It is no easy task to respond to the 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd by J. Glenn Friesen. The theses are not complete in rendering Dooyeweerd’s thought. For example, his analyses of the history of philosophy and his legal philosophy are hardly touched upon. Yet the theses cover a wide range of topics that are central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Therefore, to give a wellargued assessment of all of them would require more than one issue of this journal. Fortunately the editors have put severe restrictions on the amount of space that is available. So I will limit myself to some comments. My first comment concerns the method of Friesen and the misunderstandings it sometimes leads to. Second I mention some points where I disagree with his interpretation. Third I discuss the idea of supratemporality. I agree with Friesen that it is central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy but I have problems with the views of Dooyeweerd himself. Then I will deal with another issue where my main problem is with Dooyeweerd, the idea of theoretical thought as opening up naïve thinking. I end with some concluding remarks. They concern my general assessment of the theses and what I see as the importance of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.