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Beyond roll call: executive-legislative relations and lawmaking in the Philippine House of Representatives

In: Philippine Political Science Journal
Author:
Rogelio Alicor L. Panao Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

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This article analyzes lawmaking in presidential systems where legislative roll call votes do not reflect policy or ideological stance, taking the Philippines as a case study. As an alternative to roll call analysis, this study suggests that the time from when a bill is filed until its passage can be a gauge not only of policy preferences but executive-legislative dynamics. This is tested through an event history analysis of bills filed in the Philippine House of Representatives from the 8th to the 14th Congress. The propensity for approval of a bill is modeled as a function of institutional and political resources available to both the chief executive and members of the House of Representatives. The results indicate that a bill certified as urgent by the president generally has a higher likelihood of passage, but the effect changes over time and at some point being part of the president’s so-called legislative agenda actually increases the risk of non-approval.

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