In upholding France’s ban on public face coverings, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the manifestation of religious beliefs could legitimately be restricted in the interests of ‘vivre ensemble’—literally, ‘living together’—or what I label ‘fraternalism’. I will argue that fraternalism, in the French setting, is closely linked to the idea of a duty of civility in political theory: it is understood as a duty to practice a certain kind of fraternal sociability. This paper relates the Court’s judgment to France’s justificatory, ‘republican’ discourse. It argues that civility must be understood as a habitus—a set of learned orientations and bodily techniques—rather than as a set of discursive or speech constraints. In turn, this demonstrates the danger in the idea of civility (or fraternalism) as limiting religious liberties: far from simply fostering republican virtues, it will reinforce cultural and social power dynamics.
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See also European Court of Human Rights, Refah Partisi v. Turkey, Application no. 41340/9, 13 February 2003, where the Court upheld Turkey’s dissolution of an Islamist political party based on the threat it allegedly posed to the democratic order in Turkey. For discussion, see Kevin Boyle, ‘Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Partisi Case’, 1 Essex Human Rights Review (2004).
However, see McCrea, supra note 16.
Decision no. 2010–613, 7 October, 2011.
Ibid., p. 46.
John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 12.
Bowen, supra note 38, at 69.
Amghar, supra note 49, p. 24.
Ibid., 23.
Liogier, supra note 51, 16.
Ibid., 16.
Bowen, supra note 38, at 69 (emphasis added).
Bowen, supra note 38, at 158 (emphasis added).
Bowen, supra note 38, 187.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Projet de constitution pour la Corse (Paris: Nautilus, 2000), 77.
Ibid., 63 (author’s translation).
Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), Chapter 5.
Weithman, supra note 77, 304.
Adrienne Koch and William Peden, The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams (New York: Knopf, 1946), p. 52.
Spitz, supra note 78, p. 281.
Goodin, supra note 79, p. 72.
See e.g. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000).
Calhoun, supra note 88, p. 257.
Ibid., p. 252.
Calhoun, supra note 88, p. 260.
Ibid., p. 466.
See Zerilli, supra note 89.
Bowen, supra note 38, p. 5.
Durand, supra note 36, pp. 33 and 39.
See generally Olivia Bui-Xuan, Le droit public français entre universalisme et différencialisme (Paris: Economica, 2004).
See generally Bourdieu, supra note 95.
Calhoun, supra note 88, p. 252.
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In upholding France’s ban on public face coverings, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that the manifestation of religious beliefs could legitimately be restricted in the interests of ‘vivre ensemble’—literally, ‘living together’—or what I label ‘fraternalism’. I will argue that fraternalism, in the French setting, is closely linked to the idea of a duty of civility in political theory: it is understood as a duty to practice a certain kind of fraternal sociability. This paper relates the Court’s judgment to France’s justificatory, ‘republican’ discourse. It argues that civility must be understood as a habitus—a set of learned orientations and bodily techniques—rather than as a set of discursive or speech constraints. In turn, this demonstrates the danger in the idea of civility (or fraternalism) as limiting religious liberties: far from simply fostering republican virtues, it will reinforce cultural and social power dynamics.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 387 | 79 | 5 |
Full Text Views | 251 | 5 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 98 | 13 | 0 |