27 and 28 above and the accompanying text. 127. Convention, Art. 134(2). 128. Convention, Art. 1(1)(3).

129. Convention, Art. 137(1). 130. Cf. the Canadian paper submitted to the UN Seabed Committee in 1971, UN document A/AC. 138/59, in 26, United Nations General Assembly Official Records (UNGAOR) suppl. 21, 205 UN document A/8421 (1971), cited in Zedalis (n. 2 above), pp. 31-32, n. 107. 131. Zedalis (n. 2 above), p. 32. 132. Convention, Art. 147 (1)(3). 133. Convention, Art. 87(2). 134. Convention, Art. 147(2). 135. Art. Convention 147(2)(d). 136. Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), p. 855. Moreover, as noted by Treves, one must rule out the possibility that activities in the Area, especially those of the Enterprise, might be conducted not "for peaceful purposes" (perhaps there is even a legal presumption of their peaceful nature) whereas one cannot take this for granted in the case of a conflicting activity. Ibid; See also Treves, "La notion" (n. 79 above), p. 695.

137. See Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), p. 819, and "La notion" (n. 79 above), pp. 693-94. 138. See Sec. VI of this article. 139. Convention, Art. 240(a). Readers are referred to an article by Alexander Yankov, "A General Review of the Law of the Sea: Marine Science and Its Applica- tion," Ocean Yearbook 4, ed. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 150-75. 140. Convention Art. 242(2). There is no adverb "exclusively" here. 141. The coastal state has jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research in the EEZ; the Convention, Art. 56(l)(b)(ii) and 246(1)(2), and the Continental Shelf; the Convention, Art. 246(1)(2). 142. The Convention, Art. 246(2)(3).

143. The Convention, Art. 248(a). 144. Booth (n. 3 above), p. 88. 145. Treves, "La notion" (n. 79 above), p. 698. 146. See Treves, "Military Installations" (n. 49 above), p. 818, and "La notion" (n. 79 above), pp. 694-98. 147. See Sec. V D of this article. 148. Convention, Art. 297(2)(a)(i). 149. The same applies to the coastal state's decision to order suspension or cessa- tion of a research project if it subsequently decides that it is not exclusively for peaceful purposes. This results from the Convention, Art. 253(1)(a). On the other hand, if one assumes that the dispute over the exclusively peaceful nature of a research project concerns not the "exercise" of the right to give consent but the presupposition of such exercise, then the dispute might be submitted to compulsory settlement. See Tullio Treves, "Principe du consentement et recherche scientifique dans le nouveau droit de la mer," 84 RGDIP (1980):253, esp. pp. 264-65.

150. The International Sea-Bed Authority has the right to inspect all installations in the Area used in connection with activities there. Convention, Art. 153(5). There have been proposals to grant the Authority verification powers with regard to all kinds of installations. See proposal of Canada, March 2, 1972, in the Seabed Committee. UN document A/AC.138/SC.1/SR. 33. See also intervention of the Iranian delegate at UNCLOS III, 5 Official Records 66; and see further Borgese "The Sea-Bed Treaty and the Law of the Sea" (n. 35 above), pp. 97-99. 151. The Convention, Annex III, Art. 18. However, the Authority may not execute such decision until the contractor has been accorded a reasonable opportunity to exhaust judicial remedies available to him pursuant to the provisions of Part II dealing with the settlement of disputes (Sec. 5). 152. This results from Convention, Annex III, Art. 4(2). 153. Convention, Art. 187(d). 154. Convention Art. 298(l)(b). See also Mark W. Janis, "Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activities Exemption," 4 ODIL (1977): 51-65.

155. Arvid Pardo (International Ocean Institute) at the sixty-third Plenary Meet- ing, Fourth Session of UNCLOS III, New York, 1976, in 5 Official Records, p. 46. And see also generally Jean-Pierre Queneudec, "Les incertitudes de la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer," in Vukas, ed. (n. 70 above), pp. 47, 49-52.

156. But again, it can be argued on behalf of the naval power that such a "low threshold of anxiety" of the coastal state cannot, apart from the due regard clause, diminish the rights of the flag state. Richardson, "Law of the Sea," (n. 102 above), p. 574. 157. This expression, rite conjuratoire, is used by Treves in "La notion." See Treves (n. 79 above), p. 698. 158. Arvid Pardo, "Foreword," in Byers, ed. (n. 2 above).

159. This aspect is raised in Treves, "La notion" (n. 79 above), pp. 698-99. 160. Oxman (n. 70 above), p. 831. As noted by O'Connell with regard to the peaceful purposes reservation in the Declaration of Principles (n. 28 above), "reitera- tion of the formula in the Sea-Bed Committee and persistent lip service which has been given to it, have created a political milieu in which no credit is likely to accrue to any assailant on the sea bed, however defensible its motives," See D. P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p. 159. 161. Some general ideas on this theme can be found in the debate on the peace- ful reservation at UNCLOS III. See, e.g., Madagascar, 5 Official Records (1976), p. 58; Iran, ibid., p. 66.

162. See the UN Study on the Naval Armament Race, UN document A/140/535 (1985).


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