The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9

In: Phronesis
Author: José Edgar González-Varela 1
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  • 1 Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Circuito Mario de la Cueva s/n, 04510, Ciudad de México, Mexico
Online Publication Date:
29 Aug 2018
Volume/Issue:
Volume 63: Issue 4
Article Type:
Research Article
Page Count:
408–448
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341356
Keywords:
Aristotle; Platonic Forms; one; many; plurality

Abstract

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in Metaphysics A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

In:
Phronesis
E-ISSN:
1568-5284
Print ISSN:
0031-8868
Publisher:
Brill
Cover Phronesis
Subjects:
Ancient Philosophy, Classical Studies

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