Skepticism and Elegance

An Explanationist Rejoinder

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world (the Real World Hypothesis, rwh) is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s strategy for showing that the rwh is a better explanation than its skeptical rivals fails. Second, he argues that if Vogel’s strategy does succeed, then it accomplishes too much—it removes skeptical doubts when it should not. I argue that Gifford is mistaken on both accounts.

Skepticism and Elegance

An Explanationist Rejoinder

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

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References

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