Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism
In: International Journal for the Study of SkepticismSearch for other papers by Anthony Brueckner in
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In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel’s article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel’s, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I discuss the question whether Barel’s “Rationalistic” anti-skeptical argument is successful.
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Barel F. (2012). “ Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2: 21–43.
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Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism
In: International Journal for the Study of SkepticismSearch for other papers by Anthony Brueckner in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel’s article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel’s, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I discuss the question whether Barel’s “Rationalistic” anti-skeptical argument is successful.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 369 | 76 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 155 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 43 | 8 | 0 |
