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 Compare Perin (2010), but also see Williams (1988).

 David Sosa (2009) is an exception.

 Compare Searle (1969), 67. Regarding assert, state, affirm and the like, Searle says, “Unlike argue these do not seem to be essentially tied to attempting to convince. Thus ‘I am simply stating that p and not attempting to convince you’ is acceptable, but ‘I am arguing that p and not attempting to convince you’ sounds inconsistent.” Searle’s first point here (about stating) is right in line with the points I make in the main text. But the second point (about arguing) doesn’t seem right. Just as I might regard it as my duty to inform you of something but be unconcerned with whether you’re persuaded, likewise I might regard it as my duty to present you with an argument, but disavow any intention of actually persuading you by presenting it to you.