Comparing Lives in Plato, Laws 5

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Abstract

In Laws 5 (732d-734e), the Athenian argues in favour of virtuous over vicious lives on the basis that the former are preferable to the latter when we consider the pleasures and pains in each. This essay offers an interpretation of the argument which does not attribute to the Athenian an exclusively hedonist axiology. It argues for a new reading of the division of ‘types of life’ at 733c-d and suggests that the Athenian relies on the conclusion established earlier in the Laws that we humans take pleasure in harmony and order. Virtuous lives exhibit just such harmony and order and are therefore always more pleasant than and preferable to vicious lives.

Phronesis

A Journal for Ancient Philosophy

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References

AnnasJ. Platonic Ethics, Old and New 1999 Ithaca

AnnasJ. Bobonich ‘Virtue and Law in Plato’ 2010 71 91 2010

BobonichC. ‘Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato’s Laws’, Classical Quarterly 1991 41 365 388

BobonichC. Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics 2002 Oxford

BobonichC. Plato’s Laws: a Critical Guide 2010 Cambridge

BravoF. ScolnicovS.BrissonL. ‘Le Platon des Lois est-il hédoniste?’ Plato’s Laws: From Theory Into Practice 2003 103 115 (Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum) (Sankt Augustin)

CaroneG. R. ‘The Place of Hedonism in Plato’s Laws’, Ancient Philosophy 2003 23 283 300

DenyerN. Plato: Protagoras 2008 Cambridge

EnglandE. B. The Laws of Plato 1921 Manchester 2 vols

FredeD. Bobonich ‘Puppets on Strings: Moral Psychology in Laws Books 1 and 2’ 2010 108 126 2010

GroteG. Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates 1888 Revised edn. London 4 vols.

GuthrieW. K. C. A History of Greek philosophy The Later Plato and the Academy 1978 Vol. 5 Cambridge

IrwinT. Plato’s Ethics 1995 Oxford

KamtekarR. ‘Psychology and the Inculcation of Virtue in Plato’s Laws Bononich 2010 2010 127 148

LaksA. ‘Legislation and Demiurgy: On the Relationship Between Plato’s Republic and Laws Classical Antiquity 1990 9 209 222

LaksA. Médiation et coercition: Pour une lecture des Lois de Platon 2005 Villeneuve d’Ascq.

PelosiF. Plato on Music, Soul and Body 2010 Cambridge

PrauscelloL. GagnéR.HopmanM. ‘Choral Persuasions in Plato’s Laws Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy 2013 Cambridge 257 277

RichardsonH. S. ‘Measurement, Pleasure, and Practical Science in Plato’s Protagoras Journal of the History of Philosophy 1990 28 7 32

RussellD. C. Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life 2005 Oxford

SaundersT. J. Notes on the Laws of Plato BICS Supplement 1972 28 London

SchofieldM. Plato: Political Philosophy. 2006 Oxford

SchöpsdauK. Platon: Werke. Übersetzung und Kommentar. Nomoi (Gesetze) Buch IV-VII 2003 Vol. 9.2 Göttingen

StalleyR. F. An Introduction to Plato’s Laws 1983 Oxford

WhiteF. ‘Plato’s Last Words on Pleasure’ Classical Quarterly 2001 51 458 476

1)

White 2001, 458 thinks that the Laws endorses a form of hedonism; he cites a similar claim in Grote 1888, vol. 4, 301-2, and notes that Grote’s familiarity with James Mill and Bentham may lie behind the positive appraisal of both the Laws and the section of the Protagoras to which he thinks it is similar. Stalley 1983, 60 notes cautiously: ‘A passage in Book V has been taken to claim that we can and should do only what seems pleasantest to us’; his discussion of the passage at 66-70 is more nuanced. Guthrie 1978, 326-7 similarly notes the importance of pleasure and pain to the moral psychology of education in the Laws but does not explicitly attribute hedonism to the Athenian. Cf. Schöpsdau 2003, 275-7. Irwin 1995, 343-5 notes that some of the things that the Athenian says are compatible with hedonism but concludes that the Laws is committed only to the claim that the just and virtuous life is the most pleasant. This is similar to the position I will defend here.

2)

Cf. Guthrie 1978, 327 n. 2. Carone 2003, 288-91 argues that at 792c-d the Athenian is warning against the precipitous pursuit of pleasures rather than against hedonism itself and that the divine diathesis he recommends might well have its own graceful pleasures. More generally, she argues for a consistency between two claims she thinks are to be found in the Laws: (1) virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness, and (2) pleasure is necessary and sufficient for happiness. Her evidence for the claim that pleasure is sufficient for happiness comes from the passage I discuss here (732e-733a: Carone 2003, 287-91); my interpretation of the passage differs significantly from hers, as should become clear as my discussion proceeds. In brief, I agree that the Athenian holds (1) but think that he does not hold (2). Rather, he holds (2*) that the virtuous life is the most pleasant life. From (1) and (2*) it follows that the happy life is the most pleasant life, but the Athenian does not think that virtue is good because it produces pleasure.

4)

See e.g. Laks 2005, 143, who notes the similarity between the Protagoras’ concern to deny the phenomenon of akrasia and the Athenian’s contention that anyone who fails to make the right choice between lives must do so out of ignorance (733d4-6, cf. 734b4, 731c2 ff.). Certainly, both passages assume that well-informed agents will not voluntarily choose what is not genuinely good for them. But there are nevertheless important differences between the two texts that ought to be emphasised.

5)

Stalley 1983, 68 rightly notes and emphasises this.

8)

Cf. Irwin 1995, 342-3; Bobonich 2002, 566 n. 95.

10)

Carone 2000, 286 here finds the Athenian claiming that pleasure is a necessary condition for happiness. This is true, but not in the sense that it is the pleasantness of a life that makes that life happy. Rather, a virtuous life is necessarily a good life and also necessarily a pleasant life.

14)

Compare Saunders 1972, 24-5 with Schöpsdau 2003, 278-80. On the latter view the lives would both be what I shall claim are ‘balanced’ lives as described at 733c6-d2.

16)

Cf. England 1921, vol. 1 ad 734a8, and Schöpsdau 2003, 280-3.

19)

Saunders 1972, 25 traces this view back to Ast. Cf. Schöpsdau 2003, 284-5.

20)

Saunders 1972, 25-7.

21)

Stalley 1983, 68 thinks that the three-fold classification is not exhaustive. It is better for the Athenian if the classification is exhaustive since then he can claim that any pair of candidate lives can be compared in these terms.

23)

Saunders 1972, 26: ‘So in this life too we may exercise preference, and as καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι indicates, our criteria are the same as in lives A and B: we want the life that offers more pleasure than pain.’

27)

See Bobonich, 2002, 363-5; Frede 2010, 120-6; Kamtekar 2010; Pelosi 2010, 52-9; Prauscello 2013.

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