In May 1992, then-President Boris El’tsin, who was facing an increasingly violent opposition within the country, issued an edict forming a separate Russian Army (at that point, only Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine had firmly declared their intention of forming independent armed forces). See Ukaz Prezidenta RF “O sozdanii vooruzhennykh sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (7 May 1992) No.466, Vedomosti S”ezda narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (1992) No.19 item 1077. Russia’s decision to establish its own armed forces was immediately followed by other republics, irrevocably writing off the plans of those who still hoped for a united defense system. See, also, Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States 1991–1998: Stagnation and Survival”, 51(3) Europe-Asia Studies (1999), 379–415, at 381–383.

 In the 1990s, the eu also offered post-Soviet countries partnership based on a commitment to democracy and market-economy principles. It signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with all cis countries (and Georgia). See, e.g., Zhenis Kembayev, “Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan: Problems and Perspectives”, 21(2) European Foreign Affairs Review (2016), 185–203, at 187. The Agreements with Belarus and Turkmenistan did not enter into force, however, as they were not ratified by the eu in response to the political situation in those countries.

 In March 1999, the first three former members of the Warsaw Pact—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—joined nato. That same month, nato began a military campaign against Yugoslavia despite Russia’s position that nato was violating international law by not seeking the approval of the United Nations (un).

 On 2 December 2004, the un General Assembly granted observer status to the csto (see a/res/59/50), and on 2 March 2010, it adopted a resolution establishing cooperation between the csto and the un Office on Drugs and Crime and the un Counter-Terrorism Committee (a/res/64/256). Furthermore, on 18 March 2010, a declaration on cooperation between the un and csto secretariats was adopted. The text is available at<http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/A11ED61A82FAD2FCC32576F0004904F4>.

 By 2000, the economic output of the cis countries had fallen to merely 60 percent of the 1990 level. See Mitra and Selowsky, op. cit. note 29, 5.

 As of 2013, Russia was the leading destination for exports from Belarus with a share of 40 percent, while the eu accounted for 28 percent. Russia was still a major trading partner for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, accounting for approximately 20 percent of their trade, but was closely followed by China. It was on par with the eu in trade with Ukraine and Moldova, accounting for approximately 30 percent of their total exports and imports. The eu was Azerbaijan’s biggest trading partner (accounting for 50 percent of its trade, while Russia accounted for only 7 percent) and Kazakhstan (with a share of almost 40 percent, while Russia had a share of 23.5 percent and China 22.5 percent). Also noteworthy is that Turkmenistan’s biggest trading partner was China, accounting for 45.4 percent of the country’s trade, whereas the eu’s share was 12.6 percent and ­Russia’s was 7.4 percent. See European Commission Trade Statistics, available at<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/­policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/regions>. According to Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “there is little evidence that economic rationalization has ­determined the ­pre-scripted scope and pace of integration”. See Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna ­Wolczuk, “Eurasian Economic Integration: Institutions, Promises and Faultlines”, in David Cadier (ed.), The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration (lse Ideas, London, 2014), 13.

 In 2012, Russia had a high-income economy, Belarus and Kazakhstan middle-income, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were among the poorest countries in the world. See United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014 (United Nations, New York, 2014), 148, available at <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/wesp2014.pdf>. Moreover, the change in the economic situation in the region in the last decade only increased the heterogeneity of the Eurasian countries.

 Furthermore, on 15 March 2011, the Three adopted an action plan for 2012–2015 that called for the realization of 70 specific measures provided for by the previous agreements and the adoption of 13 treaties and 42 technical regulations aimed at harmonization of the social, educational, migration, and visa policies of the state parties and elimination of all restrictions on the freedom of labor, establishment, services, and capital. See Plan meropriiatii po realizatsii Soglashenii, formiruiushchikh eep (15 March 2011), available at<http://www.tsouz.ru/MGS/MGS-14/Documents/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BB-%D0%A0%D0%B5%D1%88-77.pdf>.

 See Anton Barbashin, “The Eurasian Illusion”, Foreign Affairs (15 January 2015), ­available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-01-15/eurasian-illusion>.

 See Anton Barbashin, “The Eurasian Illusion”, Foreign Affairs (15 January 2015), ­available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-01-15/eurasian-illusion>.)| false
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 See Anatolii Maryshev, “Ob istorii sozdaniia i osobennostiakh deiatel’nosti Mezhparlamentskoi Assamblei Evraziiskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soobshchestva”, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: ekonomika, pravo, politika (2010) No.7, 50–56, at 53.

 See Anatolii Maryshev, “Ob istorii sozdaniia i osobennostiakh deiatel’nosti Mezhparlamentskoi Assamblei Evraziiskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soobshchestva”, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: ekonomika, pravo, politika (2010) No.7, 50–56, at 53.)| false
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