Quoted in Stephen Barr, ‘Fearful Symmetries: The Elegant, Elusive Simplicity of the Universe’, First Things 26 (October 2010), p. 37.

 Quoted in Stephen Barr, ‘Fearful Symmetries: The Elegant, Elusive Simplicity of the Universe’, First Things 26 (October 2010), p. 37.)| false
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 Ewing, ‘The Hidden Pentecostal Doctrine: A Modern Gnosticism’, p. 8.

 Ewing, ‘The Hidden Pentecostal Doctrine: A Modern Gnosticism’, p. 8.)| false
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 William Dyrness, Visual Faith: Art, Theology, and Worship in Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), pp. 25-67, provides a helpful overview.

 William Dyrness, Visual Faith: Art, Theology, and Worship in Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), pp. 25-67, provides a helpful overview.)| false
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 Eddie Gibbs and Ryan K. Bolger, Emerging Churches: Creating Christian Culture in Postmodern Cultures (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), pp. 173-90.

 Eddie Gibbs and Ryan K. Bolger, Emerging Churches: Creating Christian Culture in Postmodern Cultures (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), pp. 173-90.)| false
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 Ewing, ‘The Hidden Pentecostal Doctrine: A Modern Gnosticism’, pp. 3-4.

 Ewing, ‘The Hidden Pentecostal Doctrine: A Modern Gnosticism’, pp. 3-4.)| false
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 Joel Green, Body, Soul and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 4, wrote, ‘The human person does not consist of two (or three) parts … but is a living whole’.

 Joel Green, Body, Soul and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 4, wrote, ‘The human person does not consist of two (or three) parts … but is a living whole’.)| false
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 Green, p. 54, clarifies that nephesh is a polysemous word well ‘translated into English as “soul”, “person”, “breath”, “inner person”, “self”, “desire”, or even “throat”. Leb can mean “heart”, “mind”, “conscience”, or “inner life”’ Jeeves and Brown echo that, ‘Surprisingly, the scriptures offer not a single mention of the brain’ (Malcom Jeeves and Warren Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion: Illusions, Delusions, and Realities about Human Nature [West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Templeton Foundation Press, 2009], p. 24).

 James K.A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Pentecostal Manifestos Series; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), p. 52.

 James K.A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Pentecostal Manifestos Series; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), p. 52.)| false
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 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, p. 21.

 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, p. 21.)| false
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 Moyers, ‘Emotional Intelligence’, p. 45.

 Moyers, ‘Emotional Intelligence’, p. 45.)| false
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 Moyers, ‘Emotional Intelligence’, p. 43, wrote, ‘Theologians unfortunately continue to leave feelings and emotions to their psychological counterparts’.

 Moyers, ‘Emotional Intelligence’, p. 43, wrote, ‘Theologians unfortunately continue to leave feelings and emotions to their psychological counterparts’.)| false
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 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, p. 66.

 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, p. 66.)| false
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 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, pp. 42-48, describe these neural firings involving brain physiology as ‘action loops’. The brain variously processes information, sensory feedback, and conscious reflection in lesser to higher degrees of sophistication.

 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, pp. 42-48, describe these neural firings involving brain physiology as ‘action loops’. The brain variously processes information, sensory feedback, and conscious reflection in lesser to higher degrees of sophistication.)| false
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 Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics, p. 88. From his own empirical observations, Dewey sustained such analysis, ‘For in much of our experience we are not concerned with the connection of one incident with what went before and what comes after. There is no interest that controls attentive rejection or selection of what shall be organized into the developing experience. Things happen, but they are neither definitively included nor decisively excluded; we drift’ (Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 41).

 Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics, p. 88. From his own empirical observations, Dewey sustained such analysis, ‘For in much of our experience we are not concerned with the connection of one incident with what went before and what comes after. There is no interest that controls attentive rejection or selection of what shall be organized into the developing experience. Things happen, but they are neither definitively included nor decisively excluded; we drift’ (Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 41).)| false
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 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, p. 51. Jeeves and Brown, pp. 51-2, note that brain neuroscience suggests that human thought can move between ‘primary consciousness’ (‘the ability to construct a mental scene’) and ‘high-order consciousness’ (primary consciousness ‘accompanied by a sense of self and the ability, in the waking state, to construct explicit past and future scenes … [requiring], at minimum, a semantic capacity and, in its most developed form, a linguistic capacity’). People’s thought processes move between these two kinds of consciousness such that the brain’s ‘dynamic core’ of consciousness can be traced by the neural firings in the brain’s cerebral cortex. The more the cerebral cortex processes certain kinds of thinking (for example, remembering, imagining, language use) the less cortical neurons are required for further/future thinking. This sustains my own position that we process much of life with our consciousness in neutral. David G. Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils (Yale University Press, 2002, 2004), p. 17, sums this kind of unconscious thinking as ‘automaticity of being’.

 Jeeves and Brown, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Religion, p. 51. Jeeves and Brown, pp. 51-2, note that brain neuroscience suggests that human thought can move between ‘primary consciousness’ (‘the ability to construct a mental scene’) and ‘high-order consciousness’ (primary consciousness ‘accompanied by a sense of self and the ability, in the waking state, to construct explicit past and future scenes … [requiring], at minimum, a semantic capacity and, in its most developed form, a linguistic capacity’). People’s thought processes move between these two kinds of consciousness such that the brain’s ‘dynamic core’ of consciousness can be traced by the neural firings in the brain’s cerebral cortex. The more the cerebral cortex processes certain kinds of thinking (for example, remembering, imagining, language use) the less cortical neurons are required for further/future thinking. This sustains my own position that we process much of life with our consciousness in neutral. David G. Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils (Yale University Press, 2002, 2004), p. 17, sums this kind of unconscious thinking as ‘automaticity of being’.)| false
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 Gladwell, Blink, p. 253, relates the story about how Thomas Hoving, former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, used to have his employees cover or hide pieces of art so that when he ‘discovered’ them he would process them spontaneously and determine how he felt about them on the spot. Dewey, Art as Experience, calls this ‘the original innocency of the eye’ (p. 260).

 Gladwell, Blink, p. 253, relates the story about how Thomas Hoving, former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, used to have his employees cover or hide pieces of art so that when he ‘discovered’ them he would process them spontaneously and determine how he felt about them on the spot. Dewey, Art as Experience, calls this ‘the original innocency of the eye’ (p. 260).)| false
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 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, p. 33.

 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, p. 33.)| false
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 Notably, Donald Dayton, Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1991), p. 23, called this a ‘subjective hermeneutic’.

 Notably, Donald Dayton, Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1991), p. 23, called this a ‘subjective hermeneutic’.)| false
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 Timothy Keller, The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Riverhead Books, 2008).

 Timothy Keller, The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Riverhead Books, 2008).)| false
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 Green, Body, Soul and Human Life, p. 128.

 Green, Body, Soul and Human Life, p. 128.)| false
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 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Plural Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 94.

 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Plural Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 94.)| false
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 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, pp. 39-41.

 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, pp. 39-41.)| false
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 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 2001), p. xiv.

 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 2001), p. xiv.)| false
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 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, pp. 20-21.

 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, pp. 20-21.)| false
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 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 150.

 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 150.)| false
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 Quoted in Klein, The Power of Intuition (New York: Currency Books, 2003), p. 3.

 Quoted in Klein, The Power of Intuition (New York: Currency Books, 2003), p. 3.)| false
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 Edmund J. Rybarczyk, Beyond Salvation: Eastern Orthodoxy and Classical Pentecostalism on Becoming Like Christ (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: Paternoster, 2004), pp. 213-39.

 Edmund J. Rybarczyk, Beyond Salvation: Eastern Orthodoxy and Classical Pentecostalism on Becoming Like Christ (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: Paternoster, 2004), pp. 213-39.)| false
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 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, p. 80.

 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, p. 80.)| false
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 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, pp. 64-65 (quotation from page 72). I agree with Smith’s delineation, but am arguing in this paper that most of the human race processes reality thusly. In suggestive ways, this can further understanding why Pentecostalism is exploding around the globe. For instance, the Pentecostal tributary of Christianity does not require indigenous peoples either to westernize, post-Enlightenment-ize, or jettison their former worldviews. I argued thus in Rybarczyk, Beyond Salvation, pp. 220-27, 336-42; and in Edmund J. Rybarczyk, ‘New Churches: Pentecostals and the Bible’, in John Kenneth Riches (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Bible Volume IV: Modernity, Colonialism and Their Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Influential on my epistemological formulation in this regard has been Michael Polanyi’s philosophy concerning the traditioned nature of all knowledge. See Mark T. Mitchell, Michael Polanyi: The Art of Knowing (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006).

 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, pp. 64-65 (quotation from page 72). I agree with Smith’s delineation, but am arguing in this paper that most of the human race processes reality thusly. In suggestive ways, this can further understanding why Pentecostalism is exploding around the globe. For instance, the Pentecostal tributary of Christianity does not require indigenous peoples either to westernize, post-Enlightenment-ize, or jettison their former worldviews. I argued thus in Rybarczyk, Beyond Salvation, pp. 220-27, 336-42; and in Edmund J. Rybarczyk, ‘New Churches: Pentecostals and the Bible’, in John Kenneth Riches (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Bible Volume IV: Modernity, Colonialism and Their Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Influential on my epistemological formulation in this regard has been Michael Polanyi’s philosophy concerning the traditioned nature of all knowledge. See Mark T. Mitchell, Michael Polanyi: The Art of Knowing (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006).)| false
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 Klein, Power of Intution, pp. 65-66. Defending intuition against analytical analysis Klein clarified, ‘Our eyes aren’t perfect—they have blind spots, they sometimes have floaters that create blurriness, they often require lenses to correct for distortions. Yet we aren’t rejecting the information we receive from our eyes. Just because intuition is fallible that doesn’t mean we can’t make good use of it’ (p. 73). On theological lines, I maintain epistemological unpacking of the sensus fidelium could be, but will not be, carried out here.

 Klein, Power of Intution, pp. 65-66. Defending intuition against analytical analysis Klein clarified, ‘Our eyes aren’t perfect—they have blind spots, they sometimes have floaters that create blurriness, they often require lenses to correct for distortions. Yet we aren’t rejecting the information we receive from our eyes. Just because intuition is fallible that doesn’t mean we can’t make good use of it’ (p. 73). On theological lines, I maintain epistemological unpacking of the sensus fidelium could be, but will not be, carried out here.)| false
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 Gladwell, Blink, p. 92. Particularly revealing are the use of IAT’s, Implicit Association Tests, that analyze and measure subject’s responses with micro-second technology. See Gladwell, Blink, pp. 75-88, 96-97. Thin-slicing is Gladwell’s description for the unconscious interpretive processing that human beings routinely do each day. Thin-slicing can be summarized as viscerally and rapidly processing first impressions. Gladwell refined his emphasis, ‘the truth is that our unconscious is really good at this, to the point where thin-slicing often delivers a better answer than more deliberate and exhaustive ways of thinking’ (Gladwell, Blink, p. 34, emphasis added). Too much critical processing, Gladwell argues throughout, can confuse analyses and diagnoses. This, however, is not to suggest that intuition is always correct, as Gladwell notes repeatedly; under intense physiological stress our intuitive capacities can be rendered blind (pp. 229-32). Klein, Power of Intuition, avers the same about intuition versus critical analysis throughout his book. He argues we need both critical reasoning and intuition; however, intuition is especially helpful when we are overloaded with data and facts.

 Gladwell, Blink, p. 92. Particularly revealing are the use of IAT’s, Implicit Association Tests, that analyze and measure subject’s responses with micro-second technology. See Gladwell, Blink, pp. 75-88, 96-97. Thin-slicing is Gladwell’s description for the unconscious interpretive processing that human beings routinely do each day. Thin-slicing can be summarized as viscerally and rapidly processing first impressions. Gladwell refined his emphasis, ‘the truth is that our unconscious is really good at this, to the point where thin-slicing often delivers a better answer than more deliberate and exhaustive ways of thinking’ (Gladwell, Blink, p. 34, emphasis added). Too much critical processing, Gladwell argues throughout, can confuse analyses and diagnoses. This, however, is not to suggest that intuition is always correct, as Gladwell notes repeatedly; under intense physiological stress our intuitive capacities can be rendered blind (pp. 229-32). Klein, Power of Intuition, avers the same about intuition versus critical analysis throughout his book. He argues we need both critical reasoning and intuition; however, intuition is especially helpful when we are overloaded with data and facts.)| false
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 Klein, Power of Intuition, pp. xiv, 21-22, et passim. Quotes are from pp. xiv and 29. Intuition is not inborn, p. 290.

 Klein, Power of Intuition, pp. xiv, 21-22, et passim. Quotes are from pp. xiv and 29. Intuition is not inborn, p. 290.)| false
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 Klein, Power of Intuition, p. 36.

 Klein, Power of Intuition, p. 36.)| false
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 Gladwell, Blink p. 239, develops how it is that thin-slicing—intuitive processing—can be refined through repetition and practice. Klein constantly avers the same throughout Power of Intuition, as does Myers in Intuition. Does it not follow that the Pentecostal emphasis can itself lead persons and communities to be more attuned to intuitive spirituality?

 Gladwell, Blink p. 239, develops how it is that thin-slicing—intuitive processing—can be refined through repetition and practice. Klein constantly avers the same throughout Power of Intuition, as does Myers in Intuition. Does it not follow that the Pentecostal emphasis can itself lead persons and communities to be more attuned to intuitive spirituality?)| false
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