The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Sections

References

Index Card

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 12 12 1
Full Text Views 14 14 0
PDF Downloads 1 1 0
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0