Save

A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: James R. Beebe1
View More View Less
  • 1 University at Buffalo
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution

Purchase

Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

€29.95$34.95

In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the present article, I defend a priori skepticism against Vahid’s criticisms.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 219 73 4
Full Text Views 198 6 0
PDF Views & Downloads 30 11 0