The pseudo-Platonic Definitions seems to ascribe to ὄνοµα, ‘name’, the function of signifying two kinds of predicate. This is problematic, and I propose an emendation of the text, arguing that a definition of ῥῆµα, ‘verb’, has fallen out.
AdemolloF., '‘Names, Verbs, and Sentences in Ancient Greek Philosophy’', in M. Cameron and R. Stainton(eds), Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language, (Oxford2015) 33-54.
MenchelliM., '‘Osservazioni sulle forme della lettura di Platone tra gli eruditi bizantini e sulla trasmissione del testo della Appendix degli apocrifi del corpus platonico (con note paleografiche sul Vat. Pal. gr. 173 e sul Vat. Pal. gr. 174)’', in J. Signes Codoñer and I. Pérez Martín(eds), Textual Transmission in Byzantium: Between Textual Criticism and Quellenforschung, (Turnhout2014) 199-230.
On A, see Carlini1972, 145-6, 160; Post 1934, 6-8; Petrucci 2013, 177-82. On P, see Post 1934, 4, 46-7, 74-5; Carlini 1972, 173-5; Menchelli 1991; 2014, 172-7. On O, see Post 1934, 8-14; Luzzatto 2008; Petrucci 2013, 182-201. On L, see Post 1934, 69 (where it is initially introduced as δ). On V, see Post 1934, 78 (where it is labelled ‘R’) and Petrucci 2014.
Post1934, 4regards P (which contains excerpts from the Laws) as ‘Too freely paraphrased to be useful. Independent of A and O.’
See Whitaker1996, 5-7; Sedley 2004.
Cf. Cornarius1561: quidvis quod non per seipsum dicitur.
Tr. Barnes1993, modified.
Hutchinson’s (1997) translation of παντὸς τοῦ µὴ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ λεγοµένου as ‘everything which is not said of a thing in its own right’ invokes another use of ‘by itself’, according to which for X to hold of Y ‘by itself’ is for X to be essentially predicated of Y (see APo. 1.4, 73a34-7, Metaph. Δ.18, 1022a27-9). This must be understood in the context of Hutchinson’s translation of τοῦ … κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορουµένου as ‘what is predicated in the essence’: the outcome is that a name signifies either essential or non-essential predicates. Apart from the illegitimacy, which I pointed out above, of translating κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας as ‘in the essence’, this outcome is open to two of the criticisms I advance in the text below: the function of ‘everything’ is unclear; and it is very odd that a name should be defined only as an expression for predicates of various kinds, to the exclusion of proper names for substances.
See Code1986, 419and n. 11.
On the Stoic definitions, see Brunschwig1984. Apollonius Dyscolus seems to have endorsed a modified version, according to which a name is a part of speech ἑκάστου τῶν ὑποκειµένων σωµάτων ἢ πραγµάτων κοινὴν ἢ ἰδίαν ποιότητα ἀπονέµον, literally ‘which assigns a common or peculiar quality of each of the underlying bodies or objects’ (Uhlig 1883, pp. lxxxiii-lxxxiv). See De pron. [Gramm. Gr. ii.1.1], 105.18-19 Schneider; Synt. [Gramm. Gr. ii.2], 142.1-4, 155.45 Uhlig; Priscian, Inst. [Gramm. Lat. ii], 56.28-57.1 Hertz; Partitiones [Gramm. Lat. iii], 2.481.2-4 Keil; Schol. in Dion. Thr. [Gramm. Gr. i.3], 524.8-12 Hilgard (cf. 358.29-32).
Tr. Barnes 2003. See Barnes2003, 78-9, 325-7 on individual predicates in Porphyry and Aristotle. A difficulty in connection with Porphyry is that it is unclear whether his predicates are meant to be expressions or entities: see Barnes 2003, 68-70.