Analoga and Phantasmata: On the Intuitiveness of Imagination in Husserl and Sartre
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Abstract
In this essay, I study the departure performed in The Imaginary (Sartre, 1940) from the Husserlian position spanning from the Logical Investigations and the 1904/1905 lectures on the imagination. In Sartre’s conception, the imagination in its two forms (“physical image,” “mental image”) is never intuitive. Moreover, in an act of imagination we can never find immanent sensible contents. In Husserl, the imagination in its two forms (“imaging consciousness,” “phantasia”), is a sensible intuition, like perception. Furthermore, every act of imagination apprehends immanent sensible contents (phantasmata).
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Analoga and Phantasmata: On the Intuitiveness of Imagination in Husserl and Sartre
In: Research in PhenomenologySearch for other papers by Alain Flajoliet in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
In this essay, I study the departure performed in The Imaginary (Sartre, 1940) from the Husserlian position spanning from the Logical Investigations and the 1904/1905 lectures on the imagination. In Sartre’s conception, the imagination in its two forms (“physical image,” “mental image”) is never intuitive. Moreover, in an act of imagination we can never find immanent sensible contents. In Husserl, the imagination in its two forms (“imaging consciousness,” “phantasia”), is a sensible intuition, like perception. Furthermore, every act of imagination apprehends immanent sensible contents (phantasmata).
