While Russia may have been less perturbed by certain other NATO expansions, and accordingly may have expressed less concern about them, it has continuously and emphatically communicated that NATO expansion to the Baltics, Ukraine, and/or Georgia would gravely impinge upon Russia’s interests, and thus that Moscow was/is strongly opposed to such expansion. These communications began in the early 1990s, but the US dismissed and rejected this opposition – in some cases, quite consciously and deliberately. Drawing on official US and Russian sources, this article demonstrates that Russia’s public stance on NATO’s Baltic/Ukrainian/Georgian expansion was/is clear – it simply was not accommodated.
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All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
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Abstract Views | 467 | 467 | 36 |
Full Text Views | 59 | 59 | 5 |
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While Russia may have been less perturbed by certain other NATO expansions, and accordingly may have expressed less concern about them, it has continuously and emphatically communicated that NATO expansion to the Baltics, Ukraine, and/or Georgia would gravely impinge upon Russia’s interests, and thus that Moscow was/is strongly opposed to such expansion. These communications began in the early 1990s, but the US dismissed and rejected this opposition – in some cases, quite consciously and deliberately. Drawing on official US and Russian sources, this article demonstrates that Russia’s public stance on NATO’s Baltic/Ukrainian/Georgian expansion was/is clear – it simply was not accommodated.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 467 | 467 | 36 |
Full Text Views | 59 | 59 | 5 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 213 | 213 | 13 |