The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2
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In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.
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The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2
In: PhronesisSearch for other papers by José Edgar González-Varela in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 561 | 56 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 107 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 166 | 10 | 0 |