HOW NOT TO BE AN ANTI-REALIST: HABERMAS, TRUTH, AND JUSTIFICATION

in Philosophia Reformata
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This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas’s “pragmatic realist” conception. By critically appropriating Habermas’s insights, I aim to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute, replacing questions of independence with questions of interdependence. I claim that truth theory needs to begin with the interdependence of “mind” and “object” and with the corporeal multidimensionality of both human knowers and that about which they acquire knowledge.

HOW NOT TO BE AN ANTI-REALIST: HABERMAS, TRUTH, AND JUSTIFICATION

in Philosophia Reformata

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