A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the present article, I defend a priori skepticism against Vahid’s criticisms.

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References

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 See Beebe (2010) for detailed discussion of the set of constraints skeptical hypotheses must satisfy.

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