Improving the Kremlin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution Practices after the 2011–2012 Winter of Discontent and the Euromaidan
In: Russian PoliticsSearch for other papers by Stephen G F Hall in
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This paper argues that between 2012 and 2019, the Kremlin recalibrated preventive counter-revolutionary practices due to fears that an event like the Arab Spring or Euromaidan could occur in Moscow or that the 2011–2012 winter of discontent could return. While the Kremlin returned to practices of the preventive counter-revolution used after 2004, the tactics increased creating a “politics of fear.” The preventive counter-revolution post-2012 implemented new tactics, incorporating an external element of countering the involvement of Western states in destabilizing authoritarian regimes, specifically in the post-Soviet space, thereby attempting to weaken Western states. The tactics of the preventive counter-revolution after 2012 have the potential to coup-proof the Kremlin and serve as a model for other authoritarian regimes to devise methods to counter Western states and democratization, thereby allowing the Kremlin to become a model and black knight for other authoritarian regimes.
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| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 534 | 136 | 24 |
| Full Text Views | 75 | 14 | 5 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 107 | 28 | 1 |
Improving the Kremlin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution Practices after the 2011–2012 Winter of Discontent and the Euromaidan
In: Russian PoliticsSearch for other papers by Stephen G F Hall in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
This paper argues that between 2012 and 2019, the Kremlin recalibrated preventive counter-revolutionary practices due to fears that an event like the Arab Spring or Euromaidan could occur in Moscow or that the 2011–2012 winter of discontent could return. While the Kremlin returned to practices of the preventive counter-revolution used after 2004, the tactics increased creating a “politics of fear.” The preventive counter-revolution post-2012 implemented new tactics, incorporating an external element of countering the involvement of Western states in destabilizing authoritarian regimes, specifically in the post-Soviet space, thereby attempting to weaken Western states. The tactics of the preventive counter-revolution after 2012 have the potential to coup-proof the Kremlin and serve as a model for other authoritarian regimes to devise methods to counter Western states and democratization, thereby allowing the Kremlin to become a model and black knight for other authoritarian regimes.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 534 | 136 | 24 |
| Full Text Views | 75 | 14 | 5 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 107 | 28 | 1 |