* This Agreement was agreed upon on august 24, 1994 but was signed by the two parties in Erez on August 29,1994. The following two agreements are now superseded by the third Agreement that appears under number (3) which is better known as the "Taba - Washington Agreement" or "Oslo II" Agreement.
* This Protocol was signed in Cairo on August 27, 1995.
* The attached text was originally initialed in Taba, Egypt, on September 24, 1995, by the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres. It was subsequently signed and executed in Washington, D.C. on September 28, 1995, by Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. President Bill Clinton, H. M. King Hussein of Jordan, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, in addition to other dignitaries, attended the White House ceremonies, and witnessed the signature of that important document. When he initialed the very long and tediously detailed agreement in Taba, Chairman Arafat eommented: "I would like to speak to our prisoners, to those who were injured, with greetings, and I assure them that the dawn of freedom is eoming." Mr. Peres commented: "[What] we are doing today is not a normal political or economic enterprise, it is history in the real meaning of the word." Mr. Rabin, when submitting the initialed text of the agreement to the Knesset for endorsement, stated: "These are the main changes, not all of them, which we envision and want in the permanent solution. First and foremost, united Jerusalem, which will include both Ma'aleh Adumim and Givat Ze'ev [settlements], will be the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty, .... The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley .... other changes will include the addition of Gush Etzion, Efrat, Betar and communities [of settlements], most of which are in the area east of the Green Line ..." He further expanded on his long-term vision of a final solution by annexing more territories through "the establishment of blocks of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif." In his reply to the opposition members of the Knesset, Rabin asserted that "our aim is first and foremost to make the State of Israel a Jewish state, with at least 80 percent of its residents Jewish. We see the final arrangements as including most of the Land of Israel ..., and alongside it a Palestinian entity, which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of most of the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and West Bank." Rabin explained the historical dispute between the two schools of thought in the Zionist movement, namely Jabotinsky's Revision Zionism, the heirs of which are the right wing Likud and other splinter groups, and the main stream Zionism of Weizman-Ben Gurion, the heir of which is the Labor Party. Rabin said: "We had to choose between the Greater Land of Israel, which means a bi-national state and whose population would comprise, as of today, 4.5 million Jews and more than 3 million Palestinians, ..... and a state smaller in area, but which would be a Jewish state. We choose to be a Jewish State." [Emphasis added]. The Knesset finally endorsed the agreement which is widely known as Oslo II, by a majority of 61 to 59. See The Jerusalem Post Int'l, October 14, 1995, p. 1, cols. 1-5, p.2, cols. 1-5. All notes accompanying the text are added by the Editor. These notes are by no means exhaustive, but merely added either for reference purpose or just to highlight the main features of certain clauses.
1 For the main documents relating to the Madrid Peace Conference, see 6 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 227 (1990/91). 2 See text in 7 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L. 243 (1992/94). 3 Id. at 230. 4 Id. at 232.
5 Text supra at 315. 6 Text supra at 341.
7 The number was increased to 88 representatives, in addition to a non-voting seat allocated to an old Jew- ish community that lives in Nablus.
8 This extraterritorial jurisdiction that Israel initiated with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is now codified in the Oslo Agreement. Even though extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state is not unusual, the Israeli claim is certainly highly detrimental to the Palestinian party. It signifies the ultimate territorial designs that Israel lays to the Palestinian lands. See, for example, Emergency Regulations (Offenses Com- mitted In Israel-Held Areas-Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Extension of Validity) Law, 22 Laws of the State of Israel ("LSI"), at 20 (1967/68); Land Appreciation Tax (Amendment No. 15) Law, 38 LSI, at 246 (1983/84); Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Sinai and Southern Sinai-Crimi- nal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Amendment and Extension of Validity) Law, 38 LSI, at 43 (1983/84). For an elaboration on this law, see Tsemel, Double Standard and Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror Organization, 2 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L.37, at 39-41 (1985). For extraterritorial clauses in the Agreement, see, e.g., Art XIL1; XIILb.2; XVII.1.2.C. 9 This clause, which was incorporated originally in the DOP, proves to be, under the redeployment plan, a blemish.
10 Not reproduced in this volume due to the fact that: a) if reproduced on a smaller scale, it will not be com- prehensible to the ordinary reader; and b) if reproduced in its larger size, it has been proven to be uncom- prehensible, except to the Israeli officers. This fact became crystal clear in the event of closures whereby Palestinians did not know what was closed to whom. However, it should be pointed out that once these maps are carefully examined, it becomes immediately visible what ultimate territorial adjustments the Israeli government has in mind. It is a form of colonization by dissecting the Palestinian territories into three major areas: A, B, & C with subdivision that are called hamlets. Furthermore, Israel controls the major intercity arteries, and , at the same time, it constructs "by-pass" roads that allow settlers to move between settlements without going through Palestinian-populated centers. The immediate effect is more colonization and more parcelization of Palestinian land. For "by-pass roads" see the report supra at 255.
11 Not reproduced. 12 Not reproduced.
13 By December 27, 1995, there were still 4,118 prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons. 14 Those released were kept within Jericho area and were not allowed to return to their homes. However, with the signing of this Agreement, the restriction has been lifted.
15 It should be noted that this clause is not an arbitration clause as some Palestinian officials thought. It is rather an "agreement to agree on arbitration." It is a frivolous clause. 16 On how the freedom of expression has turned out to be only freedom of expressing the point of view of the Palestinian Authority, see the Human Rights Report in the Autonomous Areas, .rupra at 219 (herein- after the "Report").
17 This Protocol was reproduced in 7 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L. 308 (1992/94).
18 Not implemented yet. One may wonder how this "safe passage" between two separate territorial units will be implemented when "safe passage" between cities, towns and villages in the West Bank has not been hon- ored. During closure periods, no Palestinian can move, even from Ramallah to Nablus, let alone Hebron.
19 See the Israeli law reproduced supra at 149. 20 It is widely understood that these issues are the only issues for the permanent status negotiations. Howev- er, careful reading of the Agreement shows that all issues are "permanent status" issues, except for authorities delegated to the Palestinian Authorities which were largely regulated by the Israeli Civil Administration. For example, see Articles X.4; ; XL2 (f); XVIL2 (9), 4 (b); Annex I, Article XIII; XIV; Annex III, Article 12.A (2); 16.2; 40.1, 4, 5. The first and most crucial issue is that of sovereignty which no side has raised, and , apparently, with tacit consent.
21 This clause has been implemented. 22 Those maps were reproduced in 7 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L. 385 (1992/94).
23 This clause has been successfully implemented. See supra at 219. 24 At present, there are about one thousand prisoners and detainees in the Palestinian Authority's jails and detention camps, mostly Hamas and Jihad members, as well as other groups or individuals who are not necessarily opponents to the Oslo Agreements but critical of their contents and of the way they are inter- preted and implemented by the Israeli occupying authority.
25 There have been other agencies, the latest one is the Marine Security Service, which largely functions with abuses and lack of observance of the rule of law. See, e.g., the Report supra at 219.
26 The case of Hebron demonstrates how Israeli settlers, a few hundred in number, have held hostage an entire city with an indigenous population of over 120,000. It is a flagrant case of aggression and racism.
27 See the Report supra at 219 to show examples of abuses by Palestinians Police.
28 This was effected on November 13, 1995. 29 This was effected on December 10, 1995. 30 This was effected on December 11, 1995.
31 This was effected on December 27, 1995. 32 This was effected on December 27, 1995. 33 This was effected on December 18, 1995. 34 This was effected on December 26, 1995. However, redoployment from Hebron is still being used by the Israeli government as a bargaining chip.
35 On December 7, 1995, Chairman Arafat issued Election Law No. 13 of 1995, and it was published in the Official Gazette, issue No. 8, dated December 11, 1995. On December 29, 1995, another Law, No.16 of 1995, was issued to amend certain articles in the Election Law. On December 13, 1995, Presidential Decree No.1 of 1995 was issued, calling upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusa- lem to exercise their right to vote, and declaring that candidates can apply for their candidacy as of December 14, 1995. See the Official Gazette, issue No. 10, dated Deccmber 31, 1995. The election day was set to be January 20, 1996.
36 Not available.
37 It is an irony that under the "peace process" the criminal and civil jurisdiction of Palestinian courts has been truncated; these courts used to have wider jurisdiction under the direct Israeli military occupation authority. For example, in Case No. 42/89, dated July 15, 1993, the appellants, which were two Israeli com- panies, requested the Ramallah Court of Appeal to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of a Palestinian plaintiff by the Hebron Court of First Instance on August 20, 1988. The Hebron Court ruled that the two Israeli companies were jointly and strongly liable to pay the plaintiff a certain amount of money and denied the request for interest, court fees and expenses. See also the Case No. 480/86, dated June 23, 1987, which also involved two Israeli companies that appealed a Ramallah court judgment before the Ramallah Court of Appeal. In a criminal case, the appellants, who were holders of Israeli identity cards, challenged the criminal jurisdiction of the Palestinian court. Ramallah Court of Appeal, rejecting their challenge, asserts its juris- diction on the basis of Article 5(a) of the code of Criminal Procedures which provides that the competent court is, inter alia, the court in whose jurisdiction the crime was committed. See Case No. 815/87, dated April 23, 1987, and Case No. 704/87, dated April 18, 1987. For a legal analysis of the criminal jurisdiction of Palestinian courts under the Oslo Agreements, see, Shuqair, Criminal Jurisdiction under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, (Al-Haq, 1994).
38 The text of this Protocol was published in 7 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L. 308 (1992/94). However, the Supple- mentto that Protocol is reproduced herein.