In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
Carpenter, A. (2010), ‘What is Peculiar in Aristotle’s and Plato’s Psychologies? What is Common to Them Both?’ in V.Harte, M. M.McCabe, R.Sharples and A.Shepherd (eds.), Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato (London), 21-24.
Furley, D. (1978), ‘Self-Movers’ in G. E. R.Lloyd and G. E. L.Owen (eds.), Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum (Cambridge), 165-179. [Reprinted in M. Gill and J. Lennox (eds.), Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton (Princeton, 1994), 3-14.]