Save

In Search of Aristotle’s Third Man

In: Phronesis
Author:
Timothy Clarke Department of Philosophy, University of California Berkeley USA

Search for other papers by Timothy Clarke in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1399-9596
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution

Purchase

Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

Abstract

Aristotle thinks that the Platonic theory of Forms is vulnerable to the Third Man regress. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the regress arises from the conjunction of three Platonist claims, which I label ‘Exemplification’, ‘Similarity’, and ‘Distinctness’. It is clear why, taken together, these three claims generate an infinite regress of Forms. What is not clear is why Aristotle thinks that a Platonist should have to accept each of the claims. My answer begins from the fact that, in Metaphysics A and M, Aristotle mentions the Third Man as a consequence, not of positing Forms, but of certain ways of arguing for Forms. By working out what these arguments are likely to have been, we can understand why he took the Platonist to have been committed to all three claims, and thus why he saw the Third Man as a serious difficulty.

Content Metrics

All Time Past 365 days Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 477 477 12
Full Text Views 90 90 5
PDF Views & Downloads 230 230 15