Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, 42, 83, 115; Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, 22, 204, 276. Two exceptions to this rule might be found in the way Derrida links Exodus 22:31 (“. . . neither shall ye eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field . . .”) to Bobby, a dog that Levinas met while imprisoned in a Nazi work camp and whom he famously called “the last Kantian in Nazi-Germany” (Emmanuel Levinas, “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” in Difficult Freedom, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 151–153; Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, 115) and the way in which he explains the pedagogical value of Rousseau’s Social Contract by referring to his decision to include in Émile a long quote from Plutarch’s argument for vegetarianism in de esu carnium (Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, 22). But while these exceptions imply a potential political analysis of flesh, the fact that Derrida does not fulfil this potential and leaves them in a general and undeveloped form makes the rule that they prove all the more strong.

Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, 42, 83, 115; Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, 22, 204, 276. Two exceptions to this rule might be found in the way Derrida links Exodus 22:31 (“. . . neither shall ye eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field . . .”) to Bobby, a dog that Levinas met while imprisoned in a Nazi work camp and whom he famously called “the last Kantian in Nazi-Germany” (Emmanuel Levinas, “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” in Difficult Freedom, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 151–153; Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, 115) and the way in which he explains the pedagogical value of Rousseau’s Social Contract by referring to his decision to include in Émile a long quote from Plutarch’s argument for vegetarianism in de esu carnium (Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, 22). But while these exceptions imply a potential political analysis of flesh, the fact that Derrida does not fulfil this potential and leaves them in a general and undeveloped form makes the rule that they prove all the more strong.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 34.

Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 34.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 174; Antonin Artaud, “The Situation of the Flesh,” Collected Works: Volume One, trans. Victor Corti (London: Calder and Boyars, 1971), 165.

Ibid., 179.

Ibid., 187.

Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 188.

Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 188.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, p. 14. [German in the original].

Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, p. 14. [German in the original].)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 113–116.

Leonard Lawlor, This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); David Farrell Krell, Derrida and Our Animal Others: Derrida’s Final Seminar “The Beast and the Sovereign” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Wood, “Comment ne pas manger”; Matthew Calarco, “Deconstruction is not vegetarianism: Humanism, subjectivity, and animal ethics,” Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2004): 175–201. In a recent short text by Kelly Oliver the debate between Wood and Calarco receives the attention it deserves and has thus far not received, but this new discussion focuses on the affective and phenomenological aspects of the act of eating flesh/meat rather than on the conceptual and theoretical significance of flesh as such for Derrida. See: Kelly Oliver, “Derrida and Eating”, Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, edited by Paul B. Thompson and David M. Kaplan (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 459–465.

Leonard Lawlor, This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); David Farrell Krell, Derrida and Our Animal Others: Derrida’s Final Seminar “The Beast and the Sovereign” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Wood, “Comment ne pas manger”; Matthew Calarco, “Deconstruction is not vegetarianism: Humanism, subjectivity, and animal ethics,” Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2004): 175–201. In a recent short text by Kelly Oliver the debate between Wood and Calarco receives the attention it deserves and has thus far not received, but this new discussion focuses on the affective and phenomenological aspects of the act of eating flesh/meat rather than on the conceptual and theoretical significance of flesh as such for Derrida. See: Kelly Oliver, “Derrida and Eating”, Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, edited by Paul B. Thompson and David M. Kaplan (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 459–465.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Derrida, Of Spirit, pp. 73–74. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand,” trans. John P. Leavey, Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 165.

Derrida, Of Spirit, pp. 73–74. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand,” trans. John P. Leavey, Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 165.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 105.

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 105.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 117.

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 114.

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 114.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 116.

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 114.

Derrida and Nancy, Eating Well, 114.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 112.

Ibid., 114–115.

Ibid., 140.

Calarco, “Deconstruction is not Vegetarianism,” 193.

Calarco, “Deconstruction is not Vegetarianism,” 193.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 195.

Ibid., 197.

Derrida, Force of Law, 953.

Derrida, Force of Law, 953.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 951, 953.

Ibid., 953.

Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Violence Against Animals”, in For What Tomorrow. . .: A Dialogue, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 62–76.

Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Violence Against Animals”, in For What Tomorrow. . .: A Dialogue, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 62–76.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1955), 114–117.

William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1955), 114–117.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Ibid., 183–184.

Ibid., 183–186, 189. By talking about “a pound of flesh before the law” (p. 194), Derrida also makes it clear that this discussion should also be read as a reiteration of his more general argument regarding the basic “aporia of the law,” that is the impossible possibility of the legal touch between the singular subject of a specific legal situation and the universal nature of the law as such. See: Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law”, trans. Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, in Acts of Literature, edited by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 187.

Derrida, Force of Law, 945.

Derrida, Force of Law, 945.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Derrida, “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” 188.

Derrida, “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” 188.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation