Avicenna’s (d. 1037) theory of demonstration is largely inspired by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics but also, at the same time, characterized by significant flashes of originality. One of the areas where Avicenna’s innovative contribution is most evident is his interpretation of the notion of necessity in the context of demonstrative arguments. The paper investigates two issues. First, the relationship between the notion of substantial necessity and that of descriptional necessity and their relevance for Avicenna’s theory of scientific discourse. Second, the question whether Barbara LXL qualifies as a genuine demonstrative argument, i.e., whether its combination of modalized premises provides sufficiently strong epistemic grounds for certitude to come about in the conclusion of a syllogism.
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Modern accounts are found in N. Rescher, Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1967); N. Rescher and A. vander Nat, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy,” in Studies in Modality, ed. by N. Rescher, R. Manor et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 17–56; N. Rescher and A. vander Nat, “New Light on the Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic,” in Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. by G. Hourani (Albany: SUNY Press, 1975), 189–221; T. Street, “Toward a History of Syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher’s Studies on Arabic Modal Logic,” Journal of Islamic Studies 11, n. 2 (2000): 209–28; Id., “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (2002): 129–60; Id., “Arabic Logic,” in Handbook of the History of Logic: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, ed. by D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), 523–96; Id., “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. Zalta (first version fall 2008, substantive revision fall 2013) via http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-language/ (accessed on 30 June 2015); H. Lagerlund, “Avicenna and Ṭusī on Modal Logic,” History and Philosophy of Logic 30, n. 3 (2009): 227–39; P. Thom, Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Id., “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic,” in The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, ed. by S. Rahman, T. Street, H. Tahiri (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 361–76; Id., “Necessity- and Possibility-Syllogisms in Avicenna and Ṭusī,” in Insolubles and Consequences: Essays in Honour of S. Read, ed. by C. Dutilh Novaes and O. Thomassen Hjortland (Milton Keynes: College Publications, 2012), 239–248.
Avicenna, Burhān 2.1, 120.15–122.1. Cf. also Nağāt, 34.9–37.7; Qiyās 1.4, 32.7–33.10; Išārāt, 4.2 (1)–(3), 308.5–310.18.
Avicenna, Burhān 2.1, 122.9–14. Cf. also parallel passages in Nağāt, 133.14–134.4, translated in Avicenna, The Deliverance, 101; Muḫtaṣar, Ms. Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, f. 106v; Išārāt, 9.2 (3), 520.7–10, translated in Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and Admonitions Part one: Logic, transl. from the original Arabic with an introduction and notes by S.C. Inati (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), 150–1 alongside the Burhān text discussed here. The distinction between the two senses is also drawn in Avicenna, MM, 68.6–11.
Ṭūsī, Comm. 9.2 (3), 521.6–18, translation by T. Street (modified for the sake of homogeneity with the rest of my translations in the paper). The last passage (al-mašrūṭ bi-kawni l-mawḍūʿi ʿalā mā wuḍiʿa) is an odd wording for the usual condition of descriptional necessity, namely that the predicate be true of the substance described by the subject as long as the latter is actually described by the subject.
See in particular Avicenna, Burhān 1.1, 51.8–10. Certitude is characterized in similar terms again in Burhān 1.7, 78 and Burhān 3.9, 259.
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Avicenna’s (d. 1037) theory of demonstration is largely inspired by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics but also, at the same time, characterized by significant flashes of originality. One of the areas where Avicenna’s innovative contribution is most evident is his interpretation of the notion of necessity in the context of demonstrative arguments. The paper investigates two issues. First, the relationship between the notion of substantial necessity and that of descriptional necessity and their relevance for Avicenna’s theory of scientific discourse. Second, the question whether Barbara LXL qualifies as a genuine demonstrative argument, i.e., whether its combination of modalized premises provides sufficiently strong epistemic grounds for certitude to come about in the conclusion of a syllogism.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 341 | 48 | 8 |
Full Text Views | 239 | 3 | 2 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 91 | 9 | 7 |