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Banking on meps? The Strategic and Partisan Motivations for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of the European Central Bank

In: International Journal of Parliamentary Studies
Authors:
Julien Navarro Associate Professor of Political Science, Université catholique de Lille, Lille, France, julien.navarro@univ-catholille.fr

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Camille Kelbel Associate Professor of Political Science, Université catholique de Lille (ESPOL), Lille, France, camille.kelbel@univ-catholille.fr

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Abstract

At a time when legislative powers are being undermined by strengthened executives, oversight has become a core function of parliaments throughout the democratic world. In the European Parliament (ep), whose legislative role has been enhanced throughout the integration process, a significant proportion of the activities of its members is devoted to their broad ‘functions of political control’ on the EU’s executive institutions (art. 14 teu). The ways in which Members of the European Parliament (meps) exercise these functions and how the EU political system is impacted in turn remains, however, an under-researched topic. Focusing specifically on parliamentary questions, this article investigates the day-to-day interactions between the ep and one major EU institution, namely the European Central Bank (ecb). It seeks to establish what motivates meps questions concerning monetary and financial policies. Relying on a new dataset, we find evidence that meps’ questions to the ecb are subject to both strategic and partisan considerations.

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