Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ed—which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.

Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

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References

Nozick R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

Pritchard D. (2007). “Anti-Luck EpistemologySynthese 158: 277298.

Pritchard D. (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pritchard D. (2015). “Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My CriticsAnalysis 75: 627637.

Zalabardo J. (2015). “Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential ProblemAnalysis 75: 615627.

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