Riccardo Strobino, “Per se, Inseparability, Containment and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables,” Oriens 44.3–4 (2016): Abstract; cf. Texts 27 and 28.

Riccardo Strobino, “Per se, Inseparability, Containment and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables,” Oriens 44.3–4 (2016): Abstract; cf. Texts 27 and 28.)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 40,21.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 40,21.)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 43,6–8.

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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 51,1. See on “ ‘completive’ (συμπληρωτικός sc. τῆς οὐσίας)” as the “jargon-term” for the species forming differentiae “used by all Imperial philosophers”, Anthony C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 85–86. Riccardo Strobino points out that συμπληρωτικός is used by Philoponus to refer to differentiae and genera, and that Avicenna’s central term muqawwim (“constitutive”) is the equivalent to Philoponus’ use of the term συμπληρωτικός. See Strobino, “Per se, Inseparability, Containment and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables,” n. 12. However, as candidate for the origin of the term muqawwim must also be taken into consideration the more literal sense of “that which causes subsistence (ὑπόστασις/qiwām).” E.g. al-Fārābī defines ‘definition’ (ḥadd) at the beginning of his commentary on TopicsI.5 101b 38 referring to the Posterior Analytics: “Definition is the speech (qawl/λόγος) which signifies the notion (maʿnā) of a thing … And the notion by which the thing exists are those of its attributes (awṣāf) by which its essence subsists and by which the thing exists” (wa-maʿnā š-šayʾi llaḏī bihī wuǧūduhū huwa min bayni awṣāfi š-šayʾi awṣāfuhu llatī bihā qiwāmu ḏātihī wa-wuǧūduhū), and further that a definition (ḥadd) has “to encompass all attributes by which a thing exists and by which its essence has subsistence” (la-yastaġriqu ḏālika ǧamīʿa awṣāfihi llatī bihā wuǧūduhū wa-qiwāmu ḏātihī). Al-Fārābī, K. al-Ǧadal, in: Al-Manṭiq ʿind al-FārābīIII, ed. by F. Jabre (Beirut, Dār al-Mašriq, 1986) [henceforth = al-Ǧadal], 85,3–9. Here, as in many other places the “subsistence” (qiwām) of the essence (ḏāt) is mentioned side by side with the “existence” (wuǧūd) of the thing (šayʾ). This points to ὑπόστασις as the origin of the term qiwām. Cf. also Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn’s translation of Cat. 3, 1a 24–25: aʿnī bi-qawlī fī mawḍūʿin al-mawǧūdu fī šayʾin lā li-ǧuzʾin minhu wa-laysa yumkinu an yakūna qiwāmuhū min ġayri llaḏī huwa fīhi. See Jabre, An-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-manṭiq ArisṭūI. On qāma, yaqūmu, qiwām in the sense of “subsistence” cf. also note 35 below and Glossarium Græco-Arabicum (http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/) s.v. ὑπόστασις.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 51,1. See on “ ‘completive’ (συμπληρωτικός sc. τῆς οὐσίας)” as the “jargon-term” for the species forming differentiae “used by all Imperial philosophers”, Anthony C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 85–86. Riccardo Strobino points out that συμπληρωτικός is used by Philoponus to refer to differentiae and genera, and that Avicenna’s central term muqawwim (“constitutive”) is the equivalent to Philoponus’ use of the term συμπληρωτικός. See Strobino, “Per se, Inseparability, Containment and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables,” n. 12. However, as candidate for the origin of the term muqawwim must also be taken into consideration the more literal sense of “that which causes subsistence (ὑπόστασις/qiwām).” E.g. al-Fārābī defines ‘definition’ (ḥadd) at the beginning of his commentary on Topics I.5 101b 38 referring to the Posterior Analytics: “Definition is the speech (qawl/λόγος) which signifies the notion (maʿnā) of a thing … And the notion by which the thing exists are those of its attributes (awṣāf) by which its essence subsists and by which the thing exists” (wa-maʿnā š-šayʾi llaḏī bihī wuǧūduhū huwa min bayni awṣāfi š-šayʾi awṣāfuhu llatī bihā qiwāmu ḏātihī wa-wuǧūduhū), and further that a definition (ḥadd) has “to encompass all attributes by which a thing exists and by which its essence has subsistence” (la-yastaġriqu ḏālika ǧamīʿa awṣāfihi llatī bihā wuǧūduhū wa-qiwāmu ḏātihī). Al-Fārābī, K. al-Ǧadal, in: Al-Manṭiq ʿind al-Fārābī III, ed. by F. Jabre (Beirut, Dār al-Mašriq, 1986) [henceforth = al-Ǧadal], 85,3–9. Here, as in many other places the “subsistence” (qiwām) of the essence (ḏāt) is mentioned side by side with the “existence” (wuǧūd) of the thing (šayʾ). This points to ὑπόστασις as the origin of the term qiwām. Cf. also Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn’s translation of Cat. 3, 1a 24–25: aʿnī bi-qawlī fī mawḍūʿin al-mawǧūdu fī šayʾin lā li-ǧuzʾin minhu wa-laysa yumkinu an yakūna qiwāmuhū min ġayri llaḏī huwa fīhi. See Jabre, An-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-manṭiq Arisṭū I. On qāma, yaqūmu, qiwām in the sense of “subsistence” cf. also note 35 below and Glossarium Græco-Arabicum (http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/) s.v. ὑπόστασις.)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 46,10–12; transl. by Jan M. van Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics I (modified).

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 46,10–12; transl. by Jan M. van Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics I (modified).)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 43,24; transl. by Jan M. van Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics I.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 43,24; transl. by Jan M. van Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics I.)| false
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Cf. Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition,” 121–122.

Cf. Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition,” 121–122.)| false
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Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition,” 120.

Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition,” 120.)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 49,27–50,6.

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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 50,17–18. Cf. what Alexander says in his Treatise on Color, translated into Arabic under the title Maqālāt al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī l-lawn: “We also say, color is a thing which belongs to the things predicated which do not subsist by themselves but by another thing (al-ašyāʾ al-maḥmūla llatī lā taqūmu bi-ḏātihā bal fī šayʾ āḫar). And if this is so, then there is no doubt that there must be a body (ǧirm) which carries the color, and this is the translucent body, as the translucent body is the nearest matter [i.e. the immediate substrate] of the color.” Alexander of Aphrodisias, Die arabische Übersetzung der Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Farbe (Maqālāt al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī l-lawn), Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I. Phil.-hist. Kl. 1967/10, ed. by H. Gätje (Göttingen: Commissionsverlag der Dieterich’schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), Arab. text ll. 45–48.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 50,17–18. Cf. what Alexander says in his Treatise on Color, translated into Arabic under the title Maqālāt al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī l-lawn: “We also say, color is a thing which belongs to the things predicated which do not subsist by themselves but by another thing (al-ašyāʾ al-maḥmūla llatī lā taqūmu bi-ḏātihā bal fī šayʾ āḫar). And if this is so, then there is no doubt that there must be a body (ǧirm) which carries the color, and this is the translucent body, as the translucent body is the nearest matter [i.e. the immediate substrate] of the color.” Alexander of Aphrodisias, Die arabische Übersetzung der Schrift des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Farbe (Maqālāt al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī fī l-lawn), Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I. Phil.-hist. Kl. 1967/10, ed. by H. Gätje (Göttingen: Commissionsverlag der Dieterich’schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), Arab. text ll. 45–48.)| false
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top., 50,31–51,5; transl. Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics I (slightly modified).

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Al-Fārābī, al-Ǧadal, 96,16–20.

Al-Fārābī, al-Ǧadal, 96,16–20.)| false
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Al-Fārābī, al-Ǧadal, 87,3–12. This comments on TopicsI.5.

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Cf. Victor Kal, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle (Leiden e.a.: Brill, 1988), 35–38.

Cf. Victor Kal, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle (Leiden e.a.: Brill, 1988), 35–38.)| false
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