What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.

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