Coordination, Subordination and Control in Russian Territorial Governance

in Russian Politics
No Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

The article analyzes the current model of intergovernmental relations in Russia and explains how it was formed in the 2000s, as well as demonstrating its effects in one sphere of public administration, namely education. Based on theoretical perspectives on the expected and unexpected effects of decentralization, authoritarian politicians’ motives and central governments’ strategies aimed at overcoming the principal-agency problem, the author hypothesizes that decentralization realized under the conditions of an authoritarian government in geographically, ethnically and economically complex societies produces a kind of trap. Concentration on administrative decentralization intensifies the principal-agent problem while the authoritarian rulers’ interests limit the potential for employing effective means to overcome it.

Coordination, Subordination and Control in Russian Territorial Governance

in Russian Politics

Sections

Figures

  • View in gallery

    Ratio of federal and subnational budget revenues in the Russian Federation, 1992–2011

  • View in gallery

    Number of officials at the national and subnational governments, 2000–2013

  • View in gallery

    Dynamics of allocation of expenditures in the field of education, 2000–2015

  • View in gallery

    Dynamics of change in expenditures for education in three Russia’s republics in 2001 and 2015

Information

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 81 81 26
Full Text Views 105 105 46
PDF Downloads 9 9 1
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0