Aristotle on Virtue of Character and the Authority of Reason
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Abstract
I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.
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Aristotle on Virtue of Character and the Authority of Reason
In: PhronesisSearch for other papers by Jozef Müller in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2510 | 216 | 41 |
| Full Text Views | 535 | 18 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 595 | 45 | 2 |